THE TERRORIST GROUP AS A FIRM: A BUSINESS MODEL STUDY OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR ORGANISATIONAL STYLE

Eisa Younes Alblooshi

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Instructors:

Dr. José María Mella Márquez

Dr. Fernando Esteve Mora

Abstract

Terrorism devastating and lasting impacts on society, remains a global threat to peace and security that has yet to be effectively countered. This research adopts a novel approach to terrorism research by investigating terror groups at the organizational level through the lens of multi-product firms. The goal of this study is to develop a business model of a violent non-governmental organization. A realist pragmatic research is employed utilizing Delphi Method with mixed-methods and data to generate consensus from a panel of experts in the field. Triangulation of different data sources validated the significance of key dimensions that form a model of intra-organisational fissure that support the development of anti-terror strategies. The findings reveal four sources of organisational tension: ideological, strategic, economic security that underpin and influence a three-way schism within a terror group that occur when the unique interests of the three main individuals come into conflict. These tensions develop through the interplay of internal individual and group level dynamics. The findings identify multiple triggers and contexts that provide a range of strategies and tactics that maximise the dissent, conflict, fragmentation and collapse of terror groups. The study offers a novel intra-organizational approach to terrorism research in identifying sources of organizational tension at individual and group level dynamics that can support the development of counter-terrorism measures that undermine the core functions and capabilities of terror organisations.

Resumen

El terrorismo tiene un impacto devastador y duradero en la sociedad, y sigue siendo una amenaza global para la paz y la seguridad que aún no ha sido contrarrestada de forma eficaz. Esta investigación adopta un enfoque novedoso en el estudio del terrorismo, explorando los grupos terroristas desde el nivel organizativo a través del ounto de vista de las empresas multiproducto. El objetivo es, por tanto, desarrollar un modelo empresarial de una organización violenta y no gubernamental. Para ello, este estudio utiliza un enfoque pragmático a través del método Delphi, con metodología y datos mixtos que generan consenso a partir de un panel de expertos en la materia. La triangulación de los datos de las diferentes fuentes utilizadas para este trabajo validó la importancia de las dimensiones clave que informan un modelo de fisuras intraorganizativas que apoyan el desarrollo de estrategias antiterroristas.

Los resultados revelan tres fuentes de tensión organizativa: ideológica, estratégica y de seguridad económica, que se sustentan e influyen en un cisma tripartito dentro de un grupo terrorista, el cual que se produce cuando los intereses únicos de los tres individuos principales entran en conflicto. Estas tensiones se desarrollan a través de la interacción de dinámicas internas a nivel individual y de grupo. Los resultados demuestran cómo múltiples desencadenantes y contextos informan una serie de estrategias y tácticas que maximizan la disensión, el conflicto, la fragmentación y el colapso de los grupos terroristas.

Por otra parte, el estudio ofrece un novedoso enfoque intraorganizativo a la investigación del terrorismo al identificar las fuentes de tensión organizativa en las dinámicas a nivel individual y de grupo que pueden servir de apoyo al desarrollo de medidas antiterroristas que socavan las funciones y capacidades básicas de las organizaciones terroristas.

Conclusiones

Este estudio ofrece un enfoque intra-organizativo innovador en la investigación del terrorismo, a través de la identificación de fuentes de tensión organizativa en las dinámicas a nivel individual y grupal que pueden apoyar el desarrollo de medidas antiterroristas que socavan las funciones y capacidades centrales de las organizaciones terroristas. La triangulación de los datos de las fuentes utilizadas para este estudio validó la importancia de las dimensiones clave que componen un modelo de fisuras intraorganizacionales que apoyan el desarrollo de estrategias antiterroristas. Este modelo presenta, por tanto, tres contribuciones teóricas principales al campo del terrorismo. En primer lugar, el estudio muestra las fuentes de tensión organizativa que pueden perturbar y socavar el funcionamiento y las capacidades operativas de las organizaciones terroristas. Además, trata en profundidad la interacción entre los actores que siembran la deserción desde dentro del grupo y en los distintos niveles de la organización. En segundo lugar, las conclusiones subrayan las implicaciones de los costes para las actividades terroristas y su impacto en la eficacia de las operaciones. Una tercera contribución de este estudio es la identificación de vías para socavar las fuentes de financiación del terrorismo, tanto directa como indirectamente. Un esfuerzo en interrumpir o socavar determinadas fuentes de tensión puede repercutir directamente en las capacidades del grupo terrorista para cumplir con sus necesidades de oferta y demanda. El estudio también ofrece un marco para contextualizar las medidas de contraterrorismo en relación con la interacción entre los actores y la dinámica de los conflictos y los procesos operativos. La dinámica de los conflictos se basa en las interacciones intergrupales e individuales dentro de los grupos de actores en los diferentes niveles de la organización. Esta dinámica puede verse influida por los factores externos que, a su vez, repercuten en las estrategias que implementa la organización para cumplir con sus necesidades de oferta y demanda. Por ello, es importante concebir esta dinámica desde una perspectiva organizativa para comprender las diferentes formas en que se puede atacar y desbaratar una organización terrorista. Las conclusiones ofrecen contribuciones prácticas para el desarrollo de políticas enmarcadas en estrategias de contraterrorismo, así como para profesionales de este ámbito. En primer lugar, se hace hincapié en la necesidad de contar con organizaciones multidimensionales para el desarrollo de una lucha antiterrorista integrada que se pueda focalizar en socavar a los distintos actores de las organizaciones, así como a las fuentes de tensión identificadas. Este modelo puede también ser utilizado como un marco para la adopción de estrategias para alimentar posibles focos de vulnerabilidad y así sembrar la disidencia y la deserción dentro de la organización. Partiendo de este modelo, las estrategias

pueden centrarse en explotar las fuentes de tensión de (y entre) los actores y los diferentes niveles de la organización, a través de la elaboración de perfiles y un mapeo eficaz de los actores de la organización para comprender mejor sus actitudes, características y comportamientos. Esto tiene, a su vez, implicaciones por el coste de contar con los recursos financieros y humanos suficientes para llevar a cabo la labor de recabar información estratégica sobre las características individuales, grupales y organizativas de la organización terrorista en concreto. Esta medida es fundamental para desarrollar estrategias eficaces para contextos específicos, ya que estas estrategias requieren de la recopilación de información a través de diferentes mecanismos para comprender a los actores y los elementos operativos de la organización.

Acknowledgements

Understanding the complexity of Terrorism and how Terrorist Organizations operate has always been a topic of interest for me since November 9, 2005. I passed by the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, Jordan, with my father just two hours before the bombings carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the seed of what is currently known as ISIS. Terrorism is the instrument of coercion and intimidation that fueled conflict and insecurity causing pain and suffering for many. My work in the Ministry of Interior (UAE) and the security sector motivated my interest in this field of research and my hope to make a useful contribution academia and praxis.

I am extremely grateful to many that have helped and supported me through every stage of my research journey. I am deeply thankful to my supervisors, Dr. José María Mella and Dr. Fernando Esteve Mora. Professor José María Mella is more than just a tutor, he is my role model on both academic and personal levels. His belief in the project success and his positive support during the most arduous stages of the research were, and will always remain, a subject of my gratitude. I am also very grateful to the research director, Dr. Fernando, whose guidance and comments were a qualitative addition to the content of the research and one of the most important reasons for its completion. He managed to get the best out of me. He spared no effort or time in explaining and solving the problems encountered during my study journey. I was very fortunate to have these two supervisors, without whom I could not have completed the work, and it is an honour to have them as my supervisors.

I also thank the Department of Economics and Business Administration of Universidad Autónoma de Madrid for granting me this opportunity. I am honoured to be the first student from the United Arab Emirates to enrol in a PhD program there. I offer my deepest gratitude to my professors and colleagues, especially Shamsa, for the joyful days spent at the university, and wish you success in your research thesis.

In addition, I also want to thank my employer the Ministry of Interior in the Emirates, as well as the Emiri Court in Fujairah for their support and granting me a study sabbatical, which helped me focus my effort and time on academic studies. I thank the staff of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Madrid. My special thanks go to Fawzy, who was with me from the moment I registered at the university until my graduation, and Khaled Al-Nuaimi, the former Consul, from whom I received excellent care and attention. I also cannot forget the research centres, studies, and researchers in Think tanks, whether in Spain or abroad. In

particular, I thank Dr. Maqsoud Kruze, former director of the Hedayah International Centre of Counter Violent Extremism, David from CISEG in Barcelona, Javier from OIET in Madrid and Guillem from Pablo Olavide University.

I thank my friends Eidha and Ahmed and my friends in Spain, who were another family to me. Thank you Gema, thank you Yago, thank you Wael, thank you Suliman, Wahiba, Bahae, Juan Luis, Shorash and Abdullah. I am grateful to you for our rich conversations, sharing my interests, and your unconditional encouragement and support. I really am lucky to have you in my life. And finally, my family. Thank you very much. Mother, thank you for your prayers and your words that strengthened my heart. Father, thank you for your few words that convey so many emotions. Brother and sisters, thank you for you are the cornerstone of my life and my permanent reference. I am thankful for all this love and care. Without you, I would not have completed this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: TERRORISM, VIOLENCE AND ORGANISED VIOLENCE GROUPS

1.1 Introduction

Terrorism is a threat to international peace and security (, 2021). Not only is terrorism becoming more transnational in nature, but the emergence of new terrorism forms and strategies continue to challenge both government and non-government custodians of today's societies (Bolanos et al., 2012). As a global phenomenon, the profound consequences on people, institutions, and governments have led to different interpretations to suit those who aim to define it. There is a lack of consensus on the definition of the term among scholars, academics, and policymakers, with keen reference to the legitimate use of violence to achieve a socio-political or economic motive (Hodgson & Tadros, 2013; Marshall, 2002).

Even though the subject of terrorism cannot be debated without reference to these numerous and often diverse definitions, it is important to mention that the present study does not intend to add or justify the motives of any particular interest group in a definition of terrorism. Observing and economically conceptualising violence as an economic activity reveals key symbolisation in today's contemporary world that mirror prevailing terrorism principles as old humanity has existed (Obakhedo & Igbinovia, 2020; Agrawal, 2020). Violence from this perspective reveals the macro and microeconomic conditions that define the frequency and quality of terrorism (Agrawal, 2020) and gives the government and non-governmental custodians of today's society a clear insight on how to constrain this phenomenon.

Beyond this observation, it is equally critical to mention that the economics of terrorism is far from a holistic representation of all terrorism types, strategies, or approaches (Meserole & Byman, 2020). Upon a critical discussion of these perspectives, the study draws attention to selected, organised violent groups within the Middle East and North African region.

1.2 Concept of terrorism

1.2.1 Concept and Definitions of terrorism

Terrorism is a universal problem, but so for no universal legal definition of terrorism has been agreed upon. Debates in the United Nations (UN) continue to ensue on what group should be tagged a terrorist group, freedom fighters, or insurgent groups (Meserole & Byman, 2020). Moreover, the practice of terrorism has evolved over time, even though some underlying principles remain the same (Bolanos et al., 2012). Some acts of terrorism, such as plane

hijacking, assassinations and bombings, have persisted. Other forms, such as mass shootings and cyber terrorism, have gained roots in modern times (Scrivens & Gaudette, 2021). Generally, the 21st-century *modus operandi* of terrorist groups involves indirect manipulation of the political scene. The political goals of terrorists are achieved using psychological warfare as their weapon, mainly through mass media. Through the spread of fear and intimidation to the public through mass media tools (Shapiro, 2013), rational terrorists, in principle, reach their goals quicker if it is able to augment the consequences of its campaign (Sandler & Enders, 2008).

The challenge of arriving at a common definition for terrorism is also embedded in the nature of institutions that act as terrorist organisations. Usually small in size, these organisations are often transnational and allows for the hierarchy of previously politically motivated groups to be replaced with personal relationships[1] (Neumann, 2008). The flat structures also permit seamless communication networks, strong shared social identity, and reduced intragroup conflicts (Reedy et al., 2013). Notwithstanding, the transnational nature of modern terrorism makes them even more elusive and resilient, taking advantage of modern communication technologies and inexpensive international travel. Moreover, countries differ in terms of political security, and terrorists tend to take advantage of these differences (Rosendorff et al., 2004).

The September 11 (9/11), 2001, World Trade Center disaster in New York City is a landmark in global terrorism studies. Aside from some 3,000 lost lives, it deeply impacted US foreign policy and the world. While 9/11 was not the first transnational terrorist attack on American soil[2], it was the first of its kind in terms of the fear and damage it caused, revealing a critical insight into the threat and sophistication of modern terrorism (Marshall, 2002). This event raises questions on the increasingly difficult nature of separating terrorism from general violence or insurgency (Marshall, 2002; Agrawal, 2020). Stepanova (2008) resorted to describing the characteristics of terrorism to distinguish it from coercion as a strategy or

[1] After reviewing 254 groups from the Global Terrorism Database into one of four basic structures: market, all-channel, hub-spoke, or bureaucracy (Kilberg, 2012).

[2] February 26, 1993: Bomb explosion on the second subterranean level of Vista Hotel's public parking garage, below the 2 World Trade Center building in New York killing six and injuring more than 1,000.
April 19, 1995: A bomb rips through the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring almost 700. July 27, 1996: A bomb explodes in Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta during the middle of a concert during the Summer Olympics. One person is killed, another dies from a heart attack and more than 100 others are injured. Article. US Terrorist Attacks Fast Facts. Extracted from: https://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/18/us/u-s-terrorist-attacks-fast-facts/index.html

violence as a tactic. Tavares' (2004) characterization of terrorism acts consist of three main features:

a. the search for Terrorists seek to achieve political objectives.

b. targeting of 'innocent' uninvolved civilians directly through their attacks.

c. the state serves as their main target.

Other attempts to define terrorism have considered the economic consequence of such acts. Sandler & Enders (2008) work is a significant milestone in this regard. Notably, terrorism has dire effects on infrastructure and leads to increased security costs. Also, it results in fear, casualties, and reduced productivity of countries. Other impacts on national and international trade, foreign trade investments and economic growth cannot be ignored.

Despite the lack of consensus, a number of direct attempts have been made to define terrorism. Meisels (2006) published over 200 of these definitions and concluded that:

> *"Terrorism, it is suggested, is nothing but the intentional random murder of defenceless non-combatants, with the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amidst a civilian population as a strategy designed to advance political ends."*

Boylan (2014) had attempted to define terrorism by drawing attention to the different aspects or underlying motivations. Boylan (2014) posit that terrorism may consist of different aspects, and a single definition of one aspect may not cover all the remaining aspects of the concept. Whilst the multi-dimensional position raises more questions than answers, Hoffman (2017) support Tavares (2004) observation that terrorists differ from other violent groups due to their political interest.

It must be added that not all definitions are rooted in political motivation (Sandler & Enders, 2008). The non-political stream of definitions mainly highlights the subjects of anxiety and fear as central to defining terrorism. They also emphasise using hostile acts to intimidate individuals or groups or force the government to act in a specific manner. The US Department of State also adopts the non-political position, which according to Ruby (2002, p.2), the department is defined as:

> *"Politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience."*

Whittaker (2003, p.9) defines terrorism as:

> *"Terrorism is designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target [and is] conducted by an organisation with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia).*

In particular, Whittaker's (2003) definition draws in the element of psychological warfare combined with physical attacks, yet with the political motive in place. Sandler & Enders (2008, p.146) proposes a similar definition which considers terrorism as:

> *"The premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to get a political, religious, or ideological objective through the intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policymaking that the terrorists seek to influence."*

Contrary to the earlier definitions, the religious and ideological objectives are as well-drawn into perspective by Sandler & Enders (2008). According to Abbasi & Khatwani (2014), terrorism is a mix of psychological and tactical elements, which occur when conflicts explode between two unequal groups. In such conflict, the weaker group resorts to threat and violence as a weapon, together with the influence of the media, to achieve their objectives. Abbasi & Khatwani (2014) definition makes strong attribution to the concept of asymmetric warfare or conflict, which is discussed in the late part of the present report as one of the key approaches to violence by terrorist groups. However, it is important to first highlight and synthesise the commonality across definitions of terrorism existing within the available literature.

1.2.2 Commonality of Definitions and the adoption of Bruce Hoffman definition of terrorism

With no further need to draw into additional definitions, one common aspect of these definitions is the politically motivated *modus operandi* (Vittori, 2008). Whether or not this is the primary intent of the organisation, attacks are often not restricted to any aspect of the society but with focus on achieving maximum loss, destabilise the rules and systems of the country and undermine the spirits and safety of the citizens of the targetted country (Borgeson & Valery, 2009). The use of violence and threats in a premeditated manner also resonates throughout the presented definitions. It is also not unusual that terrorist groups involve innocent civilians.

There is also the need to emphasise that the act of terrorism involves violence. Whether planned or unplanned, violence and caused damages are often calculated. Besides the political motive, terrorism tactics may not be completely exempted from the region's social, religious, and economic situations. According to Lutz & Lutz (2014), economic, social, and often times religious destabilisation are integral aspects of global terrorism. The economy, social landscape, and politics are particularly inseparable in acts of terrorism. Even though one or more of this area may be the key source of influence, the other macro-environments may suffer in nearly equal measure (Mahan & Griset, 2012).

Common to definitions of the term, terrorism is the target of innocent and uninvolved civilians. Unlike wars and other military conflicts, terrorism does not often involve a direct confrontation of the government forces but the use of guerrilla tactics and the attack of innocent civilians (Stepanova, 2008; Tavares, 2004). Civilians may not always serve as the victims but may play an important role by adding to the capabilities of the terrorist group (Balcells, 2011; Somer et al., 2005; Primoratz, 1990). This level of direct involvement of civilians in terrorism is typical of the direct approaches to violence to be discussed in the later sections of this chapter. Finally, the use of fear through the media is one other area that has gained popularity in defining the concept of terrorism (Shapiro, 2013; Sandler & Enders, 2008).

Ultimately, from the ongoing discussion on commonalities, attention is drawn to the various strategies through which terrorists perpetrate violence. Attention to this area brings the discussion closer to an understanding of terrorism and the means or tactics used to pursue their interests in a defined geopolitical space. The present study considers Bruce Hoffman definition of terrorism as:

> *"ineluctably political in aims and motives, violent—or, equally important, threatens violence, designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted by an organisation with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia), and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity."* (Information Resources Management Association (IRMA), 2016, p. 416).

Even though a common definition of the term is not in existence, and the study makes no attempt to argue that this definition is superior to the hundred others presented in the existing literature; Hoffman (2017) definition provides a comprehensive view of the term and key or underlying elements of terrorism considered fundamental to the present study. The definition

also highlights some of the key commonalities, including using violence, causing damages, including the loss of lives, with psychological repercussions beyond the immediate outcomes of the acts being committed. The definition also portrays the terrorist group organisation with a defined structure and chain of command whilst acknowledging the external or regional role of the group within the broader economic and social landscape. Ultimately, Hoffman's (2017) definition provides a holistic view of the evolution of terrorism and the terrorist mindset necessary for supporting the economic and organisational frameworks of violent non-governmental organisations.

1.3 A typology of violent approaches (Asymmetric Conflict)

Building on the Hoffman (2017) adopted definition of terrorism; it is equally important to pay closer attention to the typology of violent approaches to properly understand violent non-governmental organisations. According to Arreguín-Toft (2001), the term asymmetric conflict appears not only in the literature on terrorism but in similar acts of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. The term has come to represent what is popularly referred to as the strategy of the weak. The weak in this regard may not be considered as an absolute measure of strength between the two parties engaged in the conflict but rather a specific conflict dyad. However, power and resources at the disposal of two parties to a conflict may have a wide or extreme gap that may create an irrational narrative when considered from the perspective of traditional warfare.

According to Arreguín-Toft (2012), efforts to explain how the weak win against the strong have ensued under two separate banners; military personnel understanding of this subject rarely build on academic work surrounding this area. This has resulted in slow progress in the general asymmetric conflict theory, leading to methodological challenges in advancing the theory. This development has also created multiple streams of ideologies of conflict by violent non-governmental organisations, without a clear view of the path for future research. Despite this disparity, consensus exists in academia and practice that terrorism is characterised more as a tactic or strategy than about emerging victorious from conflict victorious. Considering terrorism as a strategy, Freedman (2007) argues that emphasis has remained far from attaining specific goals but on the effective orchestration of key strategies such as attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, etc., outbidding. Others, including Balcells (2011), have categorised these strategies into direct and indirect approaches, which are of keen interest in the present study.

According to Weiner (2017), asymmetric warfare refers to a war between two opposing forces that differ significantly in terms of military power and capability. In specific, such warfare is characterised by the use of unconventional weapons and tactics such as those associated with guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks (Weiner, 2017). Like the concept of terrorism discussed in the previous section, the term asymmetric warfare has not been concordantly defined (Buffaloe, 2006). Nonetheless, several attempts have been made to define the concept based on the traits discussed earlier: *"A weaker military force fighting and defeating a stronger military force characterises asymmetric warfare"* (Quinn, 2001, p.9).

In a typical scenario, Quinn (2001) observes that, even though the military might of the United States is unmatched, the attack on the World Trade Centre signifies the readiness of small organisational groups to take on nations with the strongest military might. There have been ongoing efforts to enhance understanding and clarify the circumstances that make victory possible for the group with a weaker military force. The use of violence in asymmetric warfare has been separated in the motivations of the actors involved, emphasising the strategies and tactics used (Buffaloe, 2006). Another section of literature on the typology of violent approaches has focused on why conflicts start in the first place, and the different ways violence is conducted (Quinn, 2001).

The subject of asymmetric warfare brings up the notion of terrorism as a tactic and not a goal on its own. A group may know from the onset that outright win of a conflict is next to impossible but would intend to damage the larger party while creating a challenging environment to make regional governance impossible. Merari (1993) describe terrorism as a strategy of insurgency, even though terrorism and insurgency have been discussed as conceptually different (Hoffman, 2017). The political objective of the terrorist organisation may be tied to the ability of the organisation to achieve this objective. As Merari (1993) put it, circumstances drive smaller groups into the use of asymmetric warfare strategies and are not a matter of choice. Within this discourse, it is important to pay attention to the approaches used by the relatively weaker party in asymmetric warfare. Arreguín-Toft (2001) describe these strategies as direct, indirect, and express strategies.

1.3.1 Direct Approach to violence in terrorism

According to Balcells (2011), two main approaches may explain the determinants of violence against civilians by a terrorist group in a conflict situation. Noting that these approaches exclude the violence experienced in battlefield violence where combatants are assassinated,

these approaches explain the type of violence adopted by terrorists, including the distribution of political loyalties at the local level. The underlying criteria for categorising direct and indirect approaches to violence were first highlighted by Crenshaw (1981), where he explained that some approach to terrorism entails an intimate relationship between the terrorists and victims, whilst other approaches to violence do not involve direct interaction.

On this background, Balcells (2011) describes the direct approach to violence represent violence perpetrated with light weapons and in a close or face-to-face interaction between the terrorist and the victim. The direct approach often involves the use of guns and other small arms such as knives, machetes, and other light weaponry. Other forms include assassination, bombing, and kidnapping (Somer et al., 2005; Primoratz, 1990). The use of these weapons may involve an individual victim in a terrorist attack or a group of victims, as in the case of mass executions. This violence would often take place within the local community where the violence takes place. It is also not unusual for armed groups to receive the support or collaboration of local citizens to be able to execute these forms of violence (Balcells, 2011).

The role of local citizens in direct approaches to violence in terrorism has been highlighted by Choi (2010). Civilians are directly engaged in the procedures that define direct violence approaches. These include the localisation of suspects, arrests and transportation of victims to execution sites. Choi (2010) adds that, at times, locals are engaged in the executions of other civilians. In an example of ISIS, one challenge the coalition group faced in fighting this terrorist organisation is the difficulty in separating terrorists from community members (Ali, 2015). Local civilians would denounce their neighbours and play various roles that add to the capacity of the violent non-governmental organisation.

In direct approaches to violence, citizens are not only engaged in perpetrating violence but may also assume a position in the conflict, opposing the violent non-governmental organisation. In some cases, the civilians hide potential victims from the terrorists or help them move out of the community to evade assassination (Adebayo, 2019)—these other acts, among others, constraint the terrorist group's capacity to function. Balcells (2011) asserts that civilian collaboration is particularly critical in the event where the terrorist group have little local knowledge or does not have direct access to information such as the civilians within the government's books.

Direct approaches to terrorism may help see terrorism as a means and not a goal. Through close contact strategies, terrorists are able to exert their ideologies and influence more articulately. A direct approach to violence help sends a clear message to selected audiences by creating fear

among them (Yaghin et al., 2014). In a thesis by Greaver (2016), the case of ISIS was discussed as surpassing its predecessor, Al Qaeda, in the global terrorism market. Greaver (2016) mainly emphasised that ISIS had the ability to create terrorist brand exposure as integral to their brand strategy. The brand created at a global scale could not be possible without the direct approaches to violence, including mass killings. According to Ali (2015), the ISIS beheading videos are the most viewed and shared propaganda media. The video often shows "infidels" being decapitated with a knife. Expert assessment of these videos indicates that they are recorded in high-definition quality, excellent audio and multiple camera perspectives of the killings. James Foley murder in 2012 is one of ISIS strongest propaganda pieces.

Direct approaches to violence have particularly gained popularity as a propaganda weapon. They are seldom committed behind closed doors and nearly always used to send a clear message to specific actors. In the case of ISIS beheadings, the terror created by such acts were so severe that the sister terrorist group, Al Qaeda, thought such acts were too severe a terrorist tactic (Ali, 2015; Warrick, 2015). Even though they quoted various hadiths to support these gruesome acts, the strategies used by ISIS did not abide by Islamic principles in many instances. One of such instances is the gruesome murder of Muslim Jordanian Pilot Moaz-Al-Kasabeh, which attracted criticisms from Muslims and other religions alike (Ali, 2015).

It is important to add that even though interest in the use of violence to create propaganda, direct strategies of terrorism does not always involve violence. For the first time in the history of terrorism, a terrorist group did not only appeal to interest groups through threats but formal branding efforts. Ali (2015) ISIS manifesto for women is one of such attempts to brand the terrorist group at the global level. According to Peresin & Cervone (2015, p.502), the manifesto titled "Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case Study" is the first of its kind. The 41-page manifesto was published in Arabic but later translated into English by the Quilliam Foundation, a British counter-terrorism organisation. The manifesto was carefully drafted within the organisational structures of the terrorist group, mainly the AL-Khansaa Brigade. By spelling out the unique role of women in the Islamic State, their religious duties, education, and marriage, among others. This arm of branding significantly contributed to Jihadi Feminism, which led to over 500 European Muslims migrating from their home to join ISIS (Peresin & Cervone, 2015).

Whether violent or non-violent strategies, the intent is to create a brand and flourish through brand exposure is clear. By perpetrating violence and creating propaganda through these acts,

the capacity to perform deadly attacks is communicated to the local political government and the global audience; in the case of Alshabaab, for instance, the capacity to perform deadly attacks have been clearly communicated through online and local media (Sikorski, 2014). According to Greaver (2016), the capacity to create a resilient brand directly correlates with the ability of the terrorist group to attract financiers, sympathisers, recruits and make themselves relevant on the global political front.

The ability of a terrorist group to brand themselves through local acts of violence and non-violence may be compared to the commercial firm attempt to brand itself and remain relevant in a particular market (Sikorski, 2014). Just like the organisation, terrorists also need to remain relevant by carrying frequent attacks and spreading propaganda on the internet. Like the example of ISIS beheading videos, the terror attacks carried out by Alshabaab were aired globally on micro-blogs and far-reaching media channels. Greaver (2016) argues that to remain relevant, terrorist groups have first to gain the attention of global media.

In one final stream of arguments, it is important to define the role of direct strategies within the broader frame of asymmetric warfare. Based on Weiner (2017) definition of asymmetric warfare discussed earlier, this form of conflict ensues between two opposing forces that differ significantly in terms of military power, capability and resources. Direct violence methods employ unconventional weapons and tactics such as those associated with guerrilla warfare and locally executed small-scale killings to create propaganda in asymmetric warfare (Weiner, 2017). Due to the intimate nature of direct violence approaches and their small scale, it is difficult to find and counter their strategies.

Hickman et al. (2018) argue that unconventional direct strategies are adopted by a force that feels it cannot equal its opponent in the same sorts of attacks. Both Hickman et al. (2018) and Weiner (2017) note that lightly armed partisans are forced to use unconventional means to fight against a conventional army. Three of the most well-known examples of the application of unconventional direct strategies in asymmetric warfare are the Vietnamese, Afghanistan, and Iraqi War (Hickman et al., 2018). The US army fought against weaker Vietnamese, Taliban, and Iraqi forces in these three wars. Yet, despite the superior military weaponry and tactics of the US, it suffered a significant number of US casualties.

In an analysis, Laslie (2015) observed that the Vietnamese unconventional tactics made it difficult for the US army to survive in Vietnam. The aftermath of the Vietnam War led the American Army to rethink its training and tactics (Laslie, 2015). The Vietnam War is evidence

that superior force does not secure victory in the battleground but remains a product of the effective application of tactics at the ground level. Asymmetrical warfare tactics have been in existence for a very long time. For instance, Darius of Persia, who had one of the strongest armies in the 6th century BCE, was defeated by Scythians' smaller army. Despite Darius commanding a huge army, the Scythians proved to be more tactical and faster than his army, which immensely contributed to his defeat (Mccullough, 2017).

1.3.2 Indirect approaches to violence in terrorism

Indirect violence strategies are typically perpetrated with heavy weaponry (Arreguín-Toft, 2001). Contrary to the use of small arms in direct approaches to violence, indirect strategies involve the use of heavy machinery such as tanks, fighter planes, and other long-range weapons of mass destruction (Balcells, 2011). Indirect strategies do not require face-to-face interaction between the terrorist group and the victims and are therefore not capture the intimate relationship between terrorists and their victims. According to Balcells (2011), this strategy mainly relies on technology to create different means through which actors may be harmed through violence. In such an approach, civilians are often left unprepared and incapable of matching the violence of the terrorists. It must be added that indirect violence can be perpetrated in territories where the armed group has no territorial control. In such a situation, the terrorist group resorts to targeted or non-targeted aerial strikes.

In an analysis of the strategic interaction between direct and indirect strategies, Arreguín-Toft (2001) argues that "When strong actors attack using an indirect strategy, and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should lose" Pg. 110. Arreguín-Toft (2001) define strategy as the actor's plan to use armed forces to achieve a military or political objective. What Arreguín-Toft (2001) terms direct (direct attack and direct defence) and indirect strategies (barbarism and guerrilla warfare) is inverse to the ongoing discussion on direct and indirect approaches to violence explained by Balcells (2011). According to Arreguín-Toft (2001) barbarism constitutes an indirect strategy used by strong actors whilst guerrilla warfare represents indirect strategies used by weak actors. These are similar to Balcells (2011) refererence to the direct, intimate relationship between terrorists and their victims. On the contrary, what Arreguín-Toft (2001) direct strategies (attack by strong actors and defence by weak actors) encapsulate Arreguín-Toft (2001) description of an indirect approach to violence where no intimacy between terrorists and actors are experienced. Beyond

Balcells (2011) observation, Arreguín-Toft (2001) takes a step further to describe how weak and strong actors utilise direct and indirect approaches to violence to win political conflicts.

In the Arreguín-Toft (2001) strategic interaction (Figure 1.0), the chance of winning a conflict situation between a weak and strong actor is presented. Suppose a weak actor adopts a direct strategy, that is, an indirect approach to violence using military and other heavy weaponry, against a strong actor's direct strategy. In that case, the strong actor will come out victorious. However, adopting a direct approach to violence (Balcells, 2011), also referred to as guerrilla (indirect) warfare by Arreguín-Toft (2001), the weak actor may emerge victorious in the conflict situation. Likewise, when the strong actor adopts an indirect strategy or direct approach to violence, the weaker actor must employ a direct defence strategy to increase their chance of winning. In essence, facing a strong actor using an inverse strategy increases the chance of success and creates what was originally defined as asymmetric conflict.

Arreguín-Toft (2001) matrix presented in Figure 1 has been evidenced in several instances. In Somalia, the weak Alshabaab militia employed indirect strategies to disrupt well-coordinated African Union Troops who employed direct strategies.



Figure 1 Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcome

Source: Arreguín-Toft (2001, Pg. 109)

This counter-strategy increased resistance. Between 2011 and 2015, Alshabaab carried out numerous attacks within Somalia, targeting African Union troops (Okoli, 2020). One of the most renowned attacks was the 2015 Battle of Leego, in which Alshabaab attacked an African

Union base operated by the Burundian Army (Ingiriis, 2020). According to Ingiriis (2020), more than 19 African Union soldiers lost their lives while tens of them sustained severe injuries. The well-choreographed attack involved a car bomb, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenade attacks at an outpost with around 100 soldiers. It was reported that the insurgents beheaded the survivors and destroyed the critical assets in the base.

In the case of Alshabaab troops, retaliation by the UN forces becomes even more challenging due to the inability to separate the terrorist group members from the other members of the community (Hudson, 1999)[3]. The year after, other attacks were mounted by driving a car bomb inside the camp with Kenyan troops, followed by multiple propelled grenade attacks. The group used rocket-propelled grenades and assault weapons for this purpose. The group overwhelmed the Kenyan forces by 300 against 200, killed close to 190 of them and kidnapped the rest. Records show that this attack is the worst defeat that the Kenyan Army has witnessed since the country's independence in 1963 (Agencies for Citizen Digital, 2016). The use of indirect strategies by the Alshabaab terrorist group was effective with the use of the surprise element. On the other hand, the Kenyan forces lack community knowledge to facilitate a direct approach to violence and cannot pursue indirect strategies on the general community due to the lack of separation between terrorist group members and community members.

In a further elaboration, Arreguín-Toft (2001, p.107) asserts that militias prefer (indirect defence strategies) because it "*sacrifices values for time*". Indirect defence strategies take longer to resolve so long as weak actors continue to have access to the sanctuary and social support. In asymmetric conflicts, delay favours the weak as they have less to lose. Such is the case in Somalia; AU troops were unable to retaliate as the insurgents exist within the vast population. On the opposing end, having direct defence strategies in dedicated terrorist camps would prove expensive and challenging for the terrorist group due to the lack of adequate resources to mount a strong defence against government troops.

Dragging the subject of asymmetrical tactics into the discussion of indirect approaches to violence by terrorists, Arreguín-Toft (2001) observed that modern warfare often experiences the coming together of different strategies. Terrorism is not an ideology but rather a tactic used to achieve a specific objective; the objective in this regard may not necessarily entail inning

[3] Hudson (1994) explain that terrorists are known in their communities; their wives, children, parents and families may have little to nothing to do with the terrorists and their ideologies. They visit the communities – moving in an out with relative ease. Lack of separation from the community makes it difficult to target these groups. Hiding among innocent civilians may also be a deliberate attempt to prevent attack on their group.

the war or coming out victorious, at least not through traditional victory means known to conventional warfare. Mismatching the strategies of the stronger candidate, therefore, constitutes asymmetric warfare, which gives small terrorist groups a chance again powerful nations such as the United States (Polo, 2020; Powell, 2018).

The subject of indirect strategies to asymmetric warfare cannot be completed without offering attention to the intrusive use of terrorism as an indirect strategy by countries to safeguard interests in other countries (Khan & Zhaoying, 2020). State-sponsored terrorism has become a critical aspect of conflict escalation and inter-state rivalry across the globe. Khan (2020) agrees that it marks a crucial step towards a war between nations. Among countries known in this area, Iran Government is known for financing and Hezbollah militia to enable frequent attacks on its sworn enemy, Israel (Seliktar & Rezaei, 2020). The efforts to promote this group is organised and managed in plain sight and not through any hidden network of activities. With such backing, Iran was able to get Hezbollah militia to be an integral aspect of the Lebanon political system and currently wields significant political power in the region.

In another instance, the American government at one point supported Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian uprising; the Brotherhood also had Western support in Kuwait, Iraq and Yemen at some points in time (Kirkpatrick, 2019; Onuoha, 2013). This development occurred even though the terrorist group (Muslim Brotherhood) being designated as a terrorist organisation in some Middle East countries (Kirkpatrick, 2019). This discrepancy serves as one of the key challenges in arriving at a definition for the concept of terrorism. Beyond state-sponsored terrorism, states with interests in the acts or objectives of a terrorist group tend to support this group, to the extent of reducing the criticism of some dehumanising acts by these groups. The classification of a group as terrorist or not is therefore debated not only at the national level but regional and global political levels.

On the background of surprise attacks, the terrorists' acts may be exhibited in one-way indirect attacks. In such a scenario, the smaller and weaker group of people attack the more powerful and well-equipped opponents. Such a one-way indirect approach to violence may also target innocent civilians as part of the tactics of the terrorist group (Polo, 2020). According to Onuoha (2013), the Somalia-based terrorist group attack on innocent civilians in a Kenyan shopping mall is one such case. In another case in Kenya, AlShabaab unleashed a deadly attack in one of the local Universities located in the country's eastern part, which led to the death of over 100 students (Mohamed, 2016). Instead of facing the well-equipped and tactical Kenyan Army

at the time, the terrorist decided to invade weak and innocent students. These serve as good examples of how asymmetrical tactics are being used indirectly by modern terrorists to push forward their agendas.

1.3.3 Expressive Violence

Past studies have classified aggression in many ways. The type of violence perpetrated might differ in terms of nature and course possible interventions. Expressive violence is a form of violence that is not directed at acquiring any material asset or conducted to achieve any specific objective rather than violent outcomes (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). A variety of terms have been used, including "political rage", "revenge", or "hate" (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009, p, 86). Hoffman (2018) terms expressive violence as violence triggered by inappropriate emotional reactions regarding situational factors. Expressive violence tends to be brief and catastrophic in the outcome, with no particular political purpose, motive, or agenda in focus (Hoffman, 2018). In order to understand expressive strategy, attention is directed at the psychological factors that drive terrorists to commit terror out of the line of the political motive.

Rohner & Frey (2007) discuss the subject of express strategy from media attention to events of terrorism. Media in this regard is considered different from the use of media to promote fear among selected audiences. As Rohner & Frey (2007) put it, the public is naturally interested in terrorism news. Therefore, it is not new that terrorists exploit these interests and use them to their advantage in pushing their agendas. Expressing oneself is part of human nature, whether or not one is considered a terrorist. Wright-Neville & Smith (2009) argue that terrorists express emotions such as love, compassion, and courage. They also express anger, humiliation, and frustration, among others (Sprinzak & Denny, 2003). The desire for terrorists to communicate these emotions may not only be inferred from the external political development but has been established in face-to-face interviews with terrorists (Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Silke, 2004; Fair & Shepherd, 2006).

In Rohner & Frey (2007) submission, they argue that the fight against terrorists must not be used as a means to deny them the freedom of expression. The freedom of expression carries with it the right for people to be informed about the threat and occurrence of terror activities around them. The introduction of the emotional side to terrorism changes the discourse and moves slightly away from the overarching political objective (Hoffman, 2018). To this extent, Hoffman (2018) claims that both external and internal stimuli play a crucial role while terrorists

are selecting the mode of attack. The internal feelings are expressed and often overlapping and are rather difficult to separate in expressive media agenda.

In the same way, as traditional media is used to create fear and terror, expressive strategies may also be applied to gain favour from external parties. Hoffman (2018) noted that most people might opt to join terrorist groups to get a chance to connect socially and be part of an expressive agenda. From that perspective, it is evident that people alienated in society may join terrorist groups for social connection. The scenario is common in most Alshabaab terrorists. Most of these terrorists are young individuals whose professional and academic chances have been taken away by the Somali republic's continuous war. As a result, young Somali teenagers see Alshabaab as nearly the only way to make a living. The situation is also common with the alienated teenagers who seek refuge in the dreadful ISIS terror group.

1.3.3.1 Rage, Revenge and Hate in expressive terrorism

Past and present studies have shown that terrorism and psychology are closely related (Hudson, 1999; Webber & Kruglanski, 2018). Aside from the political motive, a terrorist group may be driven by social and oftentimes interests (Lutz & Lutz, 2014). Within the social space, the group may have their own grievances and social objectives. It is not new that such groups pursue their social interests alongside their political motives. However, violence in pursuance of these interests is often not differentiated from other forms of violence perpetrated by the terrorist group. Mixed with other forms of killings, kidnapping, bombing, among others, result in multiple causalities and loss of properties across the globe, terrorist groups attract negative reportage[4] from the media and the general political actors.

Even though interests have not often been expressed in this area, terrorists as humans care deeply about our loved ones even though most of their acts also involve killing (Waller, 2007). According to Waller (2007), terrorist organisations experience in-group compassion and love. These contradictory feelings of love and compassion to one's group and family members but hatred and murder intent towards the government and other innocent actors results in an unstable social context. This is captured in what Piazza (2020) refer to as "in-group love and out-group hate" (p. 432). Such a scenario is likely to result in an "us" against "them" and

[4] Negative reportage not always the intended outcome of expressing social desires and feelings by terrorist acts (Sprinzak & Denny, 2003).

promote extreme and often unending violence. Even when peace prevails, violence may return when an in-group member is attacked and other members seek revenge.

In dealing with terrorists, a vicious cycle of violence is created where retaliation is sometimes misunderstood as tactical but mostly fuelled by rage and revenge (Gallimore, 2004). Unresolved trauma not only on the part of the terrorist but the civilians who lost loves ones and the government that seeks to establish its regime. Attention to this area is critical to resolving tensions and addressing all stakeholder needs to counter-terrorism.

1.3.3.2 Violence as a way to show the weakness of the adversary

Various fighting groups across the globe have unleashed violence on their opponent's doorsteps, not to achieve the main goal or political agenda but as a tactic to demonstrate resilience and strength. Crenshaw (2007) argues that terrorism represents an iterative game, whist Lai (2007) believe that terrorism is simply a tactic used by groups within a civil war. In Lai (2007) observation, terrorism is characterised by activities that best represent "means" and not an objective in itself. By perpetrating violence, the group is able to point out the weakness of the adversary in a demonstration of strength on the part of the terrorist group.

Through well-choreographed strategies, enemy countries, terrorist groups, and narco-terrorists have used violence to express their military might and capacity (Teiner, 2020; Lai, 2007; Crenshaw, 2007). Recalling the case of the September 11 attack on the US by the Al-Qaeda terror group, the group demonstrated their capability to wound their strongest enemy and revealed a key weakness of the enemy. This attack was aired on all global media platforms. The terrorist group name Al-Qaeda rose to prominence worldwide, together with the mastermind behind this attack, Osama bin Laden. Even though the US retaliated and killed more terrorists than the number of civilians who lost their lives in the 9/11 attack, this event remains the single deadliest attack in human history, killing over 2,977, injuring 30,000 others, and causing damages worth 10 billion and over (Morgan, 2009). Although multiple efforts have been put in place to improve intelligence gathering and sharing, the attack clearly shows enemy weakness.

In the case of Somalia, the Alshabaab group has, on several occasions, overrun bases hosting the AU troops. To prove their prowess and might, the terrorist group records documentaries of the actual planning, attack, and aftermath and posts them online. According to Nacos (2016), the use of media help terrorists spread fear, propaganda and show the capacity to participate

and win conflicts. Additionally, small groups of fighters may jeopardise asymmetrical peace deals by spoiling peace processes. Peace spoiling is a new concept in political science, and scholars need to dig deeper into the issue. One notable instance of peace spoiling is Israel and Palestinian peace deal. An Islamic terror group based in Palestine has been carrying out attacks, killing thousands of Israel residents in an effort to ruin the peace agreement between the two neighbouring countries (Kolhammar, 2007).

1.4 Organised Violence groups

Holmes et al. (2007) describe violent non-governmental organisations as groups that implement guerrilla violence in the context of weak state presence, where "a higher level of state repression is associated with higher levels of insurgent violence" (p.249). In order to define a VNGO, the strength of the state relative to the group, and the level of state suppression are two factors. In contemporary society, organised violence groups have continued to evolve. A critical analysis of the surrounding literature leads to the inter-relationships presented in Figure 2.0, based on the degree of complexity.

Studies have closely examined this occurrence to show that even the least lethal group, the "lone wolf," has the likelihood of changing nature based on a situation (Korstanje, 2021). A lone wolf is a single individual who does not belong or have direct connections with a terrorist group or organisation. They act alone without any direct external commitment. The transition from lone wolf to pack of wolves is based on whether environments are favourable for conflicts or not (Shands, 2020). Lone wolves rarely form groups, but they become a pack of wolves, and they become more lethal and have the ability to coordinate small scale attacks.

Higher up the rank after the pack of wolves are terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda. Such groups are identified by their affiliation to threats that apply to the radicalisation of an ideology (Meisels, 2006; Boylan, 2014; Tavares, 2004). Even though debates continue to ensue surrounding the definition of Tavares (2004), particularly different terrorists from other groups based on their political motive, arguably, other organisational forms presented in Figure 2 may share traits of terrorist groups such as political interests. Beyond the terrorist group, insurgency and a mass movement group began to develop. These groups are wide and more complex. They also move away from small scale attacks to ambitions that involve reshaping societies. Lastly, the quasi-state group comprises individuals whose violent attacks are focused on maintaining control over a given region (Krylov, 2020).



Figure 2 Increasing Level of Complexity in Organised Violent Groups

Source: Author

Even though terrorist groups may not go through all these stages of complexity, a few cases of evolved terrorist organisations may be highlighted. The HAMAS grew into a quasi-state that have eventually gained legitimacy after ruling over the Gaza Strip from 2007. Filipec (2020) and Krylov (2020) offer a similar account that ISIS reached such a goal between 2014 and 2015, even though their ability to sustain such a state amid resistance may be debated.

Organised violent groups thrive in hostile environments. The striving of terrorist groups is heavily dependent on the existence of conflict and political instability. These groups are able to evolve and advance through the ranks by breeding conflict. Al Shabaab terrorists have sustained conflict environments by launching attacks against AMISON and other East Africa's military personnel. Sustaining these conflicts in Somalia allows them to grow and take different shapes in times of conflict. The same applies to the case of ISIS mounting attacks against innocent civilians without cause to sustain their relevance and evolve into more complex institutions (Krylov, 2020).

The growing security vacuum in the world has contributed a lot to the different forms of violence used by the various terrorist groups ranging from the least to the most complex groups.

Chermak et al. (2013) explain this by suggesting that the difference in the groups' complexity is replicated in the magnitude of their attacks and the goals and objectives. The disparity in the various terrorist groups is arguably influenced by the element of modern-day terrorism being systematically employed to address some global confrontations using artillery. Current studies on terrorism suggest, however, for a clear understanding of the differences in the complexity of the organised violent organisation to be reached, the primary objective should be to clarify the target areas and the goals and objectives of that particular group (Filipec, 2020).

From another perspective, Goldman & Bar (2020) assert that democracies are less likely than non-democracies to provide material support to "violent non-governmental organisations" (VNGOs), which some people would call terrorist groups. Also, Hou & Quek (2019) elaborated that the citizens of non-democratic systems are more likely to support the state use of lethal force in counter-terrorism efforts. As a result, most modern societies struggle with the challenges of dealing with violent non-governmental groups without escalating violence levels. In an example offered by Miller (2019), most Muslim affiliated terror groups have continued to cause mayhem all over the world, creating revolutionary movements and political unrests. Moreover, governments often resort to violence, and the demands of these groups remain unmet, creating an endless cycle of violence (Miller, 2019).

When analysed against the backdrop of religious-related attacks, special attention should focus on the extent of radical ideologies shared by a specific organised violence group. According to Merari (2007), terrorism ought to be approached differently since its forms of warfare are characteristically different from others since its target of non-combatants breaches the internationally accepted rules of war. Clear comprehension of such defining factors helps to show the factors that shape a particular organisation's operation. The approach should also include basic assumptions that paste a clear picture regarding non-state actors and their role in asymmetrical confrontations and the demilitarisation notion applied to asymmetry confrontations. This analysis shows that lone wolf terrorists are dangerous because they have grown to be common violent groups (Phillips, 2015). Such individuals are characteristically people who adhere to radicalised religious teachings, such as Anders Breivik, who killed over seventy-seven people during a bombing incidence.

1.5 Evaluate the success of the organised violent groups

The objective of the terrorist group must be brought into perspective in evaluating the success of these organised groups. Undoubtedly, very few violent non-government organisations are

able to achieve their main goal of political, social, religious, or economic ambition (Emel'janov, 1999). Terrorist groups that have come close or successfully achieved set political goals includes the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria and Hezbollah in Lebanon (DeVore & Stähli, 2015). Both groups have gained recognition over the years and been offered some degree of political control in their respective states. DeVore & Stähli (2015) argue that the effectiveness of the terrorist group in achieving their aim depends on the extent of support and recognition it is able to amass over time., Away from these discussions, others have considered terrorism a crime and a dangerous act against which the political and legal aspects of terrorist acts must not be given deserving attention (Krajnev, 1997).

However, it must be observed whether a change in socio-economic conditions, change in political actors of the government to a third party, or the mere successful orchestration of attacks may be termed success (Trebin, 2019). Whilst DeVore & Stähli (2015) discusses the success of some of the globally recognised political organisations that have over time been accepted into mainstream global politics, Trebin (2019) argue that the ambition of the terrorist group may be as basic as psychological coercion. However, higher forms of success may be observed or apply depending on the criteria of success discussed. Table 1 highlights the differences between organized terrorists and other violent groups.

Building on Trebin (2019) argument, the success of organised violent groups is usually based on their ability to cause fear or cause attacks on their target locations. Stepanova (2008) critically examines this occurrence to show that violent organised groups' success depends on their ability to grow violent extremism. An interpretation of this situation shows that violent extremism is typified by being complex, intertwined, and multifaceted. Therefore, the operations, such as causing global fear for terrorism, are influenced by the structural environment, particularly one supporting radicalisation and, perhaps, the possibility of violence. On this note, violent extremism is believably a product of political, historical, social, and economic circumstances that continue to worsen the situation, especially the impacts on local and global levels.

Further analysis also shows that the successful organisation of violent groups is gauged to grow horizontal inequalities. This form of advancement is linked with growth in organised violent crimes because the spread of inequalities all over the world acts as one of the significant contributors to violent extremism.

Table 1 Difference Between Organised Terrorists and Other Violent Groups

	Conventional War	Guerrilla	Terrorism
Unit Size in Battle	Large (armies, corps, and divisions)	Medium (Platoons, companies and battalions)	Small (usually less than ten persons)
Weapons	Full range of military hardware (air force, armour, artillery, etc.)	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces	Handguns, hand grenades, assault rifles, and specialised weapons, e.g. Car bombs, hijacking, barometric pressure bombs etc
Tactics	Usually, joint operations involving several military branches	Commando type tactics	Specialised tactics- kidnapping, assassinations, car bombings, hijacking, hostages etc
Targets	Mostly military units, industrial and transportation infrastructure	Mostly military, police, and administrative staff, as well as political opponents	State symbols, political opponents and the public at large
Intended Impact	Physical destruction	Mainly Physical attribution of the enemy	Psychological coercion
Control of territory	Yes	Yes	No
Uniform	Wear uniform	Often wear uniform	Do not wear a uniform
Recognition of war zone	War restricted to recognised geographic zones	War restricted to the country in strife	No recognised war zones. Operations carried out worldwide
International Legality	Yes, if conducted by rules	Yes, if conducted by rules	No
Domestic legality	Yes	No	No

Source: Trebin (2019)

For example, terrorist groups capitalise on social issues, such as poverty or unemployment, to radicalise youths and push them into violence and assimilating extremist perceptions of human rights violation, injustices, and social-political exclusion (Forest, 2007). With that in place, organised violent groups measure their success on the ability to influence the radicalised individuals into condemning corruption and social mistreatment, which act as the basis for the formation of lone-wolf terrorists. These push factors are quite significant since they are deciphered to show that success in these groups is not always about attacks or causing fear. Rather, it entails ensuring specific extremist ideologies are pushed to the people. This explains why HAMAS does not focus on success but maintains control.

Additionally, terrorists perceive security as the ability to gain attention, attract recruits, cause alarm and stay focused on their stipulated goals. In such contexts, states' failure to provide their people with basic needs, such as food and security, creates ample room for terrorist groups to influence a society's thinking and approach. That is, when most basic needs cannot be satisfied, terrorist groups may emerge to pursue a solution by capitalising on the vacuum created within the sovereign territory (Njoku, 2020). In Africa, the extremism of Al Shabaab

in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria are unfathomable due to this vacuum (Gray & Adeakin, 2015). Whilst the Somalia government is perceivably in ruins, and insecurity remains high, corruption and population below poverty rate create operating room in Nigeria.

Ultimately, terrorism cannot be classified in a self-determination debate; it is clear that the continued growth is facilitated by factors that range through a spectrum of what scholars identify as human discontent. According to Wilkinson (2011), if the people's political, economic, social, ideological, and psychological well-being is compromised, this creates room for terrorist groups to infiltrate sovereign societies. For instance, recruits into the far-right become the lone wolves, and their terrorist acts leave societies devastated. The driving force in such individuals is because they found solace in the organised violent groups, just when they felt unwanted by the other society. Hence, it is conclusively clear that success in terrorism is entrenched in the ability to gain attention, attract recruits, and stay focused on their stipulated goals.

1.6 Research Gap and Rationale of the Study

The present study makes a unique contribution to the field of terrorism research as it looks at terrorist groups through the lens of multi-product firms. Earlier attempts such as Agrawal (2020) provide a broad economic perspective to terrorist psychology, but without much specificity at the organisational level and with no empirical support. Considering terrorist groups through the lens of multi-product firms is critical to reveal key observations previously ignored. At the centre of the study, Galbraith's approach to multi-product firms identified three vertical levels of people in the organisation (owners, middle management, and the operational base) (Abdellahi, 2017), and these correlate with the three levels commonly identified in terrorist groups (leaders, mid-level operatives, and fighters) (Trebin, 2019). Moreover, Multi-product firms operate on a wide geographic scale and have methods of financing, recruitment, and sophisticated operations and are in turn influenced by these external conditions (Agrawal, 2020). The side-by-side juxtaposition of these business and terrorism structures sheds light on questions of leadership, recruitment, finances, and state-sponsorship, critical to counter-terrorism strategy development.

To the best of this author's knowledge, John Kenneth Galbraith's work is yet to receive the needed attention in the discourse surrounding terrorism and counterinsurgency. The popular works of *The Affluent Society* (Galbraith, 1998) and *The New Industrial State* (Galbraith, 1967) cover mass consumer markets, consumer goods, and the cycle of production, advertising, and

consumption will provide critical insight into the economics of terrorism and violent non-governmental organisations. For the purpose of this study, the original Galbraith's model is replaced with an analysis of the economics of terrorism will help understand larger, newer, and more inorganic terrorist groups manufacture ideology that is tailored to the mass audiences.

At the organisational level, structure and processes are naturally visible; however, little insight exists on how these concepts overlap and the degree of acceptance and non-acceptance. Similar observations have been made at the micro, and microeconomic levels (Agrawal, 2020), and the need for insight here is equally critical.

1.7 Research aim and objectives of the study

1.7.1 Aim of the study

The study aims to develop a business model of violent non-governmental organisations based on existing literature, refine the business model in Delphi research, and validate it in a case study experiment.

1.7.2 Objectives

I. To develop a business model of violent non-governmental organisation based on existing literature about the Galbraithian Multi-product firm.
II. To refine the business model of the terrorist groups through Delphi research.
III. To validate the business model of violent non-governmental organisations in an experimental case study

1.8 Organization of the Study (Chapter Disposition)

Chapter one presents an introduction to the research. It addresses the scope of the study and covers key literature debates covering the study. The chapter also presents the aim and objectives, summarises the research gap, and presents the study organisation. The second chapter covers the theoretical and economic frameworks of the study to arrive at the proposed business model. Chapter three presents a review of literature and cases in support of violent non-governmental organisations. Chapter four presents the methods. Chapter five presents results, and findings, covering the degree to which the evidence gathered help achieve the aim and objectives presented. The final chapter presents conclusion and counter-terrorism strategies based on the results, findings, discussions, and associated implications in both areas of academia and practice (Figure 3).



Figure 3 Outline of the Study

Source: Author

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR TERRORIST GROUPS AS BUSINESS FIRM

2.1 Introduction (Terrorist as a Firm/business enterprise)

This chapter looks at the terrorist group as a business enterprise, paying keen attention to the economic dynamics of how such business may be managed effectively. This attempt is not new, as earlier theoretical and economic proponents of terrorism have considered this position (Anderton & Carter, 2019; Agrawal, 2020). Nonetheless, an exercise is made in this chapter to create novel insight that will pave the way to comprehend existing dilemmas that are more specific to business and management challenges of terrorism. In this quest, the underlying rationale is to bring to fore the successful implementation of appropriate counter-terrorism strategies by the government agencies to fight terror (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006). Profiling terrorist organisations from the economic perspective would facilitate identification of weak and solid economic points to inform critical interventions necessary to thwart the objectives of terrorist organisations. Moreover, in the wake of the increased complexity of terrorist activities, the economic perspective to counter-terrorism has become equally relevant as other traditional and conventional counter-terrorism strategies (HM Government, 2006).

Like traditional organisations, terrorist organisations need capital to operate effectively (Jayasuriya, 2002). Aside from capital, terrorist groups often need a similar profile of resource requirements like any other organisation. This includes the vital need for human resources both at the front-end of the terrorist activities and in the management and financing of the terrorist activities. In addition, Etzioni (2010) observes that terrorist organisations have an objective, vision, mission, and key performance indicators (KPIs) (Macchia, 2004). Like traditional entities, terrorist organisations exhibit a sense of rationality regarding economic restrictions and resource limitations such as repression, persecution, target killing, and lack of cohesion. Although these dilemmas are different from traditional non-violent organisations, it persists, and a constant need for resources is always a vital problem, (Bosi et al., 2019).

Based on the rational choice model, the social and economic behaviours of terrorists may be explained (Nalbandov, 2013; Berrebi & Ostwald, 2011; Leistedt, 2013). Social actors are considered rational when considering a cost-benefit approach to decision making, based on consciously chosen stable preferences (Nalbandov, 2013; Choi & Luo, 2013). According to Anderton & Carter (2019), even though terrorist groups have an objective similar to traditional

business entities, the objectives are founded on different grounds. This is covered in Kolodny & Brunero (2013, p.1) terms "instrumental rationality". Instrumental rationality is rationality in its most basic form that compel social actors to utilise efficient resources and apply cost management strategies to achieve the desired goal (Caplan, 2013; Kolodny & Brunero, 2013). Even though many rational behaviours have come to be defined by social interaction and identity, terrorist rationality must be seen from a single, unproblematic norm of practical reasoning. The desired goals of terrorism may not be limited to death but may include fear, harm and mayhem (Caplan, 2013).

Building on the notion of instrumental rationality of the terrorist group, this may not entirely fall within the confines of mainstream or popular definition; a typical example is a rationale behind the actions of suicide bombers (Hasan, 2010; Gordon et al., 2007). This is addressed by Nalbandov (2013), who asserts that rationality is subjectively defined. Therefore, what may seem rationale to one party may contradict the popular notion of rational behaviour due to conflicting value systems (Choi & Luo, 2013). In what is categorised as individual and collective levels of rationality, an attempt is made to explain suicide terrorism where equivalent utility is considered the status quo (Caplan, 2013). Contrary to typical economic exchanges, the actual value of pre and post suicide action are misjudged, according to Nalbandov (2013).

Moreover, values and religious-based rationality do not often fit into the context of what the world has come to know as rational (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007). At the collective level, terrorist groups operate as a collective unit, with a division of labour, assigned roles, and collaboration (Choi & Luo, 2013). The rationale of suicide terrorism is complex and highly in coherence with human physiology. They are usually volunteers who already know what they will do and the possible consequence of the act. Still, the core of suicide terrorism is specialisation and exchange. Technically, to do a more considerable violent activity with many possible causalities, the attacker cannot be rescued or safe guarded, so the best possible solution in this scenario can be suicide terrorism. The killer accepts the immediate death with a massive kill. The noteworthy point is that such people are highly motivated and brainwashed with huge false promises and hopes. The attacker's motivation is not to kill but to die while killing and achieve the promises made by the motivators (Harrison, 2006).

However, it must be stated that suicide terrorism is extremely rare as compared to the other forms of terrorism (Cleaver, 2013). Although the data is hard to collect and connect, the historical figures show that the majority of such attacks occurred in past last 20 years.

According to the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), around 127 suicide attacks were executed by 177 offenders in the last year. Such attacks murdered around 765 people and around 1,925. If we compare these stats with the last year, around 149 attacks were carried out in 2019, which murdered 1,855 and further injured around 3,663. While a few years back, in 2016, the count was around 470 attacks. Three main countries faced the brunt of such attacks: 52 attacks in Afghanistan; 24 in Somalia; and 19 in Syria. Besides, 14 other countries also witnessed suicide attacks, including Iraq, Cameroon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Lebanon, Libya, Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Philippines, Russia, Tunisia and Turkey (Humanity, 2021).

A major question long associated with suicide attacks is the extent to which the suicide attackers are associated with extremists or religious fanatics, especially Muslims (Singh, R., 2019). The answer is, firstly, there is no particular connection between terrorism and religion; this can be intuitively validated as none of the world's major religions preach terrorism; they always show a negative practice towards hatred and violence (Cleaver, 2013). Secondly, the first suicide attacker was non-religious, the ethnic Tamils. To date, evidence shows that it is not from religion to terrorism, as the factor is vice versa; terrorism pulls out the extremist views, stubborn to one belief and extremism in the person (Singh, 2019).

Studies of the terrorist profile from the Middle East showed that most of them were highly educated and from well-grown economically strong backgrounds (Pape, 2003). The employment of such people is not that easy, as the leader has to bear a substantial amount of cost on behalf of the attacker, and he must explain the death clause to the rest of the family and community as well (Benmelech, 2012). So, after a century of research, there has been a majority shift towards the multiple strategic functions of suicidal operations. Although multiple sources portray it as religious extremism or individual psychopathy, many studies evidence the reason as a strategic decision of the terrorist group handling the functions and trying to manipulate the situations. So, it can be said that the suicidal attacks are more of a strategic and instrumental choice by the terrorist groups that want to have an impact (Post et al., 2009).

It is imperative to understand the economic fundamentals of how terrorist organisations adapt over time to sustain their terrorist activities. Seen from an organisational perspective, terrorist organisations have proven to be economically dynamic and even more instrumentally rational when compared to traditional businesses. Contrary to traditional organisations, the security of terrorists is not guaranteed within the traditional socio-economic sphere; as Berrebi & Ostwald (2011) put it, terrorist organisations are lumbered with a significant number of disadvantages,

and this exposes them to a good amount of threat in the hierarchies of socio-economic serenity if these threats are not adequately managed. Therefore, it is natural that terrorist organisations require higher-level economic and political will or resilience to function and operating rationally as one of the effective means to survive. Understanding the dilemmas, threats, and their leverage-ability is instrumental for the operational viability of terrorist groups and the proposition of counter-terrorism strategies (Berrebi & Ostwald, 2011).

From the counter-terrorism standpoint, intelligence and law enforcement agencies must carefully evaluate and understand the economic behaviour of these organisations to develop effective counter-strategies that will be capable of detecting and defeating the terrorists (Caruso & Locatelli, 2014). This insight will also inform the allocation of resources against such adversaries, with the appropriate metrics to measure the results of effective counter-terrorism. Contrary to the widespread assumption that terrorism is an exclusive non-profit venture, economic theory explains that the economic position of the terrorist group is usually juxtaposed to their political motives. The application of resources to these two areas holistically explains the production possibilities of the terrorist organisation, given the limited resources in their possession (Berebbi, 2009). Increasing the cost of the terrorist attacks against a limited budget would reduce the success of such an operation. Moreover, orchestrating a lower rate of return for terrorist activities would be a step in the right direction to reduce the economic viability and attractiveness of such acts in a coherent effort to reduce terrorism (Khan and Yu, 2019).

Neglecting the economic position of terrorist groups impedes the fight against terrorism, as it offers them the room to adopt profitable and relatively rudimentary portfolio management along with their modest resources. Therefore, the economic dimension adds to the effectiveness of terrorism outside of traditional "coercive" counter-terrorism strategies (Raczynski, 2020). The fundamental notion of humans as rational, however, cannot be removed from the discussion. Like traditional businesses, terrorist groups exhibit signs of rational risk avoidance and profit maximisation (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007). They, therefore, run a cost-benefit assessment to justify actionable strategies in pursuance of political and economic outcomes.

The strategic paradigm in terrorism studies posits that those terrorists are political utility maximisers. When the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest, the terrorist act is considered instrumentally rational (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007). Likewise, with limited resources, the terrorist group considers the opportunity of terrorist attack over the cost of choosing an alternative form of

protest (Cohen, 2019). This strategic position also serves as the foundation for the primary forms of rationality exhibited by terrorist groups. According to Johnson (2009), the Darwinian competition applies to the case of terrorists; contrary to the popular business outcome of competition among firms, terrorist groups put their lives on the line in mainstream economic and political competition. As a matter of life and death, terrorist groups compete against both the state and one another; the pressure and risk from this competition are very high and comes at the cost of their lives (Brown et al., 2011).

If we look at the history of the enmity between ISIS, al-Shabaab, and the revelry can be understood easily. In 2015, propaganda was released by the Islamic State that encouraged the members of al-Shabaab to join the caliphate of the Islamic State (Warner, 2017). Afterwards, a propagandist Hamil al-Bushra wrote an article, and after that, many other articles were published to support that propaganda from the Iraqi media office (Anderson, 2015). In the meantime, al-Furat released the first video addressed to Somalia in May 2015, followed by six more videos addressed to al-Shabaab to join the cause (Ingiriis, 2018). While al-Shabaab as a whole did not succumb to calculated pressure, the jihadi group was able to attract several prominent commanders and disgruntled foot-soldiers within al-Shabaab. While the propaganda war was occurring, al-Shabaab's internal security service, the Amniyat, was busy arresting, skirmishing with, and sometimes executing known or suspected Islamic State loyal members in southern Somalia (Solomon, H., 2015). Dozens of al-Shabaab members were killed or arrested by the Amniyat during this period. The relative calm between the two sides would then last until late 2018, when clashes again flared up. However, the renewed tensions did not occur in a vacuum (Bacon, 2019).

It must be added that the competition between the terrorist organisation and other groups or the government has been described as "economic warfare" and not "economic competition" (Clarke, 2015). This is based on the assertion that rivals of terrorist groups are enemies and not mere business rivals. Whilst traditional business competition involves market share acquisition and provision of room to co-exist with competitors, terrorists and their competitors usually seek to wipe out each other in a fierce competition of no rules for co-existence (Lutz & Lutz, 2006). Irrespective of the action of a government, terrorists can further their bargaining power if they receive concession or warrant retaliation through their attacks. The economic benefits of winning public support for the terrorist cause may as well be brought into perspective. The inability to protect the people from the terrorist group, as well as the inaction on the part of the government to respond to activities of the terrorist group, send unique signals to the citizens of

the country and dilute the support for the government to the point of making the terrorist group attractive (Reisman, 1999).

2.2 Financing restrictions for terrorist organisations

Resources are required at different stages of the formulation and execution of a business strategy. Similarly, in the domain of terrorism, money is needed to recruit, train, and pay salaries, provide retirement plans, acquire explosives and armaments, equipment, logistics, bribe, and fabricate documents, among others (Hamin et al., 2016). Terrorism financing is the provision of funds or providing financial support to individual terrorists or non-state actors. A constant flow of funds is required to sustain the operations of an organisation and the activities of individual operatives; nonetheless, external parties and government adversaries are in a constant attempt to block funding sources of terrorists (Lee, 2016a). For this reason, terrorist organisations strive to find open funding channels that are beyond the reach of counterterrorism agencies. Ultimately, counterterrorism agencies can put decisive pressure on these finances.

To sustain funding channels, the terrorist organization's ability and capacity to be adaptive and find other ways to fund its operations play a significant part in its lifecycle and resilience (Gold, 2004). In events following 9/11, the US government declared war on Al Qaeda financing as integral to the fight against terrorism. A widespread assumption in the fight against terrorism financing is that the lack of financing would limit the activities and the ability of the terrorist group to launch an attack, significantly reduces their capacity to cause mass casualty attacks.

Therefore, a proper understanding of counter-terrorism strategy must involve the ability first to comprehend funding sources, budget structure, and funding portfolio to curb the flow of funds (Lee, 2016a). Counter-terrorism strategy must also understand the evolutionary aspect of terrorist funding structure; this is critical as terrorist financing evolves or responds to changing environmental circumstances. Knowing the benefits and demerits of each available funding source would also be instrumental in understanding the relative advantages and disadvantages of various funding sources to any terrorist organisation. Successfully disconnecting funding sources will halt activities, restrict materials, and incapacitate recruitment and expansion.

It is essential to add that even though it is often anticipated that running a terrorist organisation might be high, evidence exists that the cost of running such organisations can be low even at the strategic levels (Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009). However, evidence also exists that funding sources may be sophisticated, involve multiple channels, and multiple costly elements to

execute any specific activity. The cost of financing the 9/11 attack was estimated to be over half a million dollars, including costly flight simulation for the hijackers (Passas, 2007). Despite an exorbitantly costing 9/11 operation, most of the operations of the terrorist group require limited funding but with the vital need to sustain the inflow of funds over a long period of time.

Indoctrination and recruitment have evolved as two critical areas of expenditure necessary for expansion and continuity (Khan and Yu 2019). In cases of terrorist organisations operating in ravaged and failed states, the funds need to be procured for imparting training, and housing installations, provision of food for the members, as well as for their families, since these areas are often non-functional in failed states (Diop, 2019; Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020; Plummer, 2012). In terms of equipment needed, funds would have to be sourced for firearms, explosives, forging travel documents, as well as bribes, in addition to expensive satellite phones and other communication devices (Estrada et al., 2018; Teichmann & Sergi, 2018). Moreover, compensation to the family of the employees who lose their lives can either be in monthly allowances or fixed pension.

In specific details, the typical funding requirements of a terror outfit can run into hundreds of millions of dollars annually. It has been estimated that Al Qaeda annual budget is $30 million (Roberts, 2011). On the other hand, Hezbollah's budget was estimated to be as high as $400 million (Rafizadeh, 2016). Afghan Taliban are also considered to operate on a budget of up to $400 million as of 2009; a US report in 2012 estimated this same amount was collected through extortion, taxes, and drugs in 2011, out of which $275 million went to the leadership and the remaining to local parties (Schmitt, 2009). Also, the insurgent groups in Iraq are considered to raise anything between $70 million and $200 million per year (Burns & Semple, 2006).

As of December 2017, the U.S. military estimated the Taliban budget to be between $300 million and $500 million a year (Babb, 2017). Approximately $200 million (60%) of that budget is derived from the illegal narcotics trade (Babb, 2017). This leads to the conclusion that funding is an integral part of the functioning capacity of terrorist organisations. Therefore, a careful assessment of the terrorist group’s leadership needs to be carried out to constraint the financing portfolio.

2.3 Sources of terrorist funding

Terrorist groups, like any other business enterprise, need income to survive and sustain their operations (Aliu et al., 2017). According to Sambo & Sule (2021), terrorist groups cannot

survive without a steady income and sources of finance – the income in such cases must be more than the cost of operating the group. The source of income for the terrorist group is diverse and primarily illegal. The sources of terrorist financing from the three main stakeholders of individuals, businesses, and states must be discussed critically (Freeman, 2011). In addition, the role of donations, market, non-market activities is as well discussed.

2.3.1 Donations

According to Phillips & Pohl (2021), most terrorist organisations are sustained by sponsorship and donations from individuals, organisations and states, petty theft and extortion, and drug and contraband smuggling (Achilli & Tinti, 2019). Donations play a significant role in terrorist organisations (Aliu et al., 2017). Most terrorist organisations, for that matter, are sustained by sponsorship from individuals, organisations and states parties. Individuals may sympathise with the terrorist group and provide monetary and non-monetary support. To a large extent, the funding model differs depending on the motivation and, in some cases, the religious inclination of the terrorist organisation (Basile, 2004). Several Muslims worldwide and religious sympathisers provide valuable support for Islamist terrorism (Basile, 2004).

Initially, the PLO did not have any stable sources of income from 1968 to 1987; the first Intifada erupted in 1987 and led to years of terror attacks and retaliation and caused a significant increase of funds for PLO (Moghadam, 2003). In this period, the PLO had the back of Muslims, and they funded it with a massive donation from all over the world, which was later increased when IRA bombed Omagh in 1998, making the extremist population happy (Kubic, 2021). However, one bad step and PLO could have lost everything to that situation. That kept PLO on the verge of some decisions, which made donors happy. So, it can be stated that when a terrorist organisation is only relying on donations, they have to face many political and unwanted decisions. On the other hand, the economic activities generate direct revenue and have no such type of cost pressure on the terrorist groups (Hou et al., 2020).

At the organisational level, several examples may be highlighted. Such an organisation may have a religious identity similar to the terrorist group. Other groups are affiliated with terrorist groups based on their political ideology (Martin, 2010). It is also not new that charity organisations and non-governmental parties provide support to terrorist groups. At the national level, state sponsorships have been witnessed in the global discourse surrounding terrorism (Wendt, 1995). The financial independence of 'The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham' (ISIS) flows from that of the Iraqi insurgency. At that time, external donations accounted for less than

5% of the group's operational budget; according to the group's internal records, ISIS continually strived for political, economic and religious autonomy. However, it continues to receive donations from wealthy business people and religious figures and institutions, primarily from (NGOs) in the Gulf States. Such donations flew to Syrian Islamism terrorist groups, specifically from Kuwait and Qatar, which was sent by Hajaj al Ajmi, an extremist who is considered a financer of several terrorist events (Nakhla, 2016). In 2015, ISIS received around $50M and over $80 million per month (Gerges, 2017). State sponsors that have gained popularity here include Iran and Libya (Aubrey, 2004).

One underlying rationale for terrorist group income generation abilities is that income increases as terrorist activities increases. Like the traditional business revenue curve where businesses generate revenue from business activities, terrorists attract income in donations and sponsorships when terrorist activity increases (Lenain et al., 2002). Like other income curves, diminishing returns set in after reaching a peak – at this point, any further expansion in scope or activity will lead to reducing income or revenue generation. The number of people can only increase until their ability or will to fund terrorist activities is exhausted. Aside from the general literature supporting incomes and donations, some attempts have also been made to categorise income sources into the market and non-market activities; close attention to these areas is offered in the following sections.

2.3.2 Market Activities

Market activities include the selling of legal goods and services by terrorist organisations. In the case of ISIS, the sale of oil and gas serves as a key source of finance to operations (Gerges, 2017). The sale of artefacts and other goods also served as a good source of income. The goods traded in this area may not essentially be illegal goods; they may involve buying and selling of illegal goods. Where legal or illegal goods are involved, the supply chain networks and business practices may involve some illegality. Osama Bin Laden's construction companies and industries in Saudi Arabia and Sudan continued to provide critical support to ISIS activities in Iraq and Syria (Gerges, 2017). Terrorists use these organisations to gain direct involvement in the market.

Aside from trading in legal goods and services, market activities also involve trade in illegal goods and services. This includes the sale of drugs, personal and community protection, and

revolutionary taxes. One of these is the jizyah[5] taxes levied at Christians in Islamic terrorism (Heath, 2019). Taxes collected from Christian minorities are used to support terrorist activities. Market activities, therefore, entails the sale of legal goods and services within the market, including the sale of illegal goods and services within the market (Li & Schaub, 2004).

The observation that the terrorist organisations do not deal solely with illegal activities is quite unpopular and has not been offered deserving attention (Pieth, 2002). To fund their businesses, terrorists often operate perfectly legal enterprises for funding. The case of Osama bin Industries to finance terrorism from Sudan as far back as the 1990s is one such case. The business was firmly knitted to the economic and political will of the owners to leverage the performance of the terrorist organisation. The market presence also helped establish a resilient finance network supporting both the company and political activities and permitting seamless transfer of resources between these entities (Pieth, 2002). In legitimate market businesses, the terrorist group must be prepared for scrutiny from the state, as the authorities are at liberty to engage in a deep investigation into the affairs of the business. This can be through the audit trail, which by law has to be maintained by the legal businesses.

In another instance where Al Qaeda was taking hold of Sudan, it engaged in many agricultures and farm-based enterprises, a bakery and even an investment company to manage its operations (Gunaratna, 2002). Historically, market activities have played a fundamental role as the most significant funding source for IRA since the 1980s. In many areas, the IRA group dealt in second-hand automobiles, workshops and a manufacturing company. Evidence of other activities such as drinking clubs, taxi corporations, and gaming arcades was established to help fund their enterprise (Pieth, 2002; Parliament. House of Commons, 2002).

The market activities cannot be concluded without mentioning the increasing role of the internet as a medium of communication, payment, and general business transactions (Leuprecht & Walther, 2018). Terrorists are becoming more adept at using websites, blogs, and other forms of cyber-assets to conduct market-related activities. Internet does not only facilitate business but serves as a place of income for terrorist groups. These include the theft of credit card details from online payment channels and systems (Arquilla et al., 2001; Khosravi & Haghighi, 2018).

[5] The jizyah is described in the Qurʾān as a tax that is imposed on a certain erring faction from among the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb; non-Muslim groups such as Christians and Jews recognized in the Qurʾān as possessing a divine scripture) who violate their own religious and ethical principles (9:29). The traditional Islamic school describes this portion of money as a payment in return for protection and exemption from participation in wars

To evade the authorities, terrorist groups are conscious of the government's control over the traditional banking systems; they resort to crypto-currency and other payment methods that can be rather difficult to trace, such as Bitcoin and Ripple (Dion-Schwarz, 2019; Salami, 2018). In other cases, traditional value transfer services are created for the local economy; these include the hawala – a system where funds are paid to an agent who then instructs a remote associate to pay the amount to the final recipient, but no physical form of money changes hands during the transfers, (Kranacher & Riley, 2019). The use of trade-based money-laundering, and cash couriers, particularly in countries with non-existent or weak national anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) tools, have also been established (Kranacher & Riley, 2019).

As terrorists engage in market activities using these elusive measures, the state struggles to keep track of the funds somehow and undertake extensive surveillance to define and ascertain the underlying activities and avenues towards which the proceeds of the businesses are going. This is even more critical of the counterterrorism aspires to focus on crippling the economic foundations of the terrorist group. In several instances, in Europe and the Americas, efforts have choked the financial sources by re-writing laws to control such practices (Sharifi &Fathpour, 2017). States must have a robust anti-money laundering system that warrants the exposure of the infrastructure of criminal organisations, webs of corruption, and conspiracies to commit terror acts. Such insights will provide the authorities with roadmaps to reduce terrorism, recovery and forfeit unlawfully acquired assets, and support broad and effective deterrence efforts against a wide range of criminal activities, including the financing of terrorism (Martini, 2020).

Money laundering remains one of the critical areas where the process through which cash raised from criminal activities is made to look legitimate for re-integration into the financial system (Naheem, 2020). This is critical since the funding to and from terrorist groups are flagged and prevented from entering the mainstream financial system. In 2020, the IMF and World Bank estimated that criminals (including terrorists) laundered nearly four trillion dollars each year (Lagarde, 2021). Terrorist organisations particularly look into the business activities that would lead to quick cash generation to launder illegal monies (Hamin et al., 2016). Adapting to the changing security circumstances is essential for terrorists to continue laundering money to finance terrorism.

2.3.3 Non-Market Activities

Non-market activities involve the sale of goods and services, but those activities are not submitted to the supply and demand law, and they occur outside a marketplace. Examples include bank robberies, smuggling, extorsions, ransoms, and drug trafficking. These activities do not often occur in the market (Heath, 2019). As opposed to market activities that may involve legal or illegal goods, non-market activities are often illegal. Even though arguable, terrorist groups are compelled to resort to illegal activities such as drug trafficking, robberies, smuggling, and extortions, to "protection" money and downright imposed taxes, mainly when market activities fail to offer the needed funding (Achilli & Tinti, 2019). The tendency of terrorist groups to turn into sophisticated forms of crime hubs, including cyber-extortion to raise funds, has been the main concern for state and international actors (Petallides, 2012).

Kidnapping for ransom is also a lucrative source of funding for violent organisations, such as Qatar funnelled millions of dollars to Nusra Front terrorists in Syria. According to BBC News, Qatar's upcoming foreign minister gave a list of captives, and they paid more than a billion dollars to free the men. The money went to the terrorist group of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, which killed the American troops with roadside bombs (Riggs, 2021). General Qasem Soleimani, leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, has been personally subjected to US and EU sanctions; and also Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, once known as al-Nusra Front, when it was an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Historically, FARC, Abu Sayyaf Group and Taliban have used this to raise significant ransom money (Harmon, 2012). In many of these cases, the victims are wealthy businessmen or their families. More often, payments get carried out without notification and intimation to the police for fear of terrorist later reprisals (Mattsson, 2019). These activities also go hand in hand with "*revolutionary taxes*"[6] since the punishment aspect of not paying taxes is reinforced with kidnappings, elaborated by Roth & Sever (2007). According to a private security analyst in Pakistan, the Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions struggling for funds have turned to kidnap "wealthy businessmen for ransom," according to a 2014 U.N. report.

Bank robberies and petty thefts to fund operations are also well known. In some cases, it has been used to fund pronounced crimes like the Bali bombings (Achilli & Tinti, 2019). Such activity is rampant for the Taliban, targetting transport vehicles, couriers, banks (Achilli &

[6] Those taxes similar to jizyah the goes to market illegal activities

Tinti, 2019). In mid-2014, the Iraqi NIS did the espionage from an insider of ISIS that revealed that the organisation had assets worth US$2 billion, making it the most affluent jihadist group in the world. About three-quarters of this sum is said to be represented by assets seized after the group captured Mosul in June 2014; this includes possibly up to US$429 million looted from Mosul's central bank, along with additional millions and a large quantity of gold bullion stolen from several other banks in Mosul (Cunliffe, E., & Curini, I., 2018). Some terrorist organisations have specialised in raising finance through smuggling; PKK and Hezbollah are prominent in this regard, especially by being connected with the drugs trade (Achilli & Tinti, 2019). There is no doubt that the returns from robberies and thefts can be significant in promoting terrorism, even though the detrimental effect on businesses comes back to haunt the acceptability of the group within the local society (Frifita & Hadhek, 2019).

On smuggling, the smuggling network of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has been known for smuggling commodities, for example, diamonds from Tanzania (Laub, Z., & Masters, J., 2014). Similarly, Hezbollah engages in smuggling by intending to profit from tax differentials between states (Achilli & Tinti, 2019). The IRA has also employed this funding source, as in one instance, it raised $2 million through pig smuggling between the Irish borders (Freeman, 2011). In addition to goods, human smuggling has remarkably increased in recent years. Human smuggling involves taking funds to illegally send people to Europe – a practice Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) has been engaged in over the years due to the advantage of its proximity to European borders. According to Interpol reports, the PKK charges 2,000 to 3,000 euros to traffic one person (Natarajan, 2019). In one instance, PKK smuggled over 9,000 Kurds into Europe (Natarajan, 2019). The adoption of strong border security and technologies to detect and counter such human trafficking all over Europe has helped to mitigate this issue. In addition, measures taken by the British Government to stop access to rights given earlier to asylum seekers have also helped mitigate this problem.

Dealing with pirated and counterfeit products can provide terrorist organisations with significant funding. This is quite pronounced in the Tri-Border area between Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, where Hezbollah thrives in an illegal business of $700 million a year (Levitt, 2019). The advantages of leveraging recourse to illegal activities provide "ready cash", and the activities can be ratcheted up to the time the funding with the need for financing specific operations (Picarelli & Shelley, 2007). Such activities may portray the terrorist organisations as potent forces and capable of holding up the powers of a state for their needs (Basuchoudhary

& Shughart, 2010). Cross-border illegal business undermines the credibility of the states as the state forces are unable to control illegal businesses.

It is essential to add those non-market activities that finally may damage the local reputation of the terrorist organisation. The political wars are usually aimed at making the terrorist organisation appear better than the government in terms of caring for the people, standing by societal values and norms, and corruption, for instance. Therefore, illegalities tint the credibility of the terrorist organisation as the community gets antagonised and reacts to such crimes. Such a phenomenon is more likely to be in cases where due to economic suffering brought about by the activities of terrorism, the constituency is already under severe pressure and would not want sporadic criminal activities worsening their plight (Gelber, 2018). Engaging in illegal businesses also leads to the dissipation of control within these organisations. Members in the lower rungs of power are tempted to make money for themselves using the organisation's name, leading to a public relations disaster for the outfit (Gelber, 2018). The abuse of power signifies corruption and does not portray the terrorist group as a better alternative to the state government.

In one usual terrorist activity in Pakistan, the country went into an uproar when a few members of the terrorist organisation MQM were involved in burning down a leather garment factory killing hundreds of labourers as the owners had refused to pay a very substantial sum of protection money (BBC, 2020). Due to this move, the organisation lost a considerable segment of its popular support in its constituencies in Karachi. Heavy reliance on non-market activities leads to a situation where the terrorist organisation invariably loses focus on its mission. When this continues, the operating cells become self-sufficient, giving them the ability to break away from the core and act independently, although using the name and brand of the entity for their purposes. This observation is similar to that established by Byman (2016) in the case of ISIS giving birth to other smaller groups and affiliates such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Islamic Movement of Palestine. In such a development, it becomes difficult to separate the actions of the individuals from the group (Höflinger, 2020).

It is essential to add that such illegal activities are risky as they offer; they state the reason and power they need to disrupt the terrorist organisation’s activity. Therefore, these illegal activities serve as entry points for the state to infiltrate and plant moles in the terrorist groups to bring them down. Non-market activities shift focus from the main aim of the terrorist groups and may jeopardise the group's prime objective.

2.4 Income Resources

Terrorist organisations generate income through revenue activities (Phillips & Pohl, 2021). These incomes generated may be considered separate from receipts in the forms of donations, sponsorship, petty theft and extortion, and the smuggling of drugs and contraband (Achilli & Tinti, 2019). To remain in operation, terrorist organisations attempt to raise funds to finance their operations, as is the case for any business. Likewise, the business must balance income generated from its revenue activities with the cost of its operations. Income is needed to finance terrorist strategies, purchase vehicles, guns, and other war-related equipment (Aliu et al., 2017). In addition, income is required for the upkeep of terrorist leaders and their families, compensations made to terrorist fighters, cover terrorist and administrator recruitment costs, pay media channels and forward propaganda on these media platforms (Aliu et al., 2017). Evidence also exists that remittances go to the front fighters and the families left behind in the event where lives are lost; regular and one-time compensations to the families of jihadists have been registered in popular terrorist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2002).

As the first approach depicpted in Figure 2-4, we can suppose the revenue or income I of Terrorist Group gets to finance their operations as dependent positively on the Terrorist activity$x$.

$Total\ Income\ (I) = I(x)$

Such as the marginal income MI can be written as:

$MI = I'^{(x)} = \frac{dI}{dx} > 0$

But with marginal decreasing returns such that:

$I''^{(x)} = \frac{d^2I}{dx^2} < 0$

That is, the returns on increasing Terrorist activity grows at a lesser rate as the Terrorist activity itself, graphically it can be expressed as:



Figure 4 Marginal Income Curve

Source: adapted from (Anderton & Carter 2019)

Later on, in this chapter, we will show a more detailed view of the monetary revenue aspect of Terrorist activity. However, as we have said, the Terrorist group must face a wide variety of expenses. So, it is necessary to consider the cost aspect of the Terrorist activity. As it is usual in the economics of production,[7] we will distinguish between two broad categories of expensive or costs:

a) Fixed costs
b) variable/operational costs

A viable terrorist organisation would have its income equal to or greater than the total of its fixed and operating costs. Fixed plus variable or operating cost leads to the total cost curve, as

[7] The analysis is in the short-medium term. In a long term there are no fixed costs. But this long-term perspective is not appropriate to terrorist group because its time span is limited (or the Terrorist group fails and disappeared, or it succeeded and become a mass movement or insurgency or its "difficult" life, with many risks to it survive made its life uncertain and this radical uncertainty makes a long term pacification impossible.

shown in Figure 5. The marginal cost curve is then estimated based on the change in cost over the change quantity or terrorist activity.



Figure 5 Terrorist Organisation Cost Assessment

Source: Graham (2013)

Fixed costs include all those costs that the organisation must incur due to its very existence, whether or not it operates. So, it does not vary with the level of *X* activity. These include maintaining sanctuaries, maintaining the information networks, fixed compensation for prisoners and the families of the martyrs and bribes for the officials, as highlighted by Teichmann & Sergi (2018). The variable/operational costs include all the direct costs associated with producing a unit of good or service, in this case, a terrorist attack. In this case, the variable costs will be the costs directly associated with terrorism violent activities[8]. They may include acquiring and maintaining active fighters, cost of munitions and logistical support,

[8] Political violent activates are such activities in which any physical, physiological, or symbolic damage occurs of any personal or organization or country, with the intention of influencing massive audience for any sort of political, social change (Chenoweth, 2019).

and recruitment for terrorism activities, among others. By adding these two types of costs, the total cost curve is determined. From the graph:

$$total\ cost\ (TC) = Fixed\ Cost\ (F) + Operational\ costs\ (O)$$

$$average\ cost\ (AC) = \frac{TC}{x}$$

The marginal cost = the change in cost/ change in quantity:

$$C^{1} = \frac{dC}{dx}$$

From an economic perspective of the Terrorist group as a business firm, we have to simultaneously consider the revenue and the costs considerations, as normal firms do.



Figure 6 Marginal Income versus Marginal Cost Curves

Source: Graham (2013)

Here x_M is the maximum level of political violent activity economically sustainable, while x_m denotes the maximum level of economically sustainable political violent activity. Whereas, $x_M - x_m$ denotes the level range of economically viable Political violent activity. A level of

Political violent activity $\bar{x}$ would be the level[9] a terrorist group choose to do if it behaves as a business firm and would try to get the maximum level of monetary benefits from its activities. Such will be the case in which the terrorist group behaves like a mafia or organised criminal group. Like inter-communal violence, organisational crimes are necessarily linked through electoral competitions and democracy (Trejo and Ley, 2017). It can also be related to the post-conflict settings.

Figure 6 combines the total revenue and total costs curves for the hypothetical terrorist organisation above. From the graph, the income and cost for each given level of activity X are represented on the X-axis. On the Y-axis, income and cost are represented. From the graph presented, both total cost (TC) and total revenue $\frac{TR}{income}$ Commence with an upward slope. In order to be economically viable, the total income must be greater than the total costs as represented by the region between x_m andx_M. Point x_m represents the point where the terrorist group would have the lowest positive returns, whereas x_M represents the point where a terrorist group would have the highest positive returns. In the beginning, both the cost and income curves are not zero, as shown.

The explanation for positive income is the initial cash outlay by the terrorists, as indicated. As part of the income analysis, it is essential to add that the organisation is expected to incur fixed costs regardless of whether it carries out any activity, as presented earlier in Figure 5.0. At the point where only fixed cost applies, the overall cost is more significant than income. In order to remain viable, the terrorist organisation would be forced to increase its political violent activities. Increasing the number of political violent activities are likely to attract more sponsors and consequently increase revenue. At where revenue exceeds the cost, that is, the entire region between x_m andx_M, organisational sustainability is attained. Considering the marginal income-cost graph, the level of marginal cost commences with a downward slope whilst marginal income starts with an upward slope. The increase in income for each change in activity (Marginal income) is increasing more than the level of increase in costs for each unit increase in activities at x_{M1} where profitability and sustainability are maximised.

[9] It is satisfied the normal conditions of profit maximization. This is the x-activity level at which marginal revenue equals marginal costs. It is said the returns from the last activity. Covers exactly the cost of doing it.

The income and cost curve gap reduction represents marginal income and marginal cost changes in the marginal cost graph. As the group increases the activity level, the marginal income diminishes (decreases) while the marginal cost increases. The increase continues until the point x_{M1} , an increase in activity level does not lead to a commensurate increase in the group's profitability. Beyond this point, the costs of additional terrorist activities outweigh the income, and the operation will be unviable. This is true for the widest gap between the TR-TC graph and where MC crosses MR atx_{M1}.

The information from the graphs above corresponds to the situation in real life. Most of the newly formed terrorist organisations do not have widespread fundraising networks and often rely on internal funds from their leaders. To become viable, the small terrorist organisations increase their activities to attract sponsorship from larger terrorist groups or individuals and governments to identify other revenue-generating opportunities. The best example of such an operating structure was ISIS, as outlined by Blannin (2017). As the groups become more significant, the costs of operation and defending its activities balloons so much that further activities become impossible, and diseconomies of scale sets in to limit further expansion.

A terrorist organisation that seeks to maximise profit would then increase its activities "x" until it reaches the maximum $x_M$where additional activities would not lead to any additional income. In this case, the maximum investment would be used to evolve the terrorist group into an insurgency. Most of its investment may be focused on expanding its territory, increasing the number of fighters and wars it is engaged in, and increasing the number of terror incidences involved. On the other hand, terrorist organisations that have operated for a long time, such as Spain's ETA and FARC, may not view their activities as investments (Harmon, 2012). As such, their income is used to defend their position and survive. The leaders and fighters may shift focus towards living well rather than increasing terrorist activities.

2.5 Type of Cost for terrorist groups

There is a difference between the daily spending of a terrorist group and the funding needed to plot actual massive destruction. In order to elaborate, many sources cited that the budget of the 9/11 attacks was approximated to be around $500,000. The attacks in Madrid 2000, London in 2005, and Paris in 2014 had cost more than hundreds of thousands of dollars. By cost, the spending of Al Qaeda as per the contract of CIA was $30 Million (Comras, 2007). The emergence of ISIS and the organisation with similar motives of using the territory has been causing a massive conflict, undermined governance, domestic issues, rule of law and economy.

Providing control of a territory can be good for the economy. However, it raises many questions over governance because the terrorist group will impact all significant decisions, and they will require massive funding for expenses. The country will be subject to constant blackmailing, as described by Lake (2016).

Cost in the terrorist organisation may be grouped into fixed and variable costs. Fixed cost represents the land, buildings, bunkers, safe houses, maintenance of information networks and other fixed forms of compensations paid to fighters, martyrs, or administrative personnel (Rosenthal, 2008); these cost elements do not change or respond to the level of terrorist activity or operations. Variable costs depend on the level of activity by the terrorist group and include arms and weapons, transportation expense, fighters' salaries, cost of hiring and recruiting fighters for activities. These factors are also considered operational costs.

To further understand the terrorist group economic underpinnings, it is essential to investigate the production options available to the organisation and how they can balance these activities to pursue its political or economic objective. (Fortna, 2015). Even though political violent activity is the core business of the terrorist group, engaging in economic activities also help raise money and keep the members economically afloat. FARC is one such organisation that eventually neglected the political agenda of their group and went into full-time economic operations by producing and selling drugs. According to Anderton & Carter (2019), a terrorist organisation focuses only on its economic aspect and drops the political agenda to become a business organisation. However, if the organisation pursues its political agenda without any economic motive, it will resort to criminal activities and become a crime organisation.

To examine the terrorist organisation from the eco-political perspective, Anderton & Carter (2019) have contributed this discourse. Moreover, a look at the organisation as a Gibraltarian firm is essential to reveal critical levels within a traditional firm's organisational structure compared to that of the terrorist group.

2.5.1 Terrorist group as Galbraithian Firm

2.5.1.1 Terrorist Groups as Multi-Product Firm

A typical terrorist organisation must undertake more than one activity to meet its objectives, as indicated above. To have a clearer understanding, therefore, we have to understand it as a multi-product firm. A multi-product firm is a firm that produces more than one good or service. The multi-product firm is relevant in this case, given that terrorist groups undertake diverse forms

of activities to reach their objectives, grouped as economic activities and Terrorist political activities. The first one is the activities a Terrorist group must undertake to get money (funds) to finance the other activities, which are the "political' Terrorist ones.

2.5.1.2 Production possibility Frontier

Based on Anderton & Carter (2019) analogy, we assume the Terrorist Group undertakes/produces two activities, x (political violent activities) and y (economic activities), and the "products" are produced using two-factor inputs labour (L) and capital (K). For a given set of inputs, The Terrorist group can do various combinations of "economic" and "political" outputs or activities that can be represented graphically as a range of possible activities the Terrorist group can do. It is a problem to choose the "best one" best combination, as shown in Figure 7.



Figure 7 Terrorist Group Production Possibility Curve

Source: Anderton & Carter (2019)

From the graph above, an increase in the production of y (political violent activity), with labour and capital remaining constant, would lead to a decline in the quantity done of "x" (economic activity). Specifically, it must face a trade-off between economic activity and Terrorist activity.

An increase in political violent activity from X0 to X1 would force the terrorist group to reduce its economic activities from Y0 to Y1, as shown in the graph. Examples of political activities undertaken by terrorists include killings, bombings, and propaganda aimed at shifting political opinions. On the other hand, examples of economic activities include legal business and illegal activities such as kidnapping and extortion.

The trade-off between economic and political activities indicates constraint in resources and the need to allocate resources to maximise general efficiency as the organization prefers. To illustrate, if the terrorist group focused on economic activities, it would produce at the level where the curve intersects the Y-axis. However, the political activities would be zero at this level, meaning it would have to abandon all political activities and become criminal organisations or mafia (Chenoweth, 2019). Similarly, if the terrorist group focuses on political activities, it would be able to produce at the level where the curve intersects the X-axis. The economic activities would be zero at this level, meaning it would have to abandon all economic activities, so it cannot finance future political activities, and the terrorist group becomes a criminal organisation.

To increase the combination of goods X and Y that the Terrorist group can produce, it would also need to increase the factors of production, as shown in Figure 8.0. Here, an outward shift in the production possibility curve is experienced due to an expansion in the factors of production of the terrorist organization. Changes in labour, capital or terrorist budget constraints can lead to such outcomes, as explained by Anderton & Carter (2019).

As Figure 8 shows, the level of political and economic activity can be increased concurrently by increasing labour and capital from L and K to L^{Δ} and K^{Δ}, respectively. The increase in the factors of production would lead to a shift in the production curve, as shown in the graph (Graham, 2013). Nevertheless, to expand its frontier of Terrorist activities, a Terrorist group needs more financial resources to get more “capital”, for instance, weapons and more “labour” for instance, more Terrorists or members or more recruiting, so there is feedback between the level and type of Terrorist activity in a moment and the possibility of growth of the Terrorist group in the future. Here, within the stand (in the dissertation), we can concentrate the analysis on the short-term efficiency problems of the Terrorist group. It is said how it chooses the best mix of economic and political activities in a short-term period, defined as the period in which capital and labour levels are fixed. So, we will analyse the terrorist group as having a frontier curve defined as:

$y = m(x)$

That shows formally the trade-off between economic activities (y) and political activities(X), such as

$m' = \frac{dy}{dx} < 0$

An increase in its level of economic activities must suppose a decrease in the level of its Terrorist activities. As usual, we also suppose that:

$m'' = \frac{d^2y}{dx^2} < 0$

It is said, there are decreasing returns to both kinds of activities.



Figure 8 Outward Shift in Production Curve of the Terrorist Organisation

Source: Anderton & Carter (2019)

2.5.1.3 Optimization of political and economic in the short-term activities

Based on the earlier assessment, a terrorist group would have to optimise their limited resources to undertake the best mix of activities. For a typical terrorist organisation, where 'L' is the human resources and 'K' is capital, the level of fighters and capital resources available determine the level of activities that the group can undertake. As terrorist groups decide to

spend more of the resources on economic activities, it earns more money, but it does fewer political violent activities in the short term. This relationship as shown in Figure 9 is a positive relationship that exists between the income from economic activities increases as the level of economic activities increases and vice versa. Specifically, the income increases from I1 to I0 when the level of economic activities rises from Y1 to Y0. Examples of illegal economic activities that would lead to a rise in economic income include increased extortion, increasing the frequency of contraband smuggling, and increasing the frequency and ransom from kidnappings (Blannin, 2017).



Figure 9 Income from Economic Activities

Source: Graham (2013)

In a multiproduct organization, the returns from all forms of activity would contribute to the overall income generated, as shown in Figure 9. The same as and when happens here also get money as the indirect effect of its political Terrorist activity, as for instance, donations of people or organisations who share terrorist group's political objectives in proportion to the levels of politically violent activities the group engaged in. The graphs in Figure 10 show the production possibilities and the income resulting from the combination of activities undertaken by the terrorist groups. Section (a) of the graph shows the income from economic activities, which directly maps onto the production possibility curve on the top right-hand corner of the diagram. The bottom part shows the income from politically violent activity, which also maps

onto the possibility frontier. Also, income from politically violent activity directly relates to activity level, as shown in section (c). Once again, the production possibility curve shows the mix of different economic and political activities at any given point in time.



Figure 10 Income from Multiple Activities

Source: Adapted from Korotayev, A., Vaskin, I., & Tsirel, S. (2021)

The income from carrying out a combination of economic activity Y_0 and political activities X_0 would be in point 0 in all sections of the graph. So if the terrorist group gets I_x^0 money from its political activities and gets I_y^0 money from its economic activities, it gets a total income of $I^0 = I_x^0 + I_y^0$ as shown in the (c) section of the graph. However, a rise in one type of Terrorist activity, with L and K held constant, would lead to a decrease in income from the other activity; even though this would be its opportunity cost, yet it would not necessarily change the cumulative incomes. For instance, an increase in political activities from X_0 to X_1 would lead to an increase in income from politically violent activities from Ix0 to I_x^1. However, the increase would lead to a decline in income contribution from the decreased strict economic activities from Y_0 to Y_1. In addition, $\bar{y}$ is the maximum economic activity that can be done, $\bar{x}$

is the maximum political violent activity that can be done, and $\bar{I}x$ is the maximum income from Political violent activity can be done. The diagram shows how income for the terrorist group is affected by the chosen mix of political and economic activities, respectively. The information on the graph can be formally shown below:

For income from political activities (x):

$I_x = \ell\,(x)$

$\ell' = \frac{dI_x}{dx} > 0$

$\ell'' = \frac{d^2 I_y}{dx^2} > 0$

For income from economic activities (y):

$I_y = h(y)$

$h' = \frac{dI_y}{dx} > 0$

$h'' = \frac{d^2 I_y}{dx^2} < 0$ And $h' > \ell'$

So, we suppose that the marginal income of both activities is positive, it is said, and an increase in economic activity (or the political Terrorist activity) translate into more financial resources. It is but in the financial product, it can be described as a means to get funds, so it can be stated that the economic activities are more "productive" than political violent activity$h' > \ell'$. As usual, we suppose there are decreasing returns in both activities.

The (c) part of the graph shows the total income the terrorist group gets by the mix of activities they carry out. As we have described, the income from the politically violent activity is an indirect source, such as donations from loyal supporters. The supporters will keep donating to the terrorist group when they see it representing the cause effectively. Further, we assume that the terrorist group will attract organisations and even some states interested in supporting terrorism to sponsor the group when they increase their political activities (Phillips & Pohl, 2021). Given that the supporters make their donation because the group is engaged in a politically violent activity they support, the terrorist group would lose all that income if it abandoned the politically violent activity. As a result, most political efforts would be directed at the political activities that have the most significant political influence. This is essentially the reason why most famous terrorist groups openly align with causes that some governments support. For instance, groups such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the Taliban may share the hate

for America to attract sponsorship from individuals and governments who share such ideals (Ali, 2010). So, formally the income from economic and political violent activities can be expressed as:

$I = I_x + I_y = \ell(x) + h(y)$

However, we know there is a relationship between x and y. So, we can replace economic activity "y" with political violent activity "$m(x)$" in the equation:

$EF = \ell(x) + h\,[m\,(x)]$

So, differentiating I (total Income) with respect to the level of political Terrorist activities can be written as:

$\frac{dI}{dx} = \ell'(x) + h'.m'(x)$

After that, the level of x activity that maximizes the income of the terrorist group taking in mind the trade-off between the x and y activities, is x_m that for which

$I' = 0 = \ell'(x_m) + h'.\ m'(x_m) = 0$

As we know, $\ell > 0,\ h' < 0$, but $m < 0$. So, the relationship between income (I) and the level of political Terrorist activity (x) is not linear (Gutfraind 2009). We can suppose that, initially, when the level of political terrorist activity is small, the increase in politically violent activity (x) would lead to an increase in the Total Income (I), even counting on the lesser level of y-activities. The increase leads to a decline in the economic activity (y) and a decrease in the income from economic activity (I_y). Nevertheless, this is more than adequately compensated with the income that comes indirectly from politically violent activities. The inverse relation is due to resources constraints, which necessitate the organisation to optimise its operations (Jackson 2009). The level where income from external sources of finance is maximised is shown in Figure 11. The graph shows that income increases as terrorist attacks increase. The theory is founded on the fact that terrorist groups often raise money through private donors and government sponsors terrorist organisations when they need to carry out an activity. Further, successfully carrying out a terrorist activity may endear the group to other sponsors and consequently increase its source of funds (Blannin, 2017). This is shown by the positive marginal income, which implies that more activities lead to more income. However, from a level of x_m terrorist political does not get enough money (fund) to the Terrorist group because the extra money from donations only can never be the replacement of the money, which terrorist groups might lose by doing less economic activities, and as a consequence, the Total Income the terrorist group gets decreases



Figure 11 Maximum Income from External Finance

Source: Anderton & Carter (2019)

So Xm is the level of violent political activities that maximise the financial resources that the terrorist group gets. To understand the behaviour of the terrorist group, it is necessary to consider the costs of the terrorist activities.

Cost structure

The cost structure is determined by the terrorist organisation's operations and level of activities conducted. As modelled in Figure 12, the group's cost structure will include the cost of producing the optimum combination of x and y. This can be represented as:

$$C = C(x) + C(y) + c(x, y)$$

Where $C_{(x)}$ is the cost of producing$x$, and $C_{(y)}$ is the cost of doing y and $C_{(x,y)}$ is the joint cost of doing x and$y$.

The first and second derivatives of cost with respect to x are positive, as shown below:

$$\frac{d}{dx} C_x = C'_{(x)} > 0$$

$$\frac{d^2}{dx^2} C_x = C''_{(x)} > 0$$



Figure 12 Cost Structure

Source: Author

This indicates that an increase in the level of x would always lead to an increase in costs. Similarly:

$\frac{d}{dx}C_y = C'_{(y)} > 0, \quad C''_{(y)} > 0$

Given that:

$y = m(x)$

So, we can write that:

$C = C(x) + C(y) + c(x, y)$

$C = C(x) + C[m(x)] + C\big(x, m(x)\big)$

$C'_x + C'_y \,.\, m'(x) + C_1 + C_2 \,.\, w'(x)$ And $C'_x > 0,\ C'_y > 0$ and $m'(x) < 0, C_1 > 0, C_2 > 0$

When the Terrorist group does not perform any x activity, it must face only the costs of doing y activities$\big(\bar{C}(\bar{y})\big)$. Then as x activity begins and increases, the total cost is starting to increase as well. We suppose that the total marginal cost of doing x is positive. When terrorist groups only do x activities$\bar{x}$, the total cost is$\big(\bar{C}(\bar{x})\big)$. We suppose that political Terrorist activity at the

maximum level is costlier than economic terrorist activity at the maximum level$\left(\bar{C}(\bar{y})\right)$, as shown below:

$\bar{C}(\bar{y}) = \bar{C}(\bar{y}) + C(0, \bar{y})$

$\bar{C}(\bar{x}) = \bar{C}(\bar{x}) + C(\bar{x}, 0)$

However, we can suppose other (scenarios) or assumptions, in which, as for instance, it would be liner for the economic activity. In that case, the total cost curve may be shown as indicated in Figure 13.



Figure 13 Cost Diagram for Terrorist Activities

Source: Author

It depends on many internal factors; perhaps we can think that the terrorist group pays its workers higher wages for the economic activities than the fighters in the political wing. This case assumes that terrorist fighters are more motivated to do political activities (x) than economic activity (y). This would be the case if the terrorist group positions itself as freedom fighters; they would be fighting or a cause without thinking of the potential returns. The organisations would have to ramp up their operations to gain funding from bigger terrorist groups, people, and regimes (Phillips & Pohl, 2021). The second aim would be to expand. In this regard, the majority of its expenditure may go toward extending its borders, raising the

number of fighters and wars it participates in, and increasing the number of terror incidents it participates in (Phillips & Pohl, 2021). For a sizeable terrorist organisation, the earnings would be used to maintain and protect its status. Instead of increasing terrorist activities, leaders and fighters would concentrate on living well since the inverse relationship indicates resource constraints and the need to share capital in a way that maximizes growth.

Profit Maximisation

Like in any ordinary business, the profit for the terrorist organisation would be represented by the difference between income and costs. The profit from political activities can be represented graphically, as shown in Figure 13.0. When a terrorist group produces X1 of political violent activity, it reaches the maximum profit for the group. As a result, if the terrorist group recruits more fighters and raises more money, it would survive and expand to a higher level in the future (Blannin, 2017). After reaching the maximum output X1, which produces the maximum profit, further political activities would reduce profitability given that the marginal profit is negative, as indicated in the graph. The reduction in profitability resulting from increased terrorist political violent activity would continue up to level X0.



Figure 14 Profit Maximisation

Source: Adapted from *Anderton & Carter (2019)*

If the terrorist group produces more than X0, it will lose money, lead to its bankruptcy, and need to get money from its "shareholders" and/or its managers and workers. Normally, that means the ideological/political leaders will have to cover it from their pocket to sustain the level of activity. Such a predicament is possible for gigantic terrorist groups, which already have attracted maximum support and sponsorship. In their case, an increase in activity would lead to an increase in income up to a certain level beyond, which it would not be possible to attract more sponsors further, regardless of whether the group increases its political activities. In the measure, the terrorist group has access to other sources of financing from external the level of x activity may be anyone, but only it has external finance; its level of x activity cannot be more than x0 (Bartlett, 2002).

The Final Model

The level of activity produced by each terrorist group would depend on the inherent motivation of the group. Specifically, terrorist organisations influenced by ideology rather than income would prefer to produce the maximum political violent activity. In contrast, terrorist organisations motivated by profitability would operate at the level where profit is maximized, as described in Figure 15.



Figure 15 Galbraithian Model

Source: Author

From the graph, X is the Maximum Political violent activity possible, although, for a level higher than X0, the terrorist group will encounter financial problems. Curve I and C represents the income and cost from the combination of X and Y produced. Applying the Galbraithian model, X0 would be the financially sustainable target for the ideological and political leaders. It is the terrorist activity level where the organisation uses all the income to produce as much political violent activity as possible. Political and ideological leaders are the terrorists leading groups whose aim is to pursue goals that are not motivated fundamentally by returns. In this case, all the income from economic and political activities would be geared towards producing the maximum political activities as indicated above.

On the other hand, operational leaders would want to maximise returns and prefer to do lesser political activities X1. In essence, operational leaders are those to whom terrorism represents a way of life. They would prefer to operate at a level where terrorism generates a comfortable level of income. The goal would be to survive and live a "good" life from their acts of terror.

It is not seemed to be unthinkable to suppose that the fighters at the beginning of the political struggle tend to be preferred than X0 as they see themselves as freedom fighters, and they do not have the capacity and the knowledge to calculate the economic consequences of the terrorist actions on the group (Rachlin, 2004). They will feel humiliated if they see themselves focusing on economic activity. However, with the years and decades of the struggle, they will tend to be less than X1, as they will see that they are the ones who are risking themselves, and the increase of doing more political violent activity means more chances to be killed or arrested by authorities (Lee, 2016b). There is a third level of the fighters, with the revenge objectives from minimum people or in many cases from a single person, and the main motive of their terrorist activity is to harm or kill that specific person. As they are taking the higher level of risk and want a lower level of x activity, they do not capture the ultimate strategical goal of the terrorist group. Many times, such fighters are captured early, and they pay the highest cost to be jailed or dead as they are on the field (Coffee, 2006).

2.5.2 Formal model of the terrorist group as Galbraithian Multi-product firm

A strong link between business and terrorism can be found in the work of John Kenneth Galbraith and the economic developments of the mid-20th century. In the present thesis, an attempt is made to offer new insights by building on the Galbraith multi-product firms. Terrorist groups vary widely in this regard, not only among one another but also across time. This dissertation also considers organisational leadership and, more crucially, human resource

management. Galbraith's concept of the multi-product firm included three subgroups: 1) owners (often shareholders), 2) techno-structure support, with middle management, and 3) the workers, as shown in Figure 15.0.

Returning to the issue of the multi-product firm's three levels within the structure, Galbraith observed that their interests sometimes diverged over the scope and pace of corporate reform. He posited an inherent conflict of interest between the owners, who periodically want to revolutionize the business, and middle management, which values standardisation and efficiency. Galbraith's three subgroups are transferrable to the study of terrorism. Numerous scholars have recognised that terrorist groups exhibit certain features, the organisational structure one might expect of a business or governmental agency. For example, at the top of such groups, one finds the political leaders who engage with the public, meet with the donors, and diffuse ideology. Their goals are often more far-reaching, unrealistic, and riskier than operational managers, who, along with many fighters, prefer to pursue lower-risk strategies.

In terrorism studies, this relates to the "preference divergence" issues which speak to the incompatibility of their members' goals due to the variance of commitment among members (Shapiro, 2013). The highly committed members are more likely to take up risky and potentially fatal assignments, and they are also the ones who are more likely to stick around. Thus, the least committed do not leave the organisation at a higher rate than the rate at which the most committed ones are getting eliminated or captured; the proportion of committed individuals will decrease, thereby diluting the mission and objectives of the terrorist organisation. The less committed take fewer risks and generally working at the backend, and thus are more likely to survive counterterror operations. As we think of the Terrorist group as a firm, we can analogise between the Galbrathian organisational structure and the organisational structure of the Terrorist Group.

This has got something to do with fragmentation in organisational dynamics, wherein the characteristics of group formation play a significant role in organisational evolution. This can be compared to a business enterprise as to how groups form in response to new businesses where the leadership and experience of individuals within the business enterprise can significantly impact the enterprise's success. These organisational dynamics containing the basic features and structures that influence the internal working of groups of individuals are equally applicable to the working of violent non-state actors. The assumption here is that militant groups are similar to other types of business firms. It is the organisational dynamics

that alter group behaviour, which includes survivability and success. Once again, to cite Shapiro (2013: ibid), terrorists are in no way different from the individuals working in traditional business enterprises. As a result, the more the preferences of principals and agents in the terrorist groups diverge, the more it causes worseness for the principals to have operatives in doing what they want. Stated otherwise, virtually all violent non-state actors exhibit a degree of 'internal disagreement', which only deteriorates further over a period of time, during which phase individuals gain experience.

Besides Shapiro, a number of scholars as Carter (2012); Horowitz (2010); Phillips (2014); Schweitzer (2011); Staniland (2010); Young & Dugan (2012) have drawn from other disciplines as economics, bureaucracy, military to explain militant groups behaviour in relation to organisational dynamics. Such a large amount of research also stresses the importance of organisation structure in influencing the effects of militants' behaviour. The structure is broadly seen as either hierarchical or decentralised, about which more is discussed in chapter 3. Given the fact that the identification of structure is of major importance for the counter-terrorism agencies to formulate their strategies, it can be stated that highly centralised terrorist groups are easier to spot, infiltrate and destabilize, whereas, on the other hand, it becomes difficult to do if the terrorist groups are decentralised for the reason flatter structures increase a group's flexibility to carry out tactical and operational experimentation without being getting noticed since command and controls are a lot more dispersed. The thesis outcome of Kilberg (2011) shows how structures exert effects that impact the behaviour of the groups.

This section can be concluded with the observation of Morrison (2013) on the point when preference divergence gets catalysed into action with the subgroup's decision to break away. Organisational exit and split take place when one of the factions believes their presence and continuance within the organisation is no longer possible and arising out of a belief in them that the newer organisation they are going to form would elicit sufficient levels of support, with resources and membership that would enable them to survive and succeed in their aims.

The Galbrathian model is diagrammatically presented in Figure 16. However, this kind of organisational structure is not fixed. It is modified upon the type of terrorist group resulting from other considerations posed by other factors that affect the terrorist group. It may be asserted that the organisational structure is one of those links between businesses and terrorist groups.



Figure 16 Galbraithian Organisational Structure - A Comparison of Types

Source: Author

For example, whether an organization is hierarchical, decentralised, networked, or cellular – along with the degree to which an organisation can modify its structure – indicates its complexity, with implications for its performance in the field.

2.5.2.1 Owners – Ideological Leaders

Ideological or political leaders and other parties that back terrorist activities want to control or protect their interests (Shiffman, 2020). This aligns pretty well with what Galbraith (2007) terms shareholders or owners of the business. The ideological or political leaders serve as the face of the group. They give specific instructions that must be carried out whether or not other actors at the lower levels are aware of the details of the entire plan. The ideological leaders must also decide between the economic and political vision of the group and balance them appropriately, but with a preference to emphasise the political activities (Chatham House, 2017).

Such is where people live in the Western world but have interests in either local leadership or use the terror cells to attack the ongoing administration efforts to fortify peaceful coexistence (Shiffman, 2020). In a terrorist organisation, they exploit the religious ideologies to make it seem like it is the radicalised people's interest to keep fighting for their freedom, and should they lose their lives along the way, the rewards in the next life are more than worthy of their sacrifices. Many stories of unknown graceful magical women would open the door of paradise immediately after they die during the fight for so-called freedom.

Also, ideological or political leaders can be individuals with businesses whose progress depends on violence (Ingram, 2020; Hansen, 2013). Taking an example of those paid to assist with humanitarian efforts to save society, they continue to make profits from the presence of refugees and refugee camps (Narang & Stanton, 2017). While they are seen as fighting for the greater good and sacrificing themselves to create a conducive environment and act as agents of change, they directly benefit from an absence of change.

Terrorist organisations face a collective action problem in which their struggle creates collective benefits but with individual costs. One way organisations overcome this is with a charismatic leader, who motivates individuals to sacrifice for the leader's mission and his vision rather than for the individual's benefit. According to Weber (1968), charismatic leaders hold "specific gifts of body and spirit" that must be "proven in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform miracles; if he wants to be a warlord, he must perform heroic deeds." Beyond the supernatural component, charisma may also be used to describe secular individuals who possess a "'magnetic' political personality," the specifics of which vary across cultures and time. Scholars from psychology, sociology, and business have defined charismatic individuals as having: "an unusual capacity to experience passion, extraordinary self-confidence, persistence, determination, and optimism"; "a contagious faith and confidence in the community's capacity to overcome, under their leadership, its distress"; the ability to invoke "enthusiasm and awe" from followers; and the capacity to "provide vision and a sense of mission, instil pride in and among the group, and gain respect and trust (Freeman, M., 2014).

2.5.2.2 Techno structures – Operational Managers

The techno structures remain one of the most vital aspects of the organisational structure. Termed operational leaders in the terrorist organisation, individuals at this level play various roles critical to the day-to-day running and survival of the terrorist group. Their roles usually extend beyond that which they are traditionally hired to perform. They can leverage multiple

skills in different related and unrelated areas to catalyse their performance (Galbraith, 2007). According to Galbraith (2007), such persons can take a wide array of decisions that would typically require the collaboration of multiple parties, usually with the help of technology. Training people to occupy these positions is not entirely feasible as traditional education and training systems do not often facilitate knowledge combination across specialised fields. Specialised talents require the need for advanced technology, capital infusion, and proper planning. In addition, these actors are foresight competent in their fields of specialisation and can respond to action as required.

In finding a market for the terrorist group's economic activity, operational leaders must foresee requirements and manage markets more effectively. The talent for managing goods produced from the terrorist market activities and pricing, promotions, and place or distribution is critical to the group's survival. Putting in place planning requires a proper understanding and access to a great variety of information. There must be actors who can foresee materials shortages with few available resources, estimated labour supply, and assess other production requirements. Knowledge of market pricing strategies, segmentation and targeting, alongside other market atomisation strategies, must be clearly defined. Other functions of promotion and distribution must be clearly defined to bring materials and goods, with proper systems installed to check payment receipts.

Financing talent must also be brought to bear as part of the operational leaders within the terrorist organisation. Insight on finance availability, how to source funds from financiers, what forms of funds are received, and how to liquefy these funds into cash would traditionally be the task of a group of actors with various specialisations. However, terrorist groups often have individuals in these positions playing a vital role in obtaining, digesting, and testing information that the group must traditionally handle. Working in collaboration and sourcing insight from others within the organisation, these actors can access the financial requirements of the group in addition to the technical know-how of how to siphon funds from distant sources and make them readily available (Hamin et al., 2016)

Similarly, operational leaders in charge of recruitment would have the appropriate expertise to source an adequate inflow of workers and experts whilst demonstrating a deep understanding of the market human resource dynamics. By playing key roles, techno structures can overcome the challenges groups face. Group decision making is often affected in terms of time and quality. Bureaucracy is removed, and the entire pool of knowledge is proceeded by a singular

actor. After taking into account constraining contexts, these actors offer solutions to the owners by structuring the opportunities available before them. This means adding attention to the problems faced by the owners and offer policy-oriented solutions to pressing problems (Dunn, 2012)

2.5.2.3 Workers – Foot Soldiers

The workers of operation are essential to the success of any endeavour, terrorism included. Employees are our most important customers because they can provide crucial insights into the overall organisation (Ogunmokun, 2020). However, they are often overlooked or neglected, and most companies do not view them as valuable assets. Employees will fully engage when they understand the strategy, the customer focus and the ultimate goals. They will feel motivated to deliver the best experience and to keep improving. They will truly live the organisation and help to evolve the interactions over time (Hazzaa, 2021). In this manner, they start to own the entire process. This will happen right across support environments, decision-makers, front line consultants – everyone will understand what your true worth is, and they will drive towards it.

This constitutes that the workers are the main operational front of the terrorist organisation (Ljujic et al., 2017; Cruz et al., 2020). They are comprised of front-end fighters and foot soldiers. With a rapid increase in the size and complexity of today's terrorist groups, the leaders seem to lose their power of decision and control at this level. These actors are assigned various grassroots roles and often serve as sacrificial pawns for the continuity of the terrorist groups. Their particular objectives may tilt to security because they perform the risky concrete activities, so terrorist group as a Galbrathian firm is an approach that underscores the inner conflict in the Terrorist group. This is an essential consideration to be used in counter-terrorism strategies.

2.6 The Security Restriction

In addition to economic restrictions, terrorist groups face unusual restrictions when compared with traditional firms. This is mainly due to the lack of laws and regulations protecting the terrorist groups and fighting them. Whilst traditional organisations fall on the police and local authorities for protection, the state acts as the custodian of safety and wellbeing for ordinary citizens and traditional organisations (Gumedze, 2008). In addition, the judiciary and other arbitration and mediation centres exist to resolve conflicts.

In addition to setting up their law enforcement systems, judicial, arbitration and mediatory centres, these organisations must also exhibit situational awareness as critical to balance and understand how to protect themselves from adversaries and general security factors. The security is against external parties and involves the need to ensure law and order within the encampments.

The response to be decided upon by terrorist organisations to potential government crackdown depends on assessing the impact on grassroots support (Shapiro, 2013). In a scenario where such support is fickle, the entity would desist from provoking the government into reprisals mode, debilitating the terrorist organizations' ranks. However, where the support gets boost upon government reprisals as they are seen to be damaging the social fabric and initiatives, the terror outfits would undertake prompt measures and get such attacks by the government intensified as that will probably lead to increasing the support for violence and sympathy for the terrorist organisation.

Their access to security resources may also constrain terrorist groups. In particular, access to foreign sanctuary may be critical (Salehyan, 2008). As Bapat (2007) shows, terrorist groups face a tough decision in seeking foreign sanctuary because doing so enhances their chances of survival and places them under the influence of a foreign power that may require them to alter their demands or turn on them in the future. Bapat models the strategic decisions of terrorists who take into account that trade-off and the strategic incentives of the prospective host and provides initial evidence that terrorists are more likely to move to host States that have a low capacity to influence their activities. More recent work calls into question the fundamental premise that access to the foreign sanctuary is an unalloyed good. Carter (2012b) shows that groups with foreign sponsors become more vulnerable if that sponsor provides heaven. He posits this because those sponsors face strong incentives to sell out their terrorist allies when they stop being valid proxies. Of course, a key determinant of how much security groups have is the baseline levels of support they enjoy from a population. Drawing on this insight, Berman et al. (2011) model the three-way interaction between insurgent organisations seeking to do violence, government forces seeking to suppress them with a mix of public goods provision and military action, and the population stuck in the middle which must decide whether to share information with counterinsurgents. They show that norms of non-cooperation with the government can critically impact the equilibrium of that interaction and use data from Iraq to test the model.

In general, the terrorist group faces an organisational dilemma whenever the leader and the workers have different preferences. This can happen due to lack of motivation but mainly due to the best solution for this cause and how to act it. In such cases, the leader must immediately take control of the situation and gather everyone on a single page (Ganor, 2005). A similar moral hazard problem that occurred and generated a trade-off between the finances and the security is when a task is assigned by the leaders but not perfectly observed (Miller, 2009). For example, in many cases, the middleman is called to manage funds for the attacks, and in many cases, a middleman is not motivated for the mission. They are only there because of the financial rewards (Shapiro, 2012). In such cases, many things can go wrong. A bomb may not fully operate; the middle man may sell out to the government, the worker may get unlucky in all such cases, the leader only observes the failure or success of the worker and never access the problems with the middle man (Shapiro, 2008).



Figure 17 Terrorist Organisational Structure - A Trade-off between Operational Security and Political Violent Activity[10]

Adapted from: START (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) (2017)

[10] Lone Actors as they are not considered Terrorist group with organizational behaviour, because it consists of a member with no interaction with other people inside a group.

It is very consistent, in hierarchical organisations, the political leaders are not worried about the security (low level of operational security), as they usually live in safe heavens, and they are not worried about the security of lesser people in the group (operational leaders or fighters) for that the political leaders want a lot of (x) political violent activity (Miller, 2009). On the other hand, cellular (moderate lower level of security) or networked (moderate-higher in security level)., the managers want more security because they are at risk. Especially if the ideological leaders are living in secured places or franchises group and lone wolves (even higher level of security), the same idea with the fighters who risk they must, and they are on the field (Abrahms, 2008). So, in that logic, each level of Galbrathian firm has its preferences on the organisational style. For instance, the political leaders' objective is to transform the terrorist group into a mass movement or a quasi-state where their authority will be more expanded over more population.

Nevertheless, when it comes to operational leaders, they think of establishing families and gaining enough money to live comfortably, making their security considerations higher. It must be added that it is not unusual for normal businesses to hire security experts or personnel to protect cyber and physical resources; however, terrorist groups face several security restrictions, which can be considered nearly inevitable (Krueger & Malečková, 2003). To conclude, a terrorist group is not a monolithic group, but a conflictual group to measure the different competent pursue different objectives or not wholly the same objective.

2.7 Recruitment and Loyalty restriction

Berman & Latin (2008) argue that religious groups are more prone to resort to 'suicide bombing', but that is in no way connected to the religious motivations of such groups. In this context, they extend the application of the club model drawn from economics and sociology of terrorism (Iannaccone 2006, Iannaccone & Berman 2006) that such action of the religious groups is linked to intragroup organisational dynamics. The religious groups that adopt extremity in their outlook are faced with the risk of sub-optimal utilisation of resources if soft supporters are permitted to remain in the club. Such of them are chosen as 'suicide bombers', with which the clubs achieve the dual objectives of weeding out the soft supporters and also hitting the hard targets. The sustentative implications of the club model from an organisational perspective is that (i) suicide bombing takes place arising out of strategies planned by the extreme religious groups at an organisational level, (ii) small organisations lack the infrastructure to use suicide bombing as that would wipe-away their organisational resources

and (iii) as observed by Horowitz, (2014) religious groups that fall below a thresh-hold of largest size are more likely to adopt to suicide bombing than largest terrorist groups.

Traditional organisations go through the process of publications, selection, interview, exam and final recruitment. However, in terrorist groups, this process does not apply – an instance is that they cannot publish in the newspapers for a general search for talent. Moreover, it is difficult for the terrorist group to hire - hiring creates additional problems in the areas of loyalty since their actions are often tested by the masses (Cruz et al., 2020).

Recruitment for these terrorist organizations becomes easy when religious elements facilitate the process by indoctrinating youth. Moreover, the economic issues of unemployment and lack of prospects within regions create an environment where the youth are forced to join these entities' folds (Berman, 2009; Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). It can be argued that a significant segment is committed to the cause as they have joined through indoctrination purely and are brainwashed for terror. Hence, commissioning the support of radical elements of religious clergy would be one of the main controls of these organizations like ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah. They provide the moral and perceived religious validation of the nefarious causes. Keeping the clergies in good humour and rewarding them handsomely for their contribution emerges as one of the main controls.

Nevertheless, the economic conditions are not correlated with the recruitment quickly and linearly. The study has found evidence that the terrorists of Hamas (Berrebi, 2003) and Hezbollah (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003) are neither flawed nor ill-educated compared to the rest of the society. The socioeconomic status of the recruits is higher as compared to the rest of the society. This study throws doubt on the assertion and belief in some quarters that poverty breeds terrorism (Abadie, 2004; Akhmat et al., 2013; Krueger, 2007; Easterley, 2016). However, the fact that poor socio-economic condition contributes to terrorism cannot be discounted, with the recruitment based on “terrorist ability” and potential – in addition to that from the standpoint that better-educated individuals would make for better terrorists, (Karandashev, 2021, p. 93).

ETA has used significant landmark events in Spanish history as a means to trigger massive recruitment drives. For example, after Franco's death, as the Basques felt emboldened, ETA leveraged the opportunity to recruit youth to increase violence against the state (Heger et al., 2012; Saad & Alhumaid, 2018). “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” (FTF), a new term that has emerged recently, widely includes all individuals who travel to a State other than their States

of residence or nationality for the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC resolution 2178, adopted mainly to counter the increasing threat by FTF, primarily targets individuals travelling to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to join ISIS (Da'esh), the Al-Nusrah Front and specific other cells or derivatives of Al-Qaida.

HTS, formerly known as Nusra Front, continues to pursue a jihadist agenda; it formally split from al-Qaeda in 2016, prompting harsh criticism from al-Qaeda leadership and defections by al-Qaeda loyalists. Al-Qaeda appears to have given up on HTS returning to the fold. Hurras al-Din, a new group that emerged last year, is widely believed to be al-Qaeda's new branch in Syria, former ISIS Fighters with some links to ISIS and Alqaeda. Despite this, the UN and many countries continue to consider HTS as an al-Qaeda affiliate and frequently use its former name, Nusra Front. The group itself appears to be trying to strike a balance between maintaining its jihadist credentials and distancing itself from global jihadist groups for the sake of survival. HTS today is one of the most powerful militant factions in northern Syria, having consolidated its power in the region through seizing territory from rival rebel groups in the past two-year ISIS and Al-Qaeda have extensive networks spanning Western countries. They recruit from foreign shores and arrange for their travel and accommodations to bring them to warring regions (Bowman-Grieve, 2013).

Before the Arab Spring erupted in 2011, some 30,000 Muslim foreign fighters had already taken part in 18 different conflicts, ranging from Bosnia to Kashmir and the Philippines (Schmid, 2015). By 2015 approximately 40,000 individuals from over 120 countries had travelled to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic as fighters, says UNODC report. These fighters are eager to embrace "martyrdom", thereby making it difficult to keep them calm during strategic occasions when wait-and-watch tactics are required. This is so because a sacrifice serves as an initiation rite, securing membership and with it access to religious club goods (Berman & Laitin, 2008).

The following description depicts how Hezbollah's supply chain in Lebanon operates:

> *"In Lebanon, the terrorists are generally from the deprived areas, mainly the internally displaced person. They are recruited through intense religious indoctrination, followed by induction into the armed ranks of Hezbollah. For that, the Elite Guard of Iran trains*

and indoctrinate. Eventually, the terrorists are readied for the regional battlefront." (Berman & Laitin, 2008, p. 1942)

The radical organisations, in this regard, tap into the diaspora, mainly via Club Model, and get a seamless supply of terrorist fighters. The state-sponsorship, thereby, legitimises such designs by providing political support and security. Places of worship and social gatherings provide the meeting point, and a venue for terrorist activities are strengthened in the guise of religious duty.

As far as competition between terrorist groups over the supply chain is concerned, the sources can be the same or similar ideology. However, two competing terror outfits bidding for the position –Hamas and rival Fatah are an excellent case in point (O'Leary, 2017). Both the outfits had parallel supply chains. The supply chains also compete for supply and the use of terror by various states. Hezbollah supplies its services to Iran in return to get state patronage and financing (Center for Security Policy, 2017). The model is underpinned by finance and ideology, and the lack of economic and social reforms in the regions help nurture it and take hold. Thus, it is in the interests of terrorist organisations, especially those indoctrinating the youth, to destroy social and economic infrastructure. They, thus, engage in provoking disproportionate responses from the state to intensify the terrorist organisations' supply lines. If the supply is depleted, the terror machinery would probably falter in the long run due to robust counterterrorism efforts to compound the problem. To break the supply of terror, its sponsorship and supporting mechanisms, the counterterrorism agencies and organisations need a clear strategy to identify the dynamics at play and the areas for focused interventions to disrupt the supply chains, both in finance and recruitment.

Berman & Laitin (2008) describe it as "The Club Model". The club model portrays voluntary religious organisations as efficient providers of local public goods who weed out potential defectors by requiring sacrifices as signals of commitment. They are thereby able to succeed in dangerous terrorist attacks such as suicide bombings. It starts with public goods provision to the marginalised in society, thereby creating a high level of trust and interdependence, which can be exploited later. It helps to gauge the damage caused by highly informed defectors. For instance, after a dispute with Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden over finance issues, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a Sudanese citizen, defected and became an informant to the United States government in the mid-1990s. Consequently, many of his comrades were incriminated based on valuable information Jamal provided to the USA counterterrorist operatives whilst being on their reward and witness program.

In the case of the Taliban, the successful militia groups control defection through the concept of "mutual aid" (Berman & Laitin, 2008). The successful outfits efficiently provide social services through mutual aid – a concept that requires the volunteers to demonstrate their commitment to the cause by sacrificing time and resources. As the concept gets rooted, the "defection constraint" gets too limiting, increasing the chances of the individuals and their dependents staying true to the cause. As a result, even families send their kids to religious schools, shunning a better future for their kids, thereby demonstrating the sacrifice element. As the kids grow up, they have inferior alternatives to staying in the organisation and invariably follow their parents' footsteps. Those who sacrifice are counted as full-time members and given more sensitive tasks that require a higher degree of trust and risk. This model has also been successfully used by Hamas, where the more violent activities are given to more reliable members who exhibit a higher degree of sacrifice.

Terrorist organisations require a constant supply of recruits, apart from financial resources, to successfully plan and execute their designs (Anderton & Carter, 2019). The recruitment sources first require a mission to be ingrained and inculcated – sold from empathy and relational aspects to the masses. Indoctrination, hence, is of critical importance, with an ideology sold resulting from some perceived disenfranchisement, sense of deprivation or revenge. The logic of using the Berman model is showing that as the terrorist group resolve the loyalty and recruitment problem, the violent political activity will increase as the workers will not have any other alternatives.



Figure 18 The Relationship of Loyalty with Political Violent Activity

Source: Author

If the loyalty increases, the political leaders have a more robust chain of command over middle managers and have more substantial authority over the fighters. They follow the orders with a higher level of loyalty, which increases x activity as the club model explains how vulnerable those fighters and their families will be outside the terrorist group.

2.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter looks at the terrorist group as a business enterprise, paying keen attention to the economic dynamics of how such business may be managed effectively. This attempt is not new, as earlier theoretical and economic proponents of terrorism have considered this position (Anderton & Carter, 2019; Agrawal, 2020). Nonetheless, an attempt is made to create novel insights that will pave the way to comprehend existing dilemmas specific to business and management challenges of terrorism. In this quest, the underlying rationale is to reveal the successful implementation of appropriate counter-terrorism strategies by the government agencies to fight terror (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006). Profiling terrorist organisations from the economic perspective would facilitate identifying the weak and solid economic points to inform critical interventions necessary to thwart the objectives of terrorist organisations. Moreover, in the wake of the increased complexity of terrorist activities, the economic perspective to counter-terrorism has become equally relevant as other traditional and conventional counter-terrorism strategies (HM Government, 2006).

Like traditional organisations, terrorist organisations need capital to operate effectively (Jayasuriya, 2002). Aside from capital, terrorist groups often need a similar profile of resource requirements like any other organisation. This includes the vital need for human resources both at the front-end of the terrorist activities and in the management and financing of the terrorist activities. In addition, Etzioni (2010) observes that terrorist organisations have an objective, vision, mission, and key performance indicators (KPIs) (Macchia, 2004). Like traditional entities, terrorist organisations exhibit a sense of rationality regarding economic restrictions and resource limitations such as repression, persecution, target killing, and lack of cohesion. Although these dilemmas are different from traditional non-violent organisations, they persist, and a constant need for resources is always a vital problem (Bosi et al., 2019).

From the counter-terrorism standpoint, intelligence and law enforcement agencies must carefully evaluate and understand the economic behaviour of these organisations to develop effective counter-strategies that will be capable of detecting and defeating the terrorists (Caruso & Locatelli, 2014). This insight will also inform the allocation of resources against such

adversaries, with the appropriate metrics to measure the results of effective counter-terrorism. Contrary to the widespread assumption that terrorism is an exclusive non-profit venture, economic theory explains that the economic position of the terrorist group is usually juxtaposed to their political motives. The application of resources to these two areas holistically explain the production possibilities of the terrorist organisation, given the limited resources in their possession (Berebbi, 2009). Increasing the cost of the terrorist attacks against a limited budget would reduce the success of such an operation. Moreover, orchestrating a lower rate of return for terrorist activities would be a step in the right direction to reduce such acts' economic viability and attractiveness in a coherent effort to reduce terrorism (Khan & Yu, 2019).

Neglecting the economic position of terrorist groups impedes the fight against terrorism as it offers them room to adopt profitable and relatively rudimentary portfolio management along with their modest resources. Therefore, the economic dimension adds to the effectiveness of terrorism outside of traditional "coercive" counter-terrorism strategies (Raczynski, 2020). The fundamental notion of humans as rational, however, cannot be removed from the discussions. Like traditional businesses, terrorist groups exhibit signs of rational risk avoidance and profit maximisation (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007). They, therefore, run a cost-benefit assessment to justify actionable strategies in pursuance of political and economic outcomes.

The strategic paradigm in terrorism studies posits that those terrorists are political utility maximisers. When the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest, the terrorist act is considered instrumentally rational (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007). Likewise, with limited resources, the terrorist group considers the opportunity of terrorist attack over the cost of choosing an alternative form of protest (Cohen, 2019). This strategic position also serves as the foundation for the primary forms of rationality exhibited by terrorist groups. According to Johnson (2009), the Darwinian competition applies to the case of terrorists; contrary to the popular business outcome of competition among firms, terrorist groups put their lives on the line in mainstream economic and political competition. As a matter of life and death, terrorist groups compete against both the state and one another; the pressures and risk from this competition are very high and comes at the cost of their lives (Brown et al., 2011).

It must be added that the competition between the terrorist organisations and other groups or the government has been described as “economic warfare” and not “economic competition” (Clarke, 2015). This is based on the assertion that rivals of terrorist groups are enemies and not

mere business rivals. Whilst traditional business competition involves market share acquisition and provision of room to co-exist with competitors, terrorists and their competitors usually seek to wipe out each other in a fierce competition of no rules for co-existence (Lutz & Lutz, 2006). Irrespective of the action of a government, terrorists can further their bargaining power if they receive concession or warrant retaliation through their attacks. The economic benefits of winning public support for the terrorist cause may as well be brought into perspective.

The inability to protect the people from the terrorist group, as well as the inaction on the part of the government to respond to activities of the terrorist group, send unique signals to the citizens of the country and dilute the support for the government to the point of making the terrorist groups attractive, (Reisman, 1999). Terrorist organisations require a constant supply of recruits, apart from financial resources, to successfully plan and execute their designs (Anderton & Carter, 2019). The recruitment sources first require a mission to be ingrained and inculcated – sold from empathy and relational aspects to the masses. Indoctrination, hence, is of critical importance, with an ideology sold resulting from some perceived disenfranchisement, sense of deprivation or revenge. The logic of using the Berman model is showing that as the terrorist group resolve the loyalty and recruitment problem, the violent political activity will increase as the workers will not have any other alternatives.

There is ample evidence in the literature to support the view that 'suicide attacks' can be explained as instrumentally rationale from an organisational perspective. Harrison (2003) offers a socio-economic perspective by arguing that in an atmosphere when there persists an oppressed environment in the society, the young ones are offered with an incentive to build, nurture and promote an identity, which is rendered valuable in the form of death with which they become martyrs. The author further opines that acts of suicide terrorism have to be analysed as an outcome of a self-enforcing contract between the recruits and the terrorist groups that recruit them, which is similar to one in an organisation, except the fact that the former does not enjoy legal validity. Further, by providing examples of suicide bombings in Lebanon between 1983 and 1986, and citing Merari (1998), the author had brought to the fore that the attackers identified themselves more with secular organisations than those based on religion and voluntarily giving up the life by the recruited ones is identified more with 'an act of 'heroism' and 'tragicness', and less with loyalty to religion and cannot be construed 'bad' or 'mad'.

From an economic perspective, ‘suicide terrorism’ is the output of a contract between the consenting parties, which gets formalised voluntarily between the attackers and the leader(s) for mutual benefit. However, there always exists a threat of the contract getting defaulted. Since there is a lacuna in the enforceability of the contract, in that voluntary death of the attackers' means, who have been not alive, cannot enforce the contract, the contract lacks credibility. With a view to pluck this loophole, it is necessary to make the contract self-enforcing towards evidence is again offered in Merari’s research, as reported by Martin (2001). The evidence has got to do with the promoting of ‘living martyr’. This is orchestrated within a few days before the attach during when the bomber records a final statement expressing his joy at becoming a ‘martyr’ through photos and letters to relatives and friends, which binds him without an avenue backtrack for the reason if he tries to do so, he would lose his identity and reputation. Nonetheless, like in an organisation with stakeholders, in suicide terrorism, the leaders benefit, as he does not die but also benefits from the profits he makes from the deaths of their foot soldiers. It proves to go that the underlying motive of the leader is driven by rational self-interest.

Therefore, the net effect of suicide attacks is the payoff that is got by promoting terrorist factions garnering power. In a typical cost-benefit analysis, which is a byproduct of rational action, the benefit of the terrorist groups growing much more outweighs the cost of impoverishment and counter action despite the fact that there takes place repeated destruction of its highly committed cadres

The long term solution that can act as a prerequisite to reducing the potential for the recruitment of ‘suicide terrorists’ is to ease the communal oppression from which these youngers are getting recruited. Therefore, weakening the terrorist groups ability to recruit ‘suicide attackers’ by making the identity redundant and blocking the flow of illicit financing is of paramount importance for the counter-terrorism agencies.

The author of this thesis concludes that in spite of the efficiency and modern methods of intelligence inputs with which states operate in containing ‘suicide terrorism’, it is fraught with limitations and uncertainty. This limits the states' powers to contain ‘suicide terrorism’, and tasting success may be farfetched, unless or otherwise, they address the underlying basic conflicts from which ‘suicide terrorism’ springs up.

CHAPTER THREE: ORGANISATIONAL MODEL FOR TERRORIST GROUPS

3.1 Introduction (Organisational Structure)

This chapter deals with the organisational aspects of 'terrorist groups'. Its key objective is to demonstrate that 'organisational structure' is a strategically important element for the terrorist groups, as it is so for the functioning of traditional business firms. While in some respects it can be similar to that a normal business firm, for example, the conduct of some of the day-to-day business activities, leadership skills, etcetera, yet, the comparison stops there, as their structure is a lot more complex, exhibiting characteristics of a 'multilayer business firm' that is rare to find in the normal business world. Despite the complexities involved, it is necessary to probe them deeply as an understanding of it throw light in aiding the state to combat terrorist activities.

Terrorist organisations cannot easily be managed due to control-efficiency constraints (Shapiro, 2013). According to the author, political or ideological leadership guides business structure formulation with which control and other efficiency-related metrics are measured. For example, control depicts the degree to which the leadership exercises a tight managerial grip over the operations and resources (Shapiro, 2013). There is major emphasis on maintaining secrecy to survive and to operate in constant opposition from the governments and other regional terrorist groups.

However, the organisational structure of terrorist organisations is a lot more complex than the traditional business firms. There is a complex interplay between organisational capabilities, leadership, recruitment, weaponry, command and control and operations to sustain their terrorist activities. They cannot be viewed just under a formal structure of functioning of business firms in terms of finance, recruitment, etcetera. It is necessary to examine them through a lens of complex structure that contains a business firm's multi-layer characteristics, as depicted in Fig 16 (Galbrathian Organisational Structure: A comparison of Types in Chapter 2), which is rare to be found in the real business world. As a result, terrorist groups not only are confronted with severe constraints in the choice of an organisational structure than that of normal firms for a reason its inside aspects as leaders, foot soldiers, etcetera, are important, added to which, they constantly face a threat to their survival has to be taken into account. Nonetheless, their structural elements need to be unearthed to formulate strategies to combat them effectively.

3.1.1 Elements of organisational Structure

The organisational structure objective of terrorist groups is linked to their ideology of violence, through which they try to address the grievances. Such ideologies can be from the religious or political beliefs they hold or a combination of them, which they use to unify members, form links with other organisations. Religious fanaticism (e.g. establishing an independent Islamic theoretic state with no constitution, where the governance would be through Sharia law, the religious law of Islam, as in the case of Afghanistan) is seen to be more dominantly prevailing as a principal motivator for terrorism. This can be identified as a type of political violence, which can be seen as a reaction to political and social changes that take place from time to time. Nonetheless, the organisational structure still bears similarity with a normal business structure. The bottom line in both cases is 'money', but the difference is that it is collected illegally through coercive measures, in the case of terrorist groups. At the same time, it is a profit motive that is legitimate in respect of traditional firms.

3.1.2. Leadership

While the leadership structure in traditional business firms is ordinarily governed by a 'hierarchical structure', in respect of terrorist groups, it is at the centre. By virtue of being so, the leader participates directly right from planning to execution of activities by giving orders to others. While in traditional organisations, the leader's charisma may apply as a leader's trait to maintain cohesion, it is not the case here, as the leaders have to be ruthless in executing, wherein there is no place for any human qualities.

There exists an element of weakness in the leadership structure of terrorist groups, yet there does not exist a clear cut succession plan, which the state can exploit to take control of them. For instance, the elimination of Abdullah Ocalan from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey had brought about a deleterious impact on the terrorist groups.

3.1.3 Commanding and Controlling Methods

These are mechanisms that the terrorist groups resort to plan, coordinate the execution of their attacks. In addition, they can also retain their own security while executing actions because they

are given from hideouts occupied in difficult terrains, access to which is not possible through common transportation.

3.1.4 Environment

Much has been described in the business and organisational literature on the internal and external environment, which determines their operations. The environment is comprised of forces and individuals with whom an organisation interacts in the course of conducting its business that impacts its operations.

Terrorist groups use the environment as a functional space to plan, train and execute their attacks. It ranges from urban neighbourhoods to state sanctuaries, support of communities, local as well as transnational. It also enables them to survive by adapting to the environment. The foregoing discussion demonstrates the terrorist groups have in place for an organisational structure in terms of leadership, recruitment, training support. It is a lot more complicated and unravelling; it would offer strategic opportunities for the states to contain their activities and the harm they cause. In other words, instead of pursuing predominantly a military support that aims at wiping away them, which may not always be successful or the cost of success is very high, they should consider analysing their organisational structure to formulate a comprehensive plan that would cut their links through calibrated economic and monetary measures, that would strike deeply into the root and throttle them.

The remaining aspects of the chapter further elaborate on business level implications of the financial, recruitment, security, control, and efficiency restrictions that terrorist organisations face. It also introduces the various operational structures of the terrorist organisation and the degree to which these structures balance control versus operational security.

3.2 The main factors that influence the organisational style

3.2.1. Financing

Undoubtedly finance is an indispensable ingredient to oil the continued operation of terrorist organisations. It provides the means to scout the frontline fighters, trains and remunerate them to pursue the political and economic agenda of the group. Financial resources also come in handy to procure materials and equipment, among others (Freeman, 2012). Availability of finance is

fundamental to the operations and sustainability of terrorist outfits, whose life cycle and resilience depend strongly on their ability to generate funds (Gold, 2003).

As established in Chapter 2, terrorists source funds through sponsorship streams and undertaking other market and non-market activities. Strategically, it is the quantum of financing that dictates the scale and magnitude of attacks, which the terrorists are able to execute. Passas (2007) estimated that the September 11 attack on US soil had cost about half a million dollars. Like any other business organisation that budgets for the present and future, the terrorists also have to prepare and put in place an estimate of what would cost towards the establishment of training facilities and housing of the structures, recruiting and indoctrinating, procurement of firearms, explosives, putting in place communication and satellite equipment (Burns & Semple, 2006).

It is possible to identify five criteria, which are associated with terrorist financing, which are (i) legitimacy, (ii) security, (iii) control, (iv) simplicity and (v) reliability; among them, legitimacy is seen as a key to the success of terrorist financing because it gives credence to an organisation to raise funds legally. Organisations with doubtful credibility face tremendous difficulties in raising funds as their intent for doing so is viewed without any justification (Elmi & Nagwenyama, 2020; O'Brien, 2012; Trager & Zagorcheva, 2006; Zabvelina, 2019). In addition, the reliability and definiteness of securing funds are of paramount importance to the terrorist groups on account of the nature of their operations.

Two key factors that play a central role in the financing reliability of terrorist groups are geographical and demographic features. Communication research confirms audience segmentation as a relevant and beneficial tool, especially when they are appended as local tags in national communication campaigns (O'Keefe et al., 1990). According to Slater (1995), demographic and geographical factors can effectively influence the attitudes and behaviours of the members of terrorist groups, for instance, towards suicide killing.

While elaborating on the merits and limitations of different organisational structures of terrorist groups, for instance' pyramid hierarchy', hybrid organisational structures, Stout et al. (2008), by quoting a strategist, Abu Musab al-Suri, mentions that the organisational structure, among other things, would have to take into the geographical nature of the country to determine what has failed in similar situations and it is the particular conditions at the ground level that is key to decide the

best organisational structure. It can also be seen that al-Qaeda made sure that not only various components are geographically linked but also used it to address global networking to take care of substitution effects in the event of some nodes being attacked.

The importance of democratic elements is even more startling. The members of terrorist groups are neither illiterate nor seen to be suffering from any mental illness. They are found to be normal human beings within their environment, and some who lead these have relatively privileged backgrounds. As has been documented by Sageman (2008) and Berrebi (2003: also mentioned elsewhere in this chapter), the common beliefs that jihadis are poor, uneducated, mentally deranged or not familiar with democracy are not only erroneous but are unfounded as well.

Closeness to the sources of funds is important in guaranteeing reliability. Elmi & Ngwenyama (2020) support this assertion as they believe that organisations whose source of funding is from a foreign state need to at least have access to that state in order to secure funds with ease.

Control over financial sources is vital in the operation of terrorist groups. They place prime importance on the internal control of their operations. Again by referring to Elmi & Ngwenyama (2020), it can be stated that the acquisition of funds increases the power and influence of the leaders as well their level of control. Terrorist organisations whose main source of finance is from the state or national sources tend to have limited control over their strategies. Private donors also tend to exert some form of control on how the group should run their activities, thus further limiting their decision-making autonomy. Even though countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, Syria and South Yemen have been spotted among state financiers of terrorism, Passas (2007) observes that there is a decline in this trend due to increased sanctions from the international community. The importance of external factors gels well with what has been stated in the previous chapter on the class struggle among the leaders, managers, and foot soldiers and in succeeding in garnering funds as discussed here.

By mapping the financial operations onto the levels of power within the terrorist organisation, it must be added that the illegitimacy in terrorist financing usually stems up from the intensions of terrorist leaders to augment their personal wealth using their position of authority as leverage. It is possible to infer that inner struggle is always won by the leaders, but this is not so for a reason. While key financial operational leaders also play an integral role in masterminding the income

generation capabilities of the terrorist organisations, to whom frontline fighters are included in being engaged to generate some economic activities at the operational level. When these organisations secure funds through legal or illegal means, ideological leadership also has a role to play, which is geared towards minimising the public's negative 'stigma'.

By utilising their financial position, ideological leadership can leverage power and control and balance the priorities placed on security and efficiency. Due to the high chance of infiltration (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008), leaders need to exercise caution and often compete with other criminal enterprises on a common source of funds (Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013). According to Picarelli & Shelley (2007), terrorists combine a mixture of market and non-market financing operations ranging from the smuggling of goods, commodities and drugs. The illegal smuggling of diamonds from Tanzania by AQI is one such terrorist financing effort (Picarelli & Shelley, 2007). Roth & Sever (2007) also pointed out some monetary benefits from human trafficking. The case of PKK on human trafficking was well elaborated in the previous chapter until the British Government's intervention (Natarajan, 2019; Parker, 2018; Madani, 2002). It is not unusual that terrorist organisations look into quick money generation sources to finance operations (Picarelli & Shelley, 2007; Hutchinson & Malley, 2007), alongside other legitimate business activities (Financial Action Task Force, 2008) and cryptocurrencies (Mendick, 2017; Torpey, 2018).

It may be pertinent to note that while speaking at the UN Security Council briefing on 'Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts' on Friday, 20th August 2021 (ANI, Friday, 20th August 2021), the External Affairs Minister to India, S. Jaishankar had stated that the flow of funds has been continuing and the rewards for killing are now even paid in Bitcoin to radicalise vulnerable youth through online propaganda campaigns and hence this remains a serious concern. This further proves that these organisations are engaged in economic activities of all types that can generate funds, including Bitcoin.

3.2.2. Recruitment

The actions of terrorism are motivated by perceived and real injustices, which offers a fertile breeding ground for recruitment. Terrorist groups have to maintain a 'recruitment pool' to ensure their survivability. It also needs to be constantly replenished with new members to make up for losses and defections.

One of the strategies they resort to is setting up front companies under the guise of charities or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which acts as a base for recruiting fighters. They are lured with powerful monetary incentives besides

The operations of the terrorist organisation require continuous human capital engagement for efficient and effective execution of their plans (Anderton & Carter, 2009). Terrorist organisations usually harness religious elements as a means of indoctrinating their recruits, who are usually youth. According to the Center for Analysis of Terrorism (2016), the youths are usually compelled into terrorist groups when unemployment and other bad economic conditions prevail in the region. The youth are recruited and are made to undergo rigorous and intensive training schemes where they are deeply indoctrinated and brainwashed.

There is, however, evidence to suggest no correlation between economic conditions and terrorist recruitment activities. Berrebi (2003) and Krueger & Maleckova (2003) arrived at a similar conclusion of no correlation when examining the economic conditions of Recruits of Hamas and Hezbollah in their respective studies. Specifically, these recruits were neither classified as poor and illiterates but held in high esteem the ideology of the terrorist organisation and its leadership. Krueger (2007), however, had a contradictory report that suggests a positive correlation between terrorism and poverty.

In addition to the reliance on landmark events to recruit personnel, Heger et al. (2012) reported the case of cross-border recruitments (Schmid, 2015; Berman & Laitin, 2008). The FTFs were incited by the concept of martyrdom, where sacrifices serve as an indication to initiate them to become members of a religious club and enjoy the benefits associated with being a member of the group. This club model has successfully been adopted by Hamas & Taliban (Berman, 2009). Beyond recruitment, Shapiro (2013) emphasises the need for training and mentoring of operatives to ensure they carry out the mission successfully.

The need for a system that grooms recruits to become potential leaders and serve as successors to the current leaders is vital for the survival and continuity of the terrorist organisation. An example of a terrorist group that collapsed due to not having a succession plan is the pro-social equity group, Tupac Guerilla Army of Bolivia, after the arrest of a large section of its leadership (Telesur, 2014).

Like corporate and formal organisations, terrorist groups have remuneration and beneficiary or compensational packages for their recruited members. Shapiro & Jung (2014) revealed that documents seized by counterterrorists during a fight with ISIS indicated precise and well-documented wages, even though not lucrative.

3.2.3. Security

Even though maintaining a balance between security and control poses a dilemma to terrorist groups leadership, yet they have to maintain this delicate balance to remain operational. According to Shapiro (2013), in order to remain operational, terrorist organisations trade security with control. This is because they are constantly faced with the threat of being cracked down by the government. In addition, they need to use security as a mechanism to protect their groups from infiltration. Functionally, they assign this function to operational heads, who have to check, instil security, safety and wellbeing of the people (Gumedze, 2008). Conflicts and disputes are resolved through arbitration and a mediation system. In all these, the op leadership plays a decisive role in the interpretation and enforcement of laws and rules, while the ideological and operational leaders are vested with playing the roles of arbitrators and mediators.

Additionally, such a balancing is also done by seeking local and international help. Salehyan (2007) determined that international support is sought by expanding the operations across borders, enabling them to gain access to foreign sanctuaries, where governmental agencies are likely to be minimal. A case in example is that of Boko Haram operating on the cross-border areas between Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. According to Bapat (2007), such territorial advantage may also be considered in tough decision-making, which may help meet their demands.

Nonetheless, maintaining security is easier said than done as terrorist groups face serious challenges while implementing it on the ground. For instance, internal conflicts always take place between ideological and operational leaders. In Ganor (2005) opinion, this causes differing preferences between the leaders and followers, (e.g. ideological leaders and foot soldiers), resulting in conflicts and rifts. From an organisational point of view, there is a decline in motivation, which requires leaders to intervene to set things right, as it otherwise can cause rift across the ranks and unrest within the organisation. Apart from Shapiro (2012;2008), Miller (2009)

has also raised the red flag by observing that it can result in 'moral hazard', resulting in forced dependence on contracted security personnel.

The organisational structure of terrorist groups can see the highest cracks when it comes to handling security. The economic objectives could be relegated to the background given the pulls and pressures between the three levels of the personnel, VIZ, managerial, operational leaders and foot soldiers, respectively. While those who manage may be concerned highest with security, the ideological leaders would be bent upon pushing their cause, as a result of which, the foot soldiers may be torn between security and ideology, which would cause a negative impact on their motivation and the ultimate outcome is a bruised organisation. Besides, the more the security, the lesser the risk of being attacked, which also means the lesser scope for getting funds. Security will remain a thorn in the ability of the organisation to garner economic wealth.

In essence, once the members of a terrorist group have navigated to terrorism, they would have to balance between two competing constraints, the first one of which is 'security' and the second one is 'influence'. They are competing because fund tensions exist between their security needs and influence objectives. The security and influence are dependent partly on their choice of targets, tactics and timing.

Like any business entity, they have to put in place a 'feedback mechanism' to identify and execute an optimal action. McCormick (2003) links this to the decision-making systems followed by the leaders, towards which parallels could be drawn from organisational theories in which the source of violence is found within the 'internal dynamics' of the terrorist groups themselves.

3.2.4. Control

These are mechanisms with which the terrorist groups resort to plan, coordinate the execution of their attacks. In addition, they also can retain their own security while executing actions because they are given from hideouts occupied from difficult terrains, access to which is not possible through common transportation.

Control issues spark major challenges for terrorist organisations. A poor command and control structure, poor leadership at the highest levels are credited for the defeat of Brotherhood at the

hands of the Syrian state forces (US Government Department of Defence, 2012). During the fight, several leaders escaped to Jordan or Iraq and tried to manage from there – a highly impractical approach that paved the way for a "rule by committee" structure, which could not achieve consensus on anything substantive and operated with disunity and disharmony that resulted into defeat. A highly critical report by an ex-member recounts how before the all-out war with the forces, a war council was conceived comprising of disparate elements like religious sheikhs to violence-oriented youth who were engaged in a power struggle inside the set-up and they were unable to look beyond their own viewpoints.

Such a centralized structure obviated the quick decentralized network structure required, thereby creating the most unresponsive and lumbered apparatus that was crushed by the Syrian forces. According to Shapiro (2013), the structure of guidance from the top can take the form of the leaderless organisation, ostensibly with the aim of escaping prosecution from the state. This was the case, for instance, with white supremacist intellectual Louis Beam, who advocated the leaderless concept, where actual operations were left to the initiative of individual patriots. Whilst this approach helped Beam lead a de facto terrorist movement for many years without being prosecuted and landing behind bars.

However, the above suffers from serious flaws when viewed from an organisational point of view. Shapiro (2013) observes that the organisational approach is not resorted to. In addition, control mechanism falters where the state legislations are rigorous enough to indict those who advance terror ideology.

Another dilemma relates to controlling by leaders who are exiled. There are ideological conflicts between the exiled ones and those managing locally, with the foot soldiers again being torn between the two resulting in internal conflicts within the organisation. A case in example is Hamas, a faction of whom favoured exiled leaders over the local command, which was seen as extending support for retaliating against Yahya Ayyash's assassination (Jamal, 2009). Similarly, the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings are thought to be an act of independent local cell at work, perpetuated by self-recruited leaderless terrorists (Reinares, 2010). Leaderless is perceived to be more of a military strategy by the terrorist groups carried out under pressures, whereas organised terrorism is seen as a group phenomenon, wherein group dynamics is taken to be an important pre-

requisite for violent radicalisation, which distinguishes it from leaderless or lone wolf terrorism, (Nesser,2012).

The above discussion strengthens the objective of this thesis, as it becomes evident that organisational structures would have to be created and put in place to mobilise resources, and organisational maintenance is needed to apply tactics.

3.2.5. Efficiency and Operational Capacity

Given that attacks are complex in nature, the intentions on the mobilisation of resources have to be consistent with the action chosen for as otherwise, it would result in attacks becoming destructive without producing any results (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017). According to Shapiro (2013), operational efficiency and control are interlinked, and the terms have also been used interchangeably in the literature. The author further observes that efficiency is correlated to political and economic activity, discussed in Chapter 2. It also depicts the ability of the organisation to dedicate adequate resources for the achievement of pre-set output through managing the three levels within an organisational structure.

The evidence offered by Horgan & Taylor (1997) from the successful operation of the provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) suggest that both efficiency and operational capacity are found in a cellular-based organisational structure built on an authoritarian structure. In this type of setup, the active members do not exceed more than a few hundred at any given time. The non-operational members are assigned the responsibility to hide as well as move weapons away from a scene.

3.3 Organisational Structures

Theoretically speaking, an ideal organisational structure, when one speaks of terrorist groups, would have to contain features that tackle four problems, VIZ, (i) financial, (ii) recruitment, (iii) control/efficiency and (iv) security. The ranking of these objectives with regard to each of terrorist group on the relative power of three groups, VIZ, (i) the political/religious leaders, (ii) the operational managers and (iii) foot soldiers. Nonetheless, there are inherent conflicts with each of these due to differing players' preferences. This is what has been described as a terrorist/organisational dilemma, which is elaborated further below.

Shapiro (2015) articulates the organisational dilemma faced by terrorist groups, which according to him, emanates whenever there is a divergence between the preferences of leaders and the operating personnel. The sources of differences can be due to gaps in information or the manner how they should act in a given situation. The implication is that there is no ideal organisational structure that would fulfil all the conditions of being reliable, resilient and secure, which is also perfectly under the control of its leader.

Like any business organisation, there has to be the delegation of powers, wherein there is an owner (stakeholder) and agents/managers who execute day-to-day operations. In terrorist groups's, the middlemen play the role of agents, who are vested with the funds for an attack. Not in all cases, the middlemen are devoting themselves wholly to accomplish a mission, as some of them are lured by the monetary rewards as well arising out of greed. In such circumstances, when an attack fails, it is not possible clearly to fix the responsibility unless or otherwise the leader can make out as to whether it is because the middlemen have misappropriated funds, as a result of which, the operatives have not been able to execute or is it despite their not being so, that the operatives were not executing the plan. In order to keep this on tab, it is necessary for the terrorist groups to keep the security at high levels, which means the security costs go up. As a result, the leaders face Hobson's choice and, for being successful, would have to navigate the trade-offs between control and security successfully.

The above discussion shows that similar to the principal-agent theory, an identical situation exists in terrorist groups wherein the leader as principal would have to manage agents' actions, for which there is no ideal solution. In the same vein, terrorist groups also do not have a magic wand in choosing an organisational structure that would be conflict less.

This would be expanded further in 3.4. In spite of all the above limitations, the organisational structures would have to offer features that can be viewed from the dual dimensions of control/efficiency and security (Figure 17.0). This is what is done in the rest of this section

3.3.1. Hierarchical Organisations

Hierarchical organisations are usually military-style hierarchies with a specific chain of command and a high degree of division of labour between individuals or units with specific skill sets.

Hierarchical structures provide a base and readiness to scale up operations, as witnessed in the case of ETA, where campaigns were sustained, providing operational flexibility to meet strategic needs accordingly (Heger et al., 2012).

In a hierarchical structure, there is a high level of control, efficiency but low security. Hierarchical organisations usually benefit from state or community support. This higher level of state or community haven gives them the freedom to operate effectively within the community. They, however, operate covertly outside the scope of their territory. Low security mainly emanates from the challenge that a leader, when caught, may expose all the lines and structures within the organisation.

As hierarchies provide a centralised command and control structure, there is a lesser likelihood of dissipation of control and dilution of strategic narrative as decision-making is centralized (Heger et al., 2012). Coupled with this, clear accountability and well-defined roles and responsibilities provide clarity for the operatives to execute tasks. Moreover, the hierarchical structure facilitates specialization, whereby in vertically integrated forms, the risk of defection is internalized, and thus specialization within is promoted (Nacos, 2016). Mainly for these three reasons, hierarchical structures can be considered to be better suited to carry out directives. The hierarchical model is indeed effective for terrorist groups, as observed by Shapiro (2005):

3.3.2 Networked organisations

Network organisations have a modified organisational structure but utilise large groups with inter-connected links to conduct their activities. This offers them the opportunity of growing in size at the same time protecting themselves from being exposed. The adoption of groups minimizes the number of possible co-conspirators that any member might know (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017).

There is minimal but adequate control over the organisation in networked organisations, and operations exist at the group level – for example, 30-50 people in each group. However, inadequate control from ideological leaders leaves the groups to high-level autonomy. Coupled with this, networked organisations are characterised by high communication and often find it easy to optimize the skill sets within their organisations. They record a high variability of operational

capacity as some groups may constitute highly skilled individuals with high success rates while other groups may possess members who are not highly skilled and thus have a higher likelihood of failing in their planned attack. Moreover, since the groups are often left to fend for themselves, efficiency is adequate as there are adequate resources for their actions. Due to the size of the groups, network organisations are often adequately stocked with the necessary.

On the other hand, security is low due to the share size of the group. Infiltration or arrest of a particular group member jeopardizes the whole terrorist group due to strongly established networks. In spite of the limitations imposed from the security angle, yet networked organisations are becoming popular because, as pointed by Sageman (2011), they are better driven by ideology; motivational factors that lead to better action. An understanding of networked organisations would offer insights for the law enforcement agencies in their efforts to contain terrorism. In addition, they are placed better in resolving financial, recruitment and security issues, which to some extent compensates for the sub-optimal level of operational efficiency (Arquilla & Reonfelt, 2001). Despite the fact that hierarchical structures give room for a wide range of specialization ranging from operations, intelligence and support, cell leaders have the comprehensive knowledge of the members under their jurisdiction; the disadvantage is that only the senior leadership could be privileged to information of everyone in the entire organisation.

Zawodny (1981) identified the Japanese Red Army, Red Brigades in Italy, Red Army Faction in Germany and some ethno-nationalist terrorist organisations, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation, as some of the most renowned terrorist organisations that adopted the network structure.

3.3.3 Cellular Organisations

Cellular organisations are individuals of small groups, typically referred to as cells that also do not have any person to person contact with others in that network. Ragazzi (2016) described cellular units as the smallest and most basic component of a terrorist organisation through direct linkage of control. Usually, cells are in the sizes of 3-5 members. Their autonomous nature guarantees them a high level of operational security because of reduced information flow. They have no links with larger organisations and only share information within their fraternity. They are immune to the risk of infiltration by intelligence agents. This assertion is affirmed by Platt (2015), who posited

that the likelihood of infiltration is very small in cellular organisation compared to the other structures.

No doubt, this structure is of interest with reference to this thesis for a reason for the antiterrorist policy, which it propounds. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind the in-house modus operative and leaderless resistance strategy, deprive them of the expertise to plan, procure the logistics and execute their attacks, resulting in limitation on control and efficiency.

Researchers have found that these terrorist cells are mainly organized based on relationships defined by family, work, or geography and that they can be multifunctional in nature. The terrorist organisation use the cell system for guidance and control their members (Combs, 2017). Then, at the cell level, this allows cell members to remain in direct contact with all associated members of the group that helps to provide emotional support and even deter desertion or a potential breach of safety procedures. As a result, the cell leader is the only individual who can coordinate or communicate with individuals on higher levels. Both control and security may therefore be considered moderate but adequate.

3.3.4 Franchise

Just as businesses organisation have private operators adapting their business model, brand image and distributing their products and services, the terrorist organisation also adopt similar strategies to carry out their operations (Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009). Terrorist organisations have independent franchise groups but have adopted the models and operational strategies of an established group.

This type represents a potential threat to international peace because its outreach is global with its religious narrative. When operating without state sponsorship, such groups tend to be the object of attention for government security agencies. AQI and ISIS represent their most lethal proponents in modern times, with franchised operations spreading to far corners of the world. This kind of terrorism includes Boko Haram in Nigeria adoption of ISIS ideologies. These groups tend to adopt a decentralized and interconnected structure and highly sophisticated communication mechanisms deployed to circumvent counterterrorism initiatives. Their preference divergence is high, and they also tend to be highly adaptable to suit the environment.

Their main propagation tools for this type of group are social media to share connections with other groups and pursue common ideologies. The life cycle is long because they do not need to rely on central leadership or central command. They show a sense of flexibility arising from their mobility as foreign terrorist fighters. In terms of relative autonomy or self-organisation, a state-sponsored organisation have low autonomy because it operates according to strict directives from the state in question. However, it may also leverage a high level of resources, and thus its capacity and capability are "high to very high" (Shapiro, 2013). The franchisee enjoys high capacity but "medium" autonomy because it has to align with the tactics and strategies of the associated organisations and their funding of ideologies.

Franchise groups' outreach and connection of ISIS, for example, has expanded to Europe. Consider, for example, the "Swedish Mujahideen," heavily indoctrinated with jihad ideology, who travelled to Syria in 2012 (Gustafsson & Ranstorp, 2017). The estimates claim that around 300 more foreign terrorist fighters flew into Syria from Sweden. A transformational leadership style has been found among their cells, and such leadership provides ideological guidance while striving to fulfil terrorist goals. Normally, the leaders lead from the front, including working closely with the operatives and being heavily involved in indoctrinating and exhorting the team into action.

Figure 19 ISIS Map

Source: Global Terrorism Index (2021)

In addition to the above, from an overall perspective, with a view to explain organisational style and efficiency better, the Figure17 from Chapter 2 is reproduced here with a change, wherein the horizontal axis represents organisational style, and the vertical one represents efficiency.



Figure 20 Terrorist's Organisational Structure - A Trade-off between Organisational Style and Efficiency

Adapted from: START (*Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism*) (2017) & modified by the Author

3.4. The Challenge of Choosing Organisational Style

No clear view emerges from the literature in respect of the organisational structure terrorist groups seek to adopt. What can be made out is that the link between terrorist organisations and the organisational structure is not one that persists over time. It is not unusual that terrorist organisations adapt and change their organisational structure over time depending on their stage within the terrorist life cycle.

Ultimately, there is no definitive answer for the best organisational style as the circumstances change and depend on the style change (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017). In an analysis of the changes in the structure of operations, Cragin et al., (2004) elaborate that the positions of the terrorist groups are not constant within the capabilities-intention matrix; however, change or shifts in the organisational structures occur not only by external actors but also based on

the inter-relationships between actors (Figure 21). In their observation, a reduction in the capabilities of al Qaeda, for instance, will create a corresponding shift in the positions of GIA and IMU towards more hostile and capable terrorist groups.



Figure 21 Notional Changes in Mappings as al Qaeda Cadres Migrate

Source: Cragin & Daly (2004)

The problem gets accentuated because there is not uniformity among the terrorist groups in adopting an organisational structure. While post to the Sept 11 attacks, the al Qaeda was seen to switch over to a decentralised structure, the terrorist groups as Hamas, PIRA, have acted in an opposite way by choosing to reduce communication between their members, as a response to the governmental measures. This can be treated as a centralised structure. Such a divergence makes it difficult for the governmental agencies to plan and formulate strategies that could make their counter-terrorism strategies.

Since theoretically, there is no singular model that can be proposed as a taken-for-granted organisational structure, this thesis strives to offer a model that considers important considerations it has discussed in the previous chapters and sections. It may be worthwhile to recall some of these. The organisational structure should address four problems, VIZ, (i) financial, (ii) recruitment, (iii) control and (iv) efficiency. It should address the power struggle between two groups, VIZ, (i)

political/religious leaders and (ii) operational managers. The foot soldiers are dropped for a reason they lack the resources, the organisational and leadership skills. Even assuming some of them rise to prominence and stage into a centre of power, they become either a pack or lone wolves, which is outside the purview of this thesis.



Figure 22 Galbraithian Organisational Structure - A compariosn of types with modifications

Source: Author

This has led this researcher to choose the John Kenneth Galbraith model, which embraces a multiproduct firm's strategy by considering three vertical levels of players in an organisation, VIZ, owners, middle management and the workers. A corresponding similarity can be drawn with

terrorist groups, VIZ, political/ideology leaders, operational personnel and foot- soldiers. For the reasons already discussed, foot-soldiers are dropped[11].

In order to suit the purpose of this study, Galbraith's model is modified (Figure 22) to suit an analysis of the 'economics of terrorism'. The suitability of Galbraith's model with subtle changes becomes all the more relevant when one considers the preferences of the players diverge, which causes the inner struggle between the players, for instance, the political leaders and operational personnel, that is similar in a business firm, wherein the stakeholders'' interests are at divergence with the operational managers, which shapes the dynamics of organisational structures.

3.5. Implementing a Dynamic Model

Mann (2015) developed a framework covering four types of powers, comprising of (i) ideological, (b) economic, (c) political and (d) military powers. Since military powers, per se, is not within the purview of this thesis, it is not taken up for further explanation. Even though political and ideology are used in the thesis in a somewhat interchangeable manner, yet for the purpose definition, they are treated as two separate terms. In this, yet another thing that is missing is the operational members. Nonetheless, since this framework provides a basic understanding of the power play of each type, which is explained to understand the background of this thesis.

Political power is drawn from the centralized, institutionalized aspects of social behaviour. It is also correlated to the territorial ambitions of those who wield power. Ideological power has is concerned value system and aims to offer meaning to norms and ritual practices. It is directly correlated to religion and secular ideologies. Economic powers are derived from the desire to satisfy subsistence needs at the basic level to climb the ladder to achieve recognition and/or self-

[11] As per the theory of Radicalization propounded by McCauley and Moskalenko, (2008), becoming an active terrorist sympathizer is a prerequisite before a foot soldier can become an active terrorist. However, Goldstein et al, (2008) state that the identification of foot soldiers could fluctuate if there is divergence between the norms of them with that of the terrorist groups. The foot soldiers also seem to prefer increased physical distance for their leaders as they perceive it protects them from immediate harm. The very nature of recruitment strategies followed by terrorist groups result in the foot-soldiers losing their personal identity for the reason they have to act in anonymity. The leaders make it a point limit with what they share with the foot-soldiers. This means restricted access to critical information so that they cannot sabotage over all mission. Among the terrorist groups, at lease Al Qaeda knew that it cannot transform ordinary foot soldiers into fully committed operatives. That apart, the foot solders due to the other reasons explained here are not backed with the resources to succeed as a terrorist group. They can at best become lone-wolves, which is outside the purview of this thesis. Hence, foot-soldiers are dropped from the organizational model.

esteem. What has been developed by the author can be considered as loosely knit social network control' depicted in Figure 23.



Figure 23 Sources of Power

Source (Mann: Modified by the author)

In such a social network of control, the distribution of powers among those who hold and exercise determines whether the network is centralized or otherwise. With reference to the thesis, if the political or ideological leaders hold absolute power in a terrorist group, it becomes centralized. Assuming powers are combined wherein political or ideological leaders still hold the majority of the power with certain authority for the operational managers, it is still centralized because it becomes so by becoming de facto centralized. On the other hand, if the operational managers hold the majority of the power within the terrorist group, which is absolute in nature, even if the political or ideological leaders hold some powers, it is de facto decentralised.

When the decision-making processes and the actual decision making are carried out at the top level, it is termed as centralised. The communication flows only one way, which is from top to bottom. Operational and middle managerial personnel virtually have no say in the decision, and they may even not be consulted on involved in the decision. In such a structure, the top management decides and implements even routine work of a day-to-day nature. The lower-level employees, at best, follow and execute the directions issued to them.

On the other spectrum is what may be referred to as a decentralised organisation, which is characterized by the decision making being delegated to the lower rung of employees. In this type, openness is maintained in communication, and the communication is both the ways; that is, it flows from top to bottom and bottom to top.

The terms de facto and de jure have more political and legal connotations rather than an organisational one. Nonetheless, they are also used in a context where power is exercised through remote control. In the context of terrorist groups, it may appear at the surface that the decision making may be delegated to the operational personnel but, in reality, may be controlled by the top political/religious leaders or even by the one who is in exile. De facto organisations exhibit characteristics of centralised operations.

The salient point is that the power system is not static and dynamic in nature. There is a competition interplay between the players of the power system. Like in a business organisation, competitive advantages are found in one or more categories of players. When the leaders compete with the followers, who are operative personnel in a terrorist group, the winner is determined by the attributes of those staking their claim to power. Since what is being seen here is a power system and not a direct fight between the individuals. Power resides with those that control the core aspects of the system; resources and security.

Nonetheless, a subtle point that needs to be taken into account with respect to this thesis is that the power balance may change not from direct competition but changes in external conditions. This can be in the form of support or opposition from other countries, economic sanctions. When a leader is able to gain control in such a situation, by changing the balance of power, they change the very nature of power. The effect of this could be in the decentralised system getting into a centralised mode.

The foregoing discussion implies that the enforcement agencies must adapt to changes in the control models, which the terrorist groups are quick enough to adopt. It is in this respect, the operative models of terrorist group differ from the business organisation's model because changing the path of business or introducing organisational changes in the hierarchy is not something that could be done as per one's whims and fancies.

Given the fact that terrorist groups change over time by constantly tuning their defensive mechanism to withstand the onslaught of counter-terrorism measures, it is necessary to offer a theoretical model that could be put into use by counter-terrorism authorities. Most of the studies have been done applying qualitative research. In contrast, a quantitative approach is needed, which makes it possible to predict whether counter-terrorism measures are sufficient enough to defeat a terrorist group. In relation to this objective in mind, this thesis makes a unique contribution of strategically designed policy solutions adopting both dynamic organisational model drawing on business organisation field and incorporating multiproduct firm strategy. The advantage of a dynamic model is that it would yield insights based on data and enable predictions to formulate counter-terrorism strategies. In this model, a numbe of assumptions are made. Firstly, from an economic and business organisation point of view, the terrorists are rational and depend upon their objectives and the constraints they face in achieving them. A terrorist group responds to changes in predictable ways (Sandler et al., 1991). Secondly, like any other business organization, terrorist groups also need financial resources to carry on their terrorist activities, which means they constantly strive to increase their incomes. This means there is a lowered amount of security, which can form the source of conflict. Thirdly, terrorist attacks are premeditated and carefully planned. While doing so, they would seek to maximize utility. Fourly, terrorists exhibit preferences, and understanding these preferences is strategically important for counter-terrorism measures because the source of conflict between the leaders and operational reasons emanate from such differing preferences. Such preferences are formed by a complex of economic, social, and cultural variables; preferences shape the type of organisational structure. An understanding of these would help the counter-terrorism agencies to flatten their preferences. Finally, in essence, given the fact that finances are a lifeline to the survival of a terrorist group, the rational choice of any terrorist group would be to opt for an organisational structure where the leader can mobilise and control resources. For the purpose of this thesis, the preferences of the terrorist groups is to adopt a centralised structure.

Since this thesis contributes to reducing a methodological void that exists in terrorism research in combating it, and despite the limitations common to any such model, such a model offers a valuable tool to evaluate the efficacy of counter-terrorism policies.

3.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter presents an analysis of the terrorist business organisation. By examining selected functional areas of financing, recruitment, control, efficiency, and efficiency or operational capacity, insight is offered on the business processes within the terrorist group at the three structural levels of the organistion. A discussion of key organisational structures applicable to the terrorist groups is presented and discussed with attention to the balance between control/ efficiency and security.

This chapter also elaborates the challenges in arriving at a singularly unique model that could be applied across the board as a policy strategy for the reason the terrorist groups are far more adoptive in changing their structures according to exigencies of circumstances. The discussion also brings to the fore the importance of resource mobilisation, as a result of which, the terrorist groups appear to prefer a centralised structure. Despite the limitations in applying a business organisation's model to the operations of terrorist groups, through in-depth analysis and explanation, this chapter demonstrates and evidences a quantitative analysis methodology to counter-terrorism measures. In that sense, this chapter has contributed modestly to the body of terrorist research that has practical utility.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design together with the results and findings of the study. The chapter commences with the research design with emphasis on the realist philosophical position. The abductive research approach is critically discussed together with the associated justifications. The Delphi research strategy is also introduced together with the case study research strategy as two key data collection processes. Following the research design, the findings of the study are presented.

4.2 Research Design

4.2.1 Philosophy (Realism)

The present study builds on the realist philosophy; this position argues that evidence is unique to the context it is located (Daymon & Holloway, 2010). Therefore, exploring such evidence is to explain it as artefacts of its context (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). This philosophical perspective goes a step further to interpret knowledge and draw conclusions based upon social evidence. According to Saunders et al. (2016), the realist paradigm views objects as they are by combining objective evidence as viewed from the perspective of actors within the system.

Building on this philosophical position, the subject of terrorism may be discussed from an objective and yet contextual point of view. As established by Saunders et al. (2016, p.104), realism posit that "*what the senses show us as reality is the truth*". This position helps blend the main positions of positivism and interpretivism in a common empirical observation. Whereas positivism deals with evidence regardless of what actors believe, interpretivism depends on the senses of actors – investigating objective evidence as interpreted by our senses, therefore, constitute realism.

According to Marsh & Furlong (2002, p. 30), "realism shares an ontological position of positivism but in epistemological terms". Realists believe that knowledge can be acquired independent of social actors and that cause-and-effect relationships can be established through research but specific to the context within which they are established. Likewise, realists believe that only inferences that best explain the phenomena can be made; no clear explanation can be offered for reality but how it appears to the researcher and actors (Hollis & Smith, 1991). For

these reasons, realists have often been considered suitable for mixed-method research or researchers that combined the positivist and interpretive positions to empirical observations.

Realism has not gone without criticism. Positivists criticise realists on the grounds that there are no social or physical structures that cannot be observed (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p.31). Nonetheless, these criticisms have led realists to enhance their justification of how this philosophy explains real-world situations through constructivism's lenses. As a result, Marsh & Furlong (2002) explains that the criticisms from interpretive positions mentioned earlier had significantly influenced contemporary realism. Realists believe that even though social actors exist independently of social phenomena, what we understand about social phenomena influence the interpretations and conclusions we offer to these phenomena, which in turn affects the interpretations and conclusions we offer to these phenomena, affecting outcomes.

Given these elaborations, the building blocks of the study are presented in Figure 24. This figure presents critical positions of the present investigation in all areas of the research design, approach, data collection and analysis.



Figure 24 Research Onion

Source: Saunders et al., (2016)

According to Sageman (2014), research on political violence did not take firm roots until after 9/11. Both academic and government actors expressed interest in terrorism research. In academia, studies have often adopted a multi-disciplinary perspective with a wide array of professionals brought on board, including political scientists, psychologists, historians, economists, engineers, and computer scientists. Like government-sponsored studies in this area are challenged by the lack of comprehensive data. Other information used by studies in this area are mainly extracted from terrorist and jihadi websites. Moreover, government sources, such as the US, have been considered heavily fragmented and biased. The need for secondary data is based on the challenge of access to original data, as terrorist territories pose a serious risk to researchers and are often not advised to conduct field exercises in these areas. Nonetheless, even though primary data may be ambitious (Sageman, 2014), it helps present keen insight into terrorist activities to support any empirical observation.

4.2.2 Research Approach (Abductive)

In line with the realist philosophy, the abductive approach to theoretical reasoning was commended by Saunders et al. (2016). Abduction offers reference to deduction and induction approaches. Whereas deduction considers theory falsification or verification, induction considers theory generation and building; abduction considers the need to incorporate appropriate theories, building new ones, or modifying existing ones (Table 2).

Table 2 Deduction, Induction and Abduction Research

	Deduction	Induction	Abduction
Logic	In a deductive inference, when the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true	In an inductive inference, known premises are used to generate untested conclusions	In an abductive inference, known premises are used to generate testable conclusions
Generalisability	Generalising from the general to the specific	Generalising from the specific to the general	Generalising from the interactions between the specific and the general
Use of data	Data collection is used to evaluate propositions or hypotheses related to an existing theory	Data collection is used to explore a phenomenon, identify themes and patterns and create a conceptual framework	Data collection is used to explore a phenomenon, identify themes and patterns, locate these in a conceptual framework and test this through subsequent data collection and so forth
Theory	Theory falsification or verification	Theory generation and building	Theory generation or modification; incorporating existing theory where appropriate, to build new theory or modify existing theory

Source: Saunders et al., (2016)

About the use of data, abduction considers the dual perspectives of exploring and studying patterns whilst testing relationships in a conceptual framework. This indicates the combination of both the qualitative and quantitative methods in a manner that addresses the objectives of the study at hand. In the area of generalisability, abductive research permits generalisation in specific contexts as permitted under the realism research philosophy. It helps establish contextual information with a diagnosis that fit the environment within which the evidence is established. This evidence may not be easily transferred into other contexts but may help explain social artefacts' role within their natural environments.

4.2.3 Research Strategy (Delphi & Case Study Research)

Delphi – mixed method

The Delphi method was originally proposed by the US Air Force in a bid to predict the time course for technological developments for which there is no known history. By engaging experts, this method permits the refining of ideas through rich feedbacks from multiple rounds of data collection inquiry. In its application, the Delphi method proved most useful in situations with a limited history, such as the unprecedented terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001. Despite weak predictive powers of terrorist events, it has been used to accurately portray insight into expected social and economic developments, scientific and technology planning, urban development, family therapy, among others.

According to Woudenberg (1991), the validity and reliability of Delphi are difficult to obtain due to the assertion that data accuracy is derived from the opinion of the experts as panel members. Validity is therefore achieved through comparable pools but with no external evidence to benchmark data accuracy. Landeta (2006) adds that using an expert panel to produce missed results in terms of accuracy, drawing a linear relationship between self-rated expertise and accuracy. Moreover, contrasting results have been established that even though minimal expertise may be useful for Delphi, higher levels of expertise lead to diminishing returns.

For the purpose of the present study, the Delphi research strategy is adopted to help define factors within the economic/business model of the violent non-governmental organisation starting from a general perspective towards a more conclusive evidence outcome. As observed by Massaroli (et al., 2018, p.3),

"the Delphi method is considered a mixed approach as it allows the use of different research strategies for data collection and analysis".

The first round of Delphi used a strictly structured interview guide based on an extensive literature review, similar to the survey questionnaire in a quantitative observation as recommended by Massaroli et al. (2018) in Figure 25. In justification, the Delphi research method was essential to help refine the research area supporting the case study validation as part of the third research objective. As observed by Massaroli et al. (2018), the primary purpose of Delphi is to engage experts to help refine a research idea based on their expert knowledge.



Figure 25 Delphi Method

Source: Riviere (2018)

The results in round 1 are then reviewed by the panel to establish consensus or to clarify and develop the findings. In Round 2, data is generated from a case study analysis. A case study strategy is employed to generate an understanding of counter-terrorism by focusing on the specific context of a terror organization. Yin (1994) defines a case study as "an empirical

inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident…[and] relies on multiple sources of evidence" (p. 13). Using this method enables an in-depth examination focused on the single case of ISIS to understand different organisational dimensions and contexts to identify key characteristics, behaviours, strengths, and vulnerabilities. The use of multiple methods and data sources can reveal multiple facets and insights of the research area. This analysis is based on a semi-structured interview and analysis of secondary sources of new sources, academic papers, government or institutional briefings, and reports since 2018.

The results in round 2 from both methods are summarised and presented to the panel for review and reflection and to develop consensus on the findings. In Round 3, the final round of the Delphi process focused on developing and validating the model by the expert panel. In this phase, members of the panel reviewed independently the results generated in Rounds 1 and 2. A final opportunity was provided to allow members to revise or offer new judgements or perspectives.

4.2.4 Methodological Choice (Mixed method)

As Massaroli (et al. 2018) outlined, a mixed research method will be implemented as suitable for Delphi research. In justification, the mixed research methods will provide more insight into the economic/business model of violent non-governmental organisations. Starting with the Delphi research, the mixed method will be applied as known to Delphi research methodology. This will be followed by a qualitative case study conducted with the help of secondary data and other published content on the ISIS terrorist group.

4.2.5 Measurement of Variables and instrumentation

For Round 1 of the Delphi method a quantitative survey instrument was employed to gather responses for 10 items based on an extensive review of the literature. Appendix C shows the 10 questions items formulated to measure and analyse 10 factors: state sponsorship and ideology; force versus organisational structure; ISIS strategic adaptation; economic versus use of force; rewarding defection versus use of force; spending patterns/financial sources; exposing money laundering versus exposing fundamentalism; targeting financing versus targeting operations; international funding versus coordination; and ISIS marketing media. A four-point Likert scale (Strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly disagree) was employed to measure response to each item.

In Round 2 a semi-structured interview guide was employed to gather experts perspectives on terrorist organisations in the case of ISIS (Appendix D). The instrument focused on mainly of three units of analysis; the first aspect deals with the terrorist group structure in three main levels of ideological leadership, operational leaders, and frontlines. The second aspect of the interview guide deals with the five main organisational processes in the areas of control, efficiency, financing, recruitment, and security. The third and final aspect of the interview guide elaborates on the organisational structures used by the terrorist groups. The interview was conducted with the main reference to the ISIS terrorist group.

4.2.6 Population and Sampling

The sampling for this study focused on two groups. Firstly, the sample for the quantitative survey in Round 1 employed a purposeful convenience sampling approach. The criteria were to sample experts from either professional or academic backgrounds from different regions with extensive knowledge and experience of terrorism. This consisted of doctoral researchers, lecturers and member of different government or international bodies in terrorist-related sectors including international relations, politics, counter-terrorism, terrorism research and national security and defence (Saunders et al., 2016). To ensure a representative sample the aim was to sample equal number of participants from each region: Latin America, North America, Europe and Middle East.

For the Expert panel which would be involved throughout the Delphi process, the purposive/judgemental snowballing sampling technique was employed due to the nature of the subject of terrorism and the rare nature of experts in this domain. This focused on individuals with knowledge and experience of terrorist from different backgrounds and perspectives. The sample consisted total of 12 experts who were involved in all rounds of Delphi research. Specifically, 6 of the respondents were academic professionals who specialised in terrorism, and the other 6 were professionals who worked with different governments to tackle terrorism. The sampling frame considered global institutions in both areas of academia and government as these experts proved difficult to find. Table 3 provides an overview of the characteristics of the expert sample.

Table 3 Expert Sample Characteristics

Area	Position	Education	Years	Areas of Expertise
Terrorism and counter terrorism	Former ISIS Fighter	Bachelor in Arabic Studies	5	How ISIS functioning Terrorism Financing process
Theologian Counter violent extremism	Head of a Think tank	PhD in Islamic theology	10	Rehabilitation programs for ISIS fighters, Al-Qaida
Counter Terrorism operation	Police Officer	MSc in Criminology	13	Counter-terror strategies; operations; Terrorist Cells
Counter insurgency	Field Commander	Military College	9	Military Strategy Operations (ISIS in Syria)
Intelligence	Intelligence Officer	PhD Politics and Security	7	Intelligence Analysis and Counter Terrorism
Counter terrorism Financing	Senior Banking Executive	PhD in Accounting	8	Counter Terrorism Financing
Politics and Terrorism	Author and Academic Professor	PhD in History	12	Author of books about the Middle east and Terrorism
Humanitarian	Humanitarian Relief	PhD Middle East Studies	7	Humanitarian work with victims of ISIS terrorism
Studies and Research	Professor	PhD Sociology	10	Terrorism Research
Counter-terrorism	Lecturer and Researcher	PhD Terrorism	14	Counter-terrorism strategies, Middle East
International Security	Lecturer and Researcher	PhD Politics and International Security	16	Counter-terrorism; national security
Terrorism and Politics	Lecturer and Researcher	PhD Political Sciences	12	Terrorist groups; international relations; Middle East

4.2.7 Access and Data Collection Methods

The respondents were contacted through the extended network of the researcher. The quantitative survey was implemented through email communication. Sample participants either directly or through gatekeepers were emailed with full details of the project information, consent and participation information and the survey. The responses were completed and returned by email. For the expert panel, experts who were contacted were requested to recommend others who were also experts in the area of terrorism. The interviews were conducted over a series of scheduled zoom meetings which lasted for an average of 15 to 20 minutes. The first round of data collection was mainly through a semi-structured interview guide, after which responses were analysed to deduce conformity. A more structured interview was conducted, which lasted 5-10 minutes only. For the final round of Delphi, data collection lasted about 3-5 minutes. The same cohort was used for all three sessions of Delphi.

4.2.8 Ethics and Limitations

Terrorism is a very delicate and sensitive theme, and as such strict ethical procedures were adopted throughout data collection. An official ethical form was signed and presented to the respondents via email, assuring them of confidentiality and anonymity (Appendix A and B). The university's ethical standards and protocols were also strictly followed.

4.5 Chapter Summary

The goal of this chapter was to present the research methodology employed to address the research goal of this study. The decision-making and rationale for the research were discussed in relation to the overarching research philosophy and its relevance and appropriateness for this research subject. A realist mixed-method abductive approach was considered appropriate based on the assumption that terrorism phenomena has both objective and subjective realities that can only be understood by drawing on on both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The design employed the Delphi method to structure data collection to generate consensus from a panel of experts in the field utilising both quantitative and qualitative methods that generate both empirical data and in-depth contextual qualitative that draws on the multiple perspectives and interpretations of actors in the field. In line with the methodological procedures were outlined for each phase of the research.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results generated from mixed-method data sources that inform the development of a business model of violent non-governmental organisations. The research design employed the Delphi method to structure data collection to generate consensus from a panel of experts in the field. The process reflects an iterative reflective process aimed at developing consensus on the constituent elements of an intra-organisational model of terror organisations. The results consisting of quantitative and qualitative were generated from multiple methods of data collection: survey, interview, case analysis. The results are structured in accordance with the three phases of the Delphi method.

5.2 Delphi Round 1 - Quantitative Survey Results

5.2.1 Descriptive Analysis

An extensive review of the literature informed the design of structured survey questionnaire to evaluate significance of a range of factors. In Round 1 a quantitative survey of was conducted (Appendix C)to obtain responses of experts from the US, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. A total of 232 responses were received with response evenly distributed across each region as shown in Table 4.

Table 4 Sample Characteristics

Region	Sample
USA	64
Latin America	69
Europe	43
Middle East	56

The mean average response for 10 questions in survey are shown in Table 5. Since a 4-point Likert scale was used, the results above show that 8 of the mean ratings were rated above the midpoint of 2.50, suggesting an overall agreement. The highest mean rating was that ISIS has been successful at strategic adaptation (M = 3.17; SD = 0.802), followed by the mean rating that the spending patterns have changed more than financial sources (M = 3.02; SD = 0.976). The third highest mean rating was that discipline with force is more significant than

organisational structure (M = 2.96; SD = 0.944), followed by that ISIS marketing needs to be challenged on media (M = 2.83; SD = 1.024).

Table 5 Mean Responses per Item

Question Items	N	Mean	SD
Q1. State sponsorship is more significant than ideology	232	2.77	.974
Q2. Discipline with force is more significant than Org. structure	232	2.96	.944
Q3. ISIS has been successful at strategic adaptation	232	3.17	.802
Q4. Economic improvement is more important force	232	2.51	1.055
Q5. Rewarding defection is more important than using force	232	2.75	1.061
Q6. Spending patterns have changed more than financial sources	232	3.02	.876
Q7. Exposing ISIS money laundering is more important exposing fundamentalism	232	2.70	1.048
Q8. Targeting financing is more important than targeting operations	232	2.29	1.004
Q9. For authorities, international funding is more important than coordination	232	2.24	.1.033
Q10. ISIS marketing needs to be challenged on media	232	2.83	1.024

The fifth rating was that state sponsorship is more significant than ideology (M = 2.77; SD = 0.974), followed by the rating for the item that rewarding defection is more important than using force (M = 2.75; SD = 1.061), and that exposing ISIS money laundering is more important exposing fundamentalism (M = 2.70; SD = 1.048), then the item that economic improvement is more important force (M = 2.51; SD = 1.055). On the other hand, there were two ratings that were rated below the midpoint and the least rating was for the item that for authorities, international funding is more important than coordination (M = 2.24; SD = 1.033), while the second least was for the item that while the second least rating was that targeting financing is more important than targeting operations (M = 2.29; SD = 1.004). The results confirm that there was strong disagreement across all the nationalities that targeting financing was more important than targeting operations and that international funding was more important than coordination.

5.2.3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

The study sought to compare the ratings for 10 attributes across four regions and to achieve this, the mean ratings were compared. Table 6 shows the means results and significance of difference between regions. To statistically test the difference between the ratings, ANOVA was used, followed and the summary statistics are presented in Table 7.

Table 6 Distribution of Means by Region

	Regions							
	Americans		Europeans		Latin Americans		Middle East	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Q1. State sponsorship is more significant than ideology	2.74 $_{a}$	.78	2.81 $_{a}$	.87	2.77 $_{a}$	.95	2.84 $_{a}$	.71
Q2. Discipline with force is more significant than Org. structure	2.77$_{a}$	.98	2.77$_{a}$	.88	2.59$_{a}$	.96	2.64 $_{a}$	.63
Q3. ISIS has been successful at strategic adaptation	3.03$_{a}$	.98	3.16$_{,b}$	.62	3.54$_{c}$	.60	3.18$_{b}$	.73
Q4. Economic improvement is more important force	2.57$_{a}$	.99	2.82$_{a}$	.91	2.62$_{a}$	1.0	2.12$_{b}$	1.2
Q5. Rewarding defection is more important than using force	2.15$_{a}$	.90	2.94$_{b}$	.85	1.79$_{a}$	1.1	3.46$_{c}$	.74
Q6. Spending patterns have changed more than financial sources	2.63$_{a}$	.85	2.92$_{a}$	.79	2.74$_{a}$	.93	3.56$_{b}$	.67
Q.7 Exposing ISIS money laundering more important exposing fundamentalism	2.88$_{a}$	1.1	2.90$_{a}$	.74	2.95$_{a}$	.91	2.27$_{b}$	1.2
Q8. Targeting financing is more important than targeting operations	2.26$_{a}$	1.0	2.27$_{a}$	.83	2.38$_{a}$	1.1	2.03$_{b}$	1.0
Q9. For authorities, international funding is more important than coordination	2.44$_{a}$	.74	2.35$_{b}$	.81	2.31$_{b}$	1.1	2.13$_{c}$	.79
Q10. ISIS marketing needs to be challenged on media	2.95$_{a}$	1.0	2.91$_{a}$	.82	2.97$_{a}$	.83	2.88$_{b}$	1.0

Note: Values in the same row and subtable not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p< .05 in the ANOVA test of equality. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume equal variances. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction

Table 7 ANOVA Results

		SS	df	MS	F	Sig.
Q1. State sponsorship is more significant than ideology	Between Groups	75.114	3	25.038	33.542	<.001
	Within Groups	267.982	359	.746		
	Total	343.096	362			
Q2. Discipline with force is more significant than Org. structure	Between Groups	41.407	3	13.802	17.626	<.001
	Within Groups	281.127	359	.783		
	Total	322.534	362			
Q3. ISIS has been successful at strategic adaptation	Between Groups	7.360	3	2.453	3.908	.009
	Within Groups	225.389	359	.628		
	Total	232.749	362			
Q4. Economic improvement is more important force	Between Groups	28.337	3	9.446	9.058	<.001
	Within Groups	374.358	359	1.043		
	Total	402.694	362			
Q5. Rewarding defection is more important than using force	Between Groups	133.894	3	44.631	58.521	<.001
	Within Groups	273.792	359	.763		
	Total	407.686	362			
Q6. Spending patterns have changed more than financial sources	Between Groups	52.358	3	17.453	27.780	<.001
	Within Groups	225.543	359	.628		
	Total	277.901	362			
Q7. Exposing ISIS money laundering is more important exposing fundamentalism	Between Groups	31.453	3	10.484	10.272	<.001
	Within Groups	366.414	359	1.021		
	Total	397.868	362			
Q8. Targeting financing is more important than targeting operations	Between Groups	33.116	3	11.039	10.279	<.001
	Within Groups	385.550	359	1.074		
	Total	418.667	362			
Q9. For authorities, international funding is more important than coordination	Between Groups	20.015	3	6.672	8.796	<.001
	Within Groups	272.305	359	.759		
	Total	292.320	362			
Q10. ISIS marketing needs to be challenged on media	Between Groups	25.077	3	8.359	8.469	<.001
	Within Groups	354.334	359	.987		
	Total	379.410	362			

On whether state sponsorship was more significant than ideology, the highest rating was observed among respondents from the Middle East (M = 2.84; SD = 0.741), while the least rating was observed among American respondents (M = 2.74; SD = 0.782). For the Europeans, the mean rating was M = 2.81 (SD = 0.870), while for Latin Americans, the mean was M = 2.77 (SD = 0.959). The overall difference across the four countries was not statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 7.468$, $p>0.05$. There was no statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and Europeans and Americans. This implies that there was agreement across all nationalities that state sponsorship is more significant than ideology.

Second, on whether discipline with force was more significant than organisational structure, also, the least rating was observed among respondents from the Middle East (M = 2.64; SD = 0.683), while the second least rating was observed among Latin American respondents (M = 2.59; SD = 0.966). For the Europeans, the mean rating was M = 2.77 (SD = 0.882), while for the Americans, the mean was M = 2.77 (SD = 0.982). The difference in the mean ratings across the four countries was not statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 4.871$, $p>0.05$. This implies that there was agreement across all nationalities that discipline with force is more significant than organisational structure.

Third, regarding whether ISIS had been successful at strategic adaptation, the highest rating was observed among respondents from the Latin Americans (M = 3.54; SD = 0.600), while the least rating was observed among American respondents (M = 3.03; SD = 0.985). For the Europeans, the mean rating was M = 3.16 (SD = 0.629), while for the Middle East, the mean was M = 3.18 (SD = 0.793). The overall difference in the mean ratings was statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 3.908$, $p<0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the ratings of the Middle East and the rest of the countries as well as between Americans and the rest of the countries. This shows that across all nationalities there was varying levels of agreement that ISIS has been successful at strategic adaptation

Fourth, on whether the economic improvement was a more important force, the highest rating was observed among Europeans (M = 2.82; SD = 0.915), while the least rating was observed among respondents from the Middle East (M = 2.12; SD = 1.127). For the Americans, the mean rating was M = 2.57 (SD = 0.996), while for the Latin Americans, the mean was M = 2.62 (SD = 1.042). The overall difference in the mean ratings was statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 9.058$, $p<0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and the ratings of Americans and Europeans. The results show that there was agreement across

all Latin America, European and American nationalities that economic improvement is more important force, but Middle East nationalities were less in agreement on this question.

The fifth aspect was on whether rewarding defection was more important than using force, and from the finding, the highest rating was among respondents from the Middle East (M = 3.46; SD = 0.744), and the least rating was observed among Latin Americans (M = 1.79; SD = 1.174). For the Americans, the mean rating was M = 2.15 (SD = 0.901), while for the Europeans, the mean was M = 2.94 (SD = 0.846). The overall difference in the mean ratings was statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 58.521$, $p<0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and the rest of the other groups. There was also a statistically significant difference between Europeans and the rest of the other groups. This shows that there was a different the level of agreement across nationalities that rewarding defection is more important than using force.

The sixth aspect was on whether spending patterns had changed more than financial sources rewarding defection was more important than using force, and from the finding, there was a more neutral view from Middle East nationalities (M = 3.56; SD = 0.667), while the second rating was observed among Latin Americans (M = 2.63; SD = 0.852). For the Americans, the mean rating was M = 2.63 (SD = 0.852), while for the Europeans, the mean was M = 2.92 (SD = 0.799). The overall difference in the mean ratings was statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 27.780$, $p<0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and the rest of the other countries. The results confirm that there was agreement across Latin America, European and American nationalities and that there was a strong agreement from Middle East nationalities that spending patterns have changed more than financial sources.

Seventh, was on whether exposing ISIS money laundering was more important exposing fundamentalism, and from the finding, and from the findings, the highest rating was among Latin Americans (M = 2.95; SD = 0.916), while the least rating was observed among respondents from the Middle East (M = 2.27; SD = 1.150). For the Americans, the mean rating was M = 2.88 (SD = 1.123), while for the Europeans, the mean was M = 2.90 (SD = 0.735). The overall difference in the mean ratings was statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 10.272$, $p<0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and the rest of the other countries. There results show that there was agreement across all Latin America, European and American nationalities that exposing ISIS money laundering is more

important exposing fundamentalism. However, there is a more neutral view from Middle East nationalities, having a mean rating close to the midpoint.

The eighth aspect was on whether targeting financing was more important than targeting operations, and the results show that the highest rating was among Latin Americans (M = 2.38; SD = 1.008), while the least rating was observed among respondents from the Middle East (M = 2.13; SD = 0.790). For the Americans, the mean rating was M = 26 (SD = 1.044), while for the Europeans, the mean was M = 2.38 (SD = 1.008). The overall difference was statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 13.746$, $p<0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and the rest of the other countries. This shows that there was strong disagreement between Middle East nationalities and the rest that targeting financing was more important than targeting operations

The ninth aspect tested whether there were differences in the ratings on whether authorities, international funding was more important than coordination, and the results show that the highest rating was among Americans (M = 2.44; SD = 0.747), while the least rating was observed among respondents from the Middle East (M = 2.13; SD = 0.790). For the Latin Americans, the mean rating was M = 2.31 (SD = 1.104), while for the Europeans, the mean was M = 2.35 (SD = 0.816). The overall difference in the mean ratings was statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 14.805$, $p<0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and the ratings by the Latin Americans, Americans and Europeans. There was also a statistically significant difference between Americans and the other two nationalities which confirms that there was a strong disagreement among all nationalities that international funding is more important than coordination.

Finally, question tested whether there were ISIS marketing needs to be challenged on media, and from the outcome, the highest rating was among Latin Americans (M = 2.97; SD = 0.827), while the least rating was observed among respondents from the Middle East (M = 2.88; SD = 1.074). For the Americans, the mean rating was M = 2.95 (SD = 1.004), while for the Europeans, the mean was M = 2.91 (SD = 0.826). The overall difference in the ratings was not statistically significant: $F(3, 359) = 4.782$, $p>0.05$. There was a statistically significant difference between the Middle East ratings and the rest of the other countries. This confirms that there was a strong agreement that ISIS marketing needs to be challenged on media.

5.2.4 Summary of Survey Results

This survey sought to evaluate the general perceptions of the participants across four regions. It is noteworthy that there were varying ratings by the respondents and the pattern of the ratings depended largely on the question. From the findings, there was no statistically significant difference in the ratings for three questions. The first and second were that state sponsorship is more significant than ideology, and that discipline with force is more significant than organizational structure, and for these, and being greater than the midpoint, this confirms that there was a strong agreement across the nationalities. However, with respect to the items that targeting financing is more important than targeting operations and that international funding is more important than coordination, the mean ratings were less than the mean ratings implying that there was a very strong disagreement across all the four nationalities. Further, with respect to the items that spending patterns have changed more than financial sources, that exposing ISIS money laundering is more important exposing fundamentalism and economic improvement is more important force, responses from Latin America, European and American nationalities were statistically significant from those from the Middle East nationalities. Lastly, there was a general agreement across nationalities that state sponsorship is more significant than ideology, that discipline with force is more significant than organisational structure and that ISIS has been successful at strategic adaptation.

5.2.5 Delphi Round 1 – Review and Validation

The survey results were subject to review and validation by the panel of experts. A summary of the survey results was shared highlighting the pattern of responses for each question in total and in relation to each geographic region. Members of the panel had the opportunity to assess the group responses submit their judgements on the pattern of the results and to provide qualitative feedback or clarifications on the significant factors and issues.

There was consensus on the ranking of the issues based on the levels of agreement indicated in the survey. Several members of the panel provided further feedback and opinion and the panel as a whole concurred with these assessments. These qualitative were shared and there was overall consensus by the expert on the points expressed above.

Firstly, in terms, of the significance of the different factors rated in the survey there was consensus around a number of clarifications. In terms of question 2, “the most agreement from this group is that ISIS has been successful a strategic adaption and I think this underlines the importance of understanding better its strategic capabilities both in terms of its resources and

processes.an understanding of their organisational strength and weaknesses allows for more effectively targeting of measures.

There appears agreement across all the issues identified and while there are 10 questions, I think we can summarise these into a smaller number of issues. Firstly, question 6-9 shows that funding dimension and underlines the importance different aspect of terror groups.

> *"I think we agree that depriving terror organisations of financial resources can significantly undermine overall capacity for these groups operate effectively. It feeds not every aspect of their operation from media operations, communications to funding frontline operations."* [Expert 3]

Question 4 and 5 underline the importance of issues that affect the recruitment of operatives, both in terms of encouragement defections (Q5) and promoting economic conditions that affect the supply of operatives. "*However, the moderate agreement on Q5 and Q2 suggests that the use of force remains an important tool to target terrorism*." [Expert 2] .

On the question of state sponsorship there was consensus around a number of views that emerged:

> "*It is interesting to note the level of agreement to the question 'state sponsorship is more significant than ideology'. Both are important dimensions of terrorism, but I think state sponsorship has far-reaching implications because it can impact profoundly on the ability of terror groups to mobilise and operate* [Expert 4]. "

The extent to which they feel safe and able to operate is function of the environmental conditions that are afforded by state sponsorship. I think sponsorship has many dimensions from financing and allowing freedom for terror organisations to move funds, recruit, communicate its ideology". [Expert 5]. The question of state sponsorship was associated with international relations and role of law and security dimension:

> *"Agreement on Q1 emphasises the importance of seeking alliances domestically and internationally so that can pressure to counter state sponsorship and enforce security through legislation and law enforcement measures. The level of security at national, regional and local levels can impact ability of terror groups to function effectively – to carry out violent, instil fear, commit criminal activities." [Expert 1].*

Ideology was emphasised as important dimension and linked to other issues by one expert. The feedback suggests that ISIS ability to project is ideology so effectively was both a function of

state sponsorship and failure of counter-terror strategies to effectively challenge it. One expert suggested:

> *"ISIS ability to effectively market and communicate on media is a major issue. There is an imperative to target this because it allows the group to build support domestically and internationally and that feeds into recruitment and financial support".* [Expert 3].

In support of this another panel member explains:

> "If ISIS marketing remains unchecked, it allows it to maximise its organisational capabilities through numbers of recruit and financing. So far, the strategy has been predominantly a military strategy, and online they remain unchallenged". [Expert 2]

The response to these questions and the feedback received suggest that we need to focus on understanding different aspects of terror organisations and how they operate and function. In this way we can identify organisational strengths and weaknesses that can be challenged and exploited. It is paramount that organisationally the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations is challenged and frustrated continuously" [Expert 7].

In respect of the significant differences between regions there was a group consensus of feedback submitted by members of the panel that the regional context is an important factor and the design of counter-terror strategies needed to be tailored and based on expert perspectives from that region. "An understanding of the contextual factors is necessary to develop counter-terrorism strategies that are appropriate and effective in their specific contexts" [Expert 4].

5.3 Delphi Round 2- Case Study Analysis - ISIS

5.3.1 Content Analysis of Secondary Data Sources

A case study analysis was employed as a method to focus on a single case of ISIS organisation that allows for in-depth exploration of organisational dimensions of a terror organisation. The data was based on secondary sources of information of new sources, academic papers, government or institutional briefings, and reports since 2018. The data was subject to content analysis focused on identifying key organisational characteristics and weaknesses of a terror organisation. An organisational analysis of ISIS emphasises the key characteristics of its culture, structure and vulnerabilities that provide opportunities for counter-terrorist measures.

ISIS emerged from the conflict and war in Iraq and Syria and was able to capture larges areas of territory. In 2006, after the merging of disparate groups into Al-Qaeda it renamed itself the

Islamic State in Iraq (ISIS) and became notable as a force in 2014 where it was able to take control of northern Iraq in short period of time. Thereafter a proclamation followed as it referred itself as the worldwide caliphate (Chulov, 2019). Since it has established diverse funds and grown its operations and reach ISIS relies on a broad range of funding strategies from criminal-based activities, revenue from controlled oil fields, and private donated sources (Financial Action Task Force, 2015).

ISIS's ideology and propaganda were a key source of recruitment that has attracted fighters from around the world. It is able to maintain demand for terrorism through narratives of marginalisation and grievance targeting a cross-section of society including Sunni in Iraq and Syria, the Pashtun in Afghanistan, and as well as religions and tribal factions in Africa (Abu Rumman, 2020). A key component of ISIS operations is a "community incubator" that supports the organisation in several ways: providing protection; recruitment; a sympathetic pool of supporters. This enables ISIS to create a favourable environment to grow, develop and expand its social networks (Abu Rumman, 2020). However, it was unable to sustain this narrative, and it was politically undermined with the loss of supporters and sympathizers from across all areas (Abu Rumman, 2020). According to Abu Rumman (2020) international and regional policies failed to counter such narratives because the focus has been predominantly on military strategies.

Several organisational characteristics can be identified that underline weaknesses that can be exploited to undermine the organisation. As ISIS becomes more formalised and bureaucratic its operations are more visible and exposed to counter-terror agencies. This has exposed it to the targeting of repeated processes and locations. Organisational control structures, in ISIS both hierarchical or cell-based, possess distinct boundaries of loyalty that create an opportunity to create division. ISIS has adopted a decentralised cell structure to streamline its operations and insulate groups from each other. While this can maximise its survival it creates challenges in terms of control and overextension (Clarke, 2019a) and restricts and pressuring tactical and operational options for the group (Chulove, 2019). The rapid expansion of these cells creates weak ties and opportunities to counter-narratives and infiltrate the organisation. Under the previous highly centralised structure leadership could exert significant control and pressure to force operations to fight to the death (Clarke, 2019b) but this is weakened under the dispersed structure.

In terms of the composition of ISIS, it is made up of several different groups including Iraqis and Syrians for survival reasons and Sunnis' intent on overthrowing the Assad regime; radical fundamentalist; Irania Shia; and marginalised young from foreign countries (Chulove, 2019). As such the cohesiveness of the group is fragile and uncertain with a wide array of national, cultural, and religious differences (Clarke, 2019b). There is strong potential for division and conflict in ISIS given the different religious and ethnic differences that make up the group. Major benefits were associated with exploiting disruptive tactics to cause dissent and division in ISIS cells (Gunaratna, 2017). The diverse demographics of ISIS make it vulnerable to differences that can lead to division and conflict. ISIS members are made of leaders and members from different generations with different ideas and perspectives on terrorism.

The extent to which ISIS ideology can appeal and all its different groups have been challenged. Internal tensions and conflict have been noted due to the different origins and capabilities and interests of its members. Some of its recruits have little or no education and while they have strong motivation to fight, they may lack the ability to adapt and assume leadership roles when needed. One dispute between foreign and domestic fighters concerns the perceived preferential treatment of foreign fighters which creates and resentment and even open conflict between the two groups (Ingram, et al., 2020; Bender, 2015). Another issue is the disillusionment of foreign fighters reportedly and the lack of interest or intention to fight and where desertions result in execution (Ingram, et al., 2020). The brutality and execution of its supporters have undermined its support with many followers. In one case the group experienced internal dissension and in one example it executed 100 fighters (Al-Arabiya, 2014). Fighters became disillusioned about the hardships they faced which resulted in internal conflict and resistance against the leadership including a coup. (Chulov, 2019). The issue of the internal issue is underlined by the formation of a special committee focus on investigating to counter internal dissension (Chulov, 2019).

5.3.2 Expert Interview Results

Several perspectives were offered on the question of how ideological leaders of the terrorist organization differ from traditional business owners or shareholders. Terror leaders possess spiritual or ideological power that translates into more authority over the operatives that businesses over their employees. Leaders use ideology as the powerful and motivational force often that is not evident in businesses that are focused on the extrinsic or intrinsic motivation of the individual. In both types of organisation there is a common process of maximising the

use of resources but towards different ends. The ideological goals of terror groups are enduring while business organisations can change significantly.

Interviewees highlighted some differences between middle managers of the terrorist organisation and businesses. While they are similar in the roles they perform, there are essential differences in the commitment to an ideology. In the view of one interviewee “

> *Operational leaders in terrorist organizations are more insistent, are consistently exposed to the risk of death, and have great power and authority on behalf of their ideological leaders. A middle leader in a terrorist organization considers terrorism a way of life and has no other life, as they are always targeted by the security authorities' [Expert 4].*

At this level, terror managers similarly possess specialist skills: planning, scheduling control, and resources much the same as a business organisation.

> "*Middle managers in terrorist organizations, according to my study of ISIS, were individuals with some degree of sharia knowledge among the fighters within the same organization. Yet while the middle field commanders… have knowledge and the sharia study, but they lack those experiences.*
> *".[Expert 7]*

The level of control and power attributed to terror managers is significantly higher as:

> “*they command respect within a small group of fighters. This is the difference, according to my point of view, between middle leaders within terrorist organizations and middle managers within businesses. They have a high degree of autonomy, which means a high degree of responsibility, so they are taking a lot of the risks. Think of how many, for example, top Al-Qaeda leaders have been killed. Think of Bin Laden. One person, but how many middle-level managers have been killed?”[Expert 3]*

A major theme in respect of how fighters, front liners of the terrorist group differ traditional organization was harsh conditions and threat to life that the former endure. According to one view characterises this:

> Front line fighters, life differs from administrators who steal and heap money. Front liners usually get small salaries and live a harsh life. They endure a brutal and aggressive environment and can be subject to coercion and physical punishment for small infractions. They are expendable ISIS and submit them to deadly missions. In comparison, employees of business organisations face less physical, emotional, and psychological suffering [Expert 1].

The lack of freedom was identified as a further distinguishing factor because while employees in companies can leave, operatives in terror organisation have a small chance to leave.

Financing challenges faced by ISIS were related to managing and securing non-traditional mechanisms of money transfer and sources of funds. It has to manage and co-ordination multiple resources based on power, smuggling to Turkey, kidnapping, crossing borders with

Turkey, Assad regime, spring of peace areas, Kurds, and ISIS, petroleum trade, Internet, political compromises, captives, occupying loyalists, agricultural lands, and many other resources and mainly from NGOs projects (fraudulent procurement, recruitment, and tenders). It must manage the complex informal network of individuals and family networks to transfer money. Countermeasures from the Kurdish government and the international coalition have intercepted and disrupted activities local transfers are largely unobserved.

In terms of recruitment, it is acknowledged that ISIS is capable of strong ideological messaging. Interviews explain that ISIS has made the best use of social media as a powerful and essential recruitment tool with a high degree of professionalism.

> *No other terrorist organization could exceed them when it comes to publishing their narratives 'Listen to us, not about us!', and their bright slogans that the Islamic state will survive and expand. Pumping them on various pages on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram enabled ISIS to deliver their message to the whole world and in different languages. At the local level, the organization is trying to target young people with limited income, or those exposed to political and sectarian injustice, to recruit them by providing a basic source of income for them and their families.* [Expert 5]

The campaign at the regional and international level divides the world into two camps (Us and them; Muslims and Disbelievers) by altering the meanings of religious texts and speaking to one's emotions. However, there has been a change because ISIS no longer invites new followers to join them on the land of the caliphate, but rather to stay in their countries as lone wolves and sleeper cells. ISIS global reach is underlined by one expert stating that"

> *ISIS turns every political event into a means to prove their message in their publications such as Amaq magazine. Today, prisons in the UK and Europe and refugee camps are among the hot topics that ISIS exploit in spreading their ideas and recruiting. The pieces of literature produced by ISIS are still available on the Internet, free of charge. This indicates that censorship of content in the countries has become ineffective [*Expert 7]

With business there is the accountability is different. Terrorist organisations leadership is highly autocratic and even brutal ad control is enforced through fear and coercion. This is an essential difference because there is always a strong potential for powerful dissent and tension. The authoritarian and repression nature of terror organisations is evident in the control systems enforced by the leader: "Leaders of ISIS have methods of enticement, intimidation, and strong use of ideology, which enables them to command and control fighters, direct them, brainwash them, and sacrifice them" [Expert 8]. ISIS uses different structures according to the geographical area and the security and military pressures it is exposed to. It is Networked in Syria and Iraq. Franchise in the conflict areas in the world, like Afghanistan, where they call

themselves the organization of the State of Khorasan, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabab in Somalia, and they have a state in Sinai.

5.3.3 Delphi Round 2 – Review and Validation

The results of the ISIS analysis generated from the interviews with panels members and secondary data analysis was shared with the panel. Members of the panel to provide qualitative feedback or clarifications on any themes in the results.

> There was some consensus that differences in intra-group attitudes and perspectives needed to be understood at a strategic level. As one expert states "there is always the potential for differences towards the level of violence that is used. Some members seek escalation while others may be open to de-escalation of violence" [Expert 1].

In terms of structure of ISIS there was consensus around the following view"

> "I think the decentralisation of Isis structure into isolated cells and groups means at some level such units are autonomous to some degree and may develop differences in terms of moral boundaries and the level and type of violence used. I think this provides some opportunity to emphasise moral boundaries to less radical or extremist units " [Expert 1]

There strong consensus on understanding the composition and mindset of terror organisations at a group and individual level:

> *It is important to examine and understand the mindset of members of the organisation motivations both extrinsic and intrinsic to gain insights into the attitudes and behaviours of individuals within terror groups. This can help to target counter-measures to encourage defections and gain support by focusing on those factors [Expert 8]*
>
> *I think we should recognise the heterogeneous nature of the organisation in terms of its members and consider that there are differences based on individual and group level thinking which convert into different attitudes and beliefs towards strategies and tactics with radical and moderate elements. Understanding this can help to identify individuals and groups to target.* [Expert 2]

There was consensus on the panel of experts on understanding strategic differences between actors in the organization"

It should not be considered that the use of violence by terrorist groups is a generalisation and widely accepted by all its members. There will be some members who oppose and have feelings of guilt and shame and conscience about violence targeting women and children. This is one aspect that undermines ideological commitment and support for extremist leaders of strategies and it can be something that can be exploited to help target and discourage individual members. Therefore we have to understand the level of commitment and criticisms that emerge in these groups. [Expert 6]

The importance of understanding internal dynamics and points of differences and sources of tension was underlined by several views that received consensus by the panel:

Understand organisational tensions that can develop in terror groups over time mean we can construct strategies and tactics that can effectively move away from violent means and strengthen disengagement at an individual level. That means developing a nuanced understanding of the emotional and psychological state of members such as level of morale, fears, commitment, anxieties, motivations, and differences at individual and group levels. [Expert 12]

If we understand the organisational problems and pressures within the organisation, then it's possible to align strategies to further division and break-up of terror groups or influence shift away from violence and towards non-violent means. You need to understand attitudes at different levels of the organisations and this requires probing and connecting with different actors to gauge thinking to identify opportunities to drive a wedge between groups, gain support and exploit fears through targeted counter-messaging and other tactics.[Expert 4]

There are always tensions and conflicts between different terror groups and this varies over time. These differences can be along ethnic, religious, or ideological lines and result in frequent attacks and assassinations within the groups. Inter-organisational conflict between groups can have a destructive effect on the terror and be highly disruptive to its operations. It can result in a cycle of violence clashed between groups. [Expert 2]

There was consensus the depriving terror groups of financing can impact significantly on the ability of organisations to carry out their operations, grow and develop. Further, it can trigger or influence frustration and dissent that leads to division and conflict over time. One expert

explains that “regardless of the level of ideological commitment and acceptance of extreme violence, the financing the ability to mobilise and carry out violence are limited. Terror organisations need to be subjected to constant financial pressure [Expert 2]

The panel coalesced around the view that terror organisations experienced numerous organisational challenges internally that creates windows of opportunity to exert some form of pressure that moves some members toward moderate positions. However, without the necessary mechanisms that provide options for members to defect or exit the group or influence a shift in policy, those opportunities can be missed. |It was noted that significant social pressures can make it difficult for individuals to draw back from violence. Those pressure need to be addressed to creating opportunities that encourage restraint or de-escalation of violence. Counter-messaging was identified as key to convey narratives that emphasise non-violent strategic options or incentives to disengage.:

> *Many foreign fighters who joined ISIS came from many backgrounds and for different reasons to join the group. Many did not understand the realities of being a terrorist and possibly regret joining. They may regret joining but lack the means or opportunity to leave and these represent opportunities for counter-terrorism. Constructing pathways to encourage defection can provide a rich source of information and intelligence* [Expert 10].

The panel agreed that the enduring nature of terror groups even in the face of political inertia exemplifies the entrenched beliefs and ideological commitment that provides ongoing impetus and motivation of terrors. Therefore a focus on targeting exploiting ideological vulnerabilities was viewe as critical to fuel division and to ensure that the will and motivation are put under maximum stress:

> *We need to have a deeper understanding of the enduring dimensions of terrors. For instance, it is for some groups solidary social bonding between soldiers is a key aspect of their motivation and it becomes a perpetuating culture where failure to achieve explicit codified goals does not undermine participation. There is research to support this.* [Expert 2]

Challenging ideology and vision of terror organization was emphasized as a major dimension to underline support and recruit. There was consensus on the view that “

It's critical to target the supply side of terrorism organisations to constrain recruitment of individuals and undermine the ability of organisations to finance the logistics that supports the training, mobilization, and communications. The capacity for terrorist originations to function is dependent availability of human capabilities. [Expert 5]

We need to consider our ability to temper the ideological and strategic impetus towards terror goals. This is a challenging issue but at one level of violence and terror is the only option available in a political context, the strategic options are limited to terrorist measures. The environmental context [political, social, religious, economic, cultural] impacts the strategic goals and decision-making and goals of terror organisations much in the same way that business environment influences business strategy. Therefore the availability of political alternatives for terror organisations can for at least the less radical/extremists groups provides alternative strategic options to terror-based strategies. Further, there is potential to create discord because, without political alternatives, the views of actors at all levels of the organisation will converge on terror.

There was consensus on the importance of a range of counter-terror measures: that were summarized:

- Deligimitising and undermining support for terror organisations can impact on recruitment and financing of terror groups.
- Targetting recruitment should also be in conjunction with tactics to promote desertion so that over time the organisation is weakened.
- Coordinate measures to maximise disruptive effects for instance by targeting funding that generates frustration and tension with deligitimisation to undermine leadership support.
- There is a need to focus on new alternative offensive strategies and programs required to build the offensive capability to disrupt the 'supply' of terrorists.
- It is necessary to target the social network of terror groups as a strategy to constrain demand for terrorism. This means finding ways to infiltrate and weaken social connections to create division.
- You need to monitor and be aware of the inconsistencies of their goals and any signs of instability that can be targeted. Any disconnect between the higher-level goals and underlying behaviours.

- Lessen conditions that draw individuals to terror organisations. Promote more inclusive conditions that minimise alienation, discrimination, marginalisation, and suffering

5.4 Delphi Round 3- Final Model Validation

This final round of the Delphi process focused on development and validation of the model by the expert panel. In this phase members of the panel reviewed independently the results generated in round 1 and 2. A final opportunity was provided to allow members to revise or offer new judgements or perspective. The focus of this phase was on the identifying and characterizing the key elements of the model that would support counter-terrorism strategies. This round was iterative and was conducted through email and online group discussion to arrive a final model that is outlined in the following chapter.

5.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the results generated from mixed-method data sources that inform the development of a business model of a terrorist group. The results are structured in accordance with the three phases of the Delphi method. Descriptive and ANOVA analysis of survey results was presented section 5.2. The results from Round 2 consisting of case analysis was presented in section 5.3. Final, section 5.3 summarises the model validation process from the final Round 3 of the Delphi method.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM MODEL

6.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the primary aim of the research to develop business model of violent non-governmental organisations. A is model proposed drawing on the findings in the previous generated through three rounds of the Delphi process. Qualitative and quantitative data from the research process informed a model building process by panel of experts in the field. Firstly, various models of counter-terrorism from intra-organisation approach are reviewed before a novel a model of intra-organisational fissure is conceptualized, identifying key constituent elements and dynamics that characterize a three-way schism within a terror group. This chapter concludes with summary of the key findings and a discussion of theoretical and practical contributions to field of terrorism and to counter-terrorism strategy.

6.1. Models of Counterterrorism through an Intra-Organisational Approach

Literature from the recent period demonstrates that tackling counter-terrorism has primarily focused on directly attacking terror groups from external vectors. These methods and their respective investigative discussions broadly fall into two distinct categories, namely direct military/security force action and effective methodologies therein (Rineheart, 2010), or an economic approach seeking to deny or control resources whether they be financial, material (Gardner, 2007), or informational (Aistrope, 2016).

However, new research, including the present one in the relevant fields, has offered a paradigm. As the understanding of the organisational dynamics of terror groups has expanded, so has an awareness of innate weaknesses within their organisational structures. Researchers have uncovered specific instances of terrorist groups falling victim to these weaknesses, and many have been classified and documented in detail. These discoveries have presented the possibility for intentional strategies to trigger or exacerbate these critical weaknesses, laying bare new internal vectors for attack.

Scholars have in recent years begun to point to the under-researched and under-theorised structural elements of counter-terrorism. Research into terror has mainly focused on developing attack methodologies without a comprehensive comparison of each approach's overall efficacy (Byman 2019). That has led to the lament of several top researchers in the field on the

fundamental gap between academic research and effective policymaking. As Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of State and a leading scholar of political science, once wrote, "the walls surrounding the ivory tower never seemed so high" (Nye 2009: A15). Regarding the field of counter-terror specifically, the aim of the research, if it is to be relevant, cannot remain within the narrow confines of data collection and theoretical assessment. Instead, counter-terror research must focus primarily on identifying which individuals can be controlled by policymakers (Byman ibid). The countless hours spent by government officials on solving national security-related issues, especially those about terrorism, speaks to the essential need for so-called "middle-level theory," namely, the scientific identification and categorisation of individuals that are most susceptible to being influenced by state power and the development of specific tactics and strategies to most effectively exert that influence (Byman and Kroenig 2016).

Within this general problem, that of the lack of middle-theory, that structural approaches to countering terrorism have gotten lost. Reverting to the lack of comprehensive comparisons between competing strategies, researchers often miss the underlying structural causes that make a given tactic successful. For example, the literature on offering concessions to militant groups has been growing for decades. The absence of evidence on the subject points to a broad spectrum of possible conclusions. While several recorded episodes of concessions lead to peace, such as the struggle between the IRA and the United Kingdom and FARC and the Columbian government, numerous counter-examples are also. For instance, De Mesquita (2005) offers several events in which conciliation had no effect whatsoever on violence levels and, in some cases, led to increased militancy. These instances almost all involved the emboldening of radicals and the strengthening of their position against more moderate elements and influencing extremist ideology inside the terrorist group.

However, an organisational analysis on when and how conciliation is applied sheds tremendous light on understanding its efficacy. Horgan (2009) points out that offering concessions and presenting them with apparent sincerity has triggered instability within terror groups. That occurs as arguments escalate between moderate and radical factions with the organisation. These fissures can often undermine the extreme position and popularise the position of compromise within the groups. As researchers point out, it was an essential factor in the dissolution of the Provisional IRA in the late 1990s. After years of stalemates and frustrations across various segments of the IRA, even the more extreme elements of the group were

primarily forced to accept offers by the British authorities for negotiation and legitimisation (Richardson, 2007).

Given the growth in scholarship on individuals that surround terror groups and the campaigns waged against them, scholars have an opportunity to understand better terror groups themselves, their organisational constructs, leadership and management challenges, and the social and political dynamics with which the organisation is forced to contend (Byman, 2019). As it will be demonstrated, there is a wide array of organisational dynamics that present not only weaknesses to the stability of the terror group but also targetable vulnerabilities that counter-terror agencies can capitalise on.

6.2 Traditional Counter-Terrorism Strategies: External Approaches to Attack

Conventional models of war methodologies have typically been the ones applied to counter-terrorism. The common characteristic of all of them has been attacking, targeting, or otherwise attempting to affect the terror group from external vectors. For the purposes of this study in intra-organisational counter-terrorism, it is necessary to dissect these various methods. This assessment aims not to criticise methodologies of how each of these strategies are applied but rather show how the fundamental approach of each relates to intra-organisational dynamics.

6.2.1 Countering Terrorism through Military Means

Military action is the most prominent means of combating terrorism by all states and regimes employing tactics designed to destroy terrorist groups ranging from full-scale military invasion to targeted attacks to destroy terror infrastructure or personnel; deployment of military assets to foreign nations; supporting local security forces; operations targeting of terrorist enclaves using advanced technological assets such as drones and intelligence to pinpoint terror operatives, leaders, or other important assets and infrastructure and destroy them. This form is the most widespread form of military-type counter-terrorism today as it is a relatively low investment, both in terms of resources and politics. As Boddery and Klein (2021, p1) "weaponised drone technology presents a low cost and potentially high-reward option to embattled presidents."

Yet, the success of military action can be highly uncertain. Large-scale invasions have had limited success and have been associated with anti-invader sentiments increasing insecurity,

terror violence, and instability (Malakoutikhah, 2020). Terrorists can regroup, reinitiate attacks, and ultimately maintain their hold on a territory.[12] Francisco (2004) pointed to the phenomenon of "backlash mobilisation", where military action causes a wave of sympathy and support for the terror group from among the population. This, in turn, brings more recruits to the organisation and increases the tendency to more attacks and operations. Furthermore, the substantial force also increases the opportunity for terror propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. Indeed, it is known that terror groups have undertaken attacks against government security forces with the express intent of instigating retaliation which will harm the local population and thereby provide fuel for pro-terror propaganda (U.S. Army 2014). Conversely, several instances from contemporary history seem to show the efficacy of overwhelming military force.[13]

Most analysis of this spectrum of outcomes has focused on the differences in the logistical or kinetic efficacy of the given operation. The aforementioned study on Algeria, for example, emphasised the physical prevention of terrorists and their base to secure support as well as the pure intimidation inflicted on the population, which deterred operations by the terrorists. Indeed, researchers have for decades been aware of the role that state military violence plays in compelling individuals from supporting, or otherwise participating in, terror activity (Tilly 1978). Similarly, it has been observed that infrastructural chaos caused by military action (lack of electricity and utilities, accessibility of roads, and other restrictions on movement) can make it impossible for terrorists to mobilise, gather intelligence, or potentially recruit scouts (Byman, 2019).

Until now, the case for military action has overlooked the intra-organisational element in determining when and how the use of force is effective. Research has shown, for instance, that the efficacy of repressive tactics is closely connected to how the terrorists support base received it and their subsequent reaction toward the terror group (Lyall 2009). In the Syrian Civil War, for instance, militant groups were severely weakened due to regime repression, but not directly

[12] The ongoing U.N. initiative in the Sahel spearheaded by France targeting Islamist and other militant groups in the Sahel region serves as an excellent example of this pattern (Wing 2019). Conversely, some similar interventions have achieved success. The U.S. (and more broadly speaking, NATO) supports the efforts to recapture Mosul from ISIS forces in Iraq in an instance in point. Current research suggests that success lies in the clearly defined and limited objective of the intervention and the political will to see it through, which was indeed the case in the liberation of Mosul (Millare 2019).

[13] In the Algerian crisis of the 1990s, it was found that "total war and eradication tactics" did produce stability and were a deterrence to the population from supporting terrorists and prevented terror groups from action out of fear of intense reprisals (International Crisis Group 2000).

due to killed operatives or damaged equipment. Rather, support bases ceased their logistical support of the terrorists and prevented them from using neighbourhoods as bases. In this case, violence was not aimed at crushing terrorists but rather creating discord between operatives and logistical support systems (Holiday 2013). This demonstrates how even external attack methods succeed (or fail) based on the organisational dynamics they affect.

6.2.2 Countering Terrorism by Addressing Root Causes

Both in academia and policymaking, addressing the root causes of terror has been observed as the most effective way of combating terror by many counter-terror experts. The basis for this theory is the pattern of political, economic, or social underdevelopment found in countries and regions from which terror sprouts (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010). Fandl (2003), writing in the early years of the War on Terror, found that upon examination, the market structure and economic development of countries where terrorist activity greatly increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s. He described regions "poisoned with incomplete or inadequate development, limited employment opportunities, and infrequent interaction with both people from other cultures and potential trading partners."

A root-cause approach is defined as anything that does not attack the "permissive individuals" that give rise to terror, but rather, motivational ones are considered root-cause directed action (Schneider et al., 2010). For instance, a terrorist group resorting to violence because there is no other way to voice their dissent, maybe be offering opportunities for political participation. In its essence, targeting the roots of terrorism means making non-violence comparatively more attractive for terrorist organisations or terrorist supporters and avoiding increasing the costs of terrorism or decreasing its benefits, which is the aim of traditional attack methods. Under this approach, the root causes of terrorism are identified and addressed early by focusing on social, political, and economic generators of terror.

In practice, governments have had mixed results. Feridun and Sezgin (2008) demonstrated--dovetailing Fandl's earlier findings--that economic under-development was a major factor in encouraging terror in the southeast Kurdish regions of Turkey. This would indicate sound and specific policy advice for addressing militancy in that region. However, it is unclear whether such strategies can be transferred to other countries in any case. Indeed, the foundational problem with the root-causes approach seems to be the difficulty in identifying and defining what the actual "root-causes" are at a global level. As Schneider et al. point out, existing

evidence "does not deliver a clear result on which individuals are actual roots of terrorism." This, the authors contend, is especially "when the analytical focus is global." In other words, evidence for root-cause approaches working in one instance has provided little to no help in formulating actual policy in another. There is no conclusive evidence on the importance of different determinants or their direction of influence (Schneider ibid). For instance, in some instances, economic instability can be identified as a cause for terror, while in other cases, it is specifically the well off, upper echelons of a society that instigate terror activity. The missing "one size fits all" result on the various causes of terrorism makes any simple policy advice nearly impossible.

The lack of intra-organisational perspectives has at least contributed to the lack of clarity on when and how root causes can be effectively addressed in terms of organisational dynamics and their relationship with these causes. The potential of organisational approaches has been highlighted by some research into root causes. For instance, Fandl (ibid, p.605) had already shown that addressing economic woes can be more effective when the operatives were engaging in terror experienced total impoverishment as opposed to mere inequality. By taking steps to address their economic grievances, the motivation for foot soldiers is sapped, leading to discord between leadership and their ground-level operatives.

6.2.3 Countering Terrorism Financing

The subject of counter-terror financing has received much attention over the recent period, especially since 9/11. Anti-terror finance is unique with the broader gamut of anti-terror subjects as it falls into its distinct category. By its very nature, it is a market and economic research endeavour. As such, finance-based methods to counter-terror have mostly taken regulatory action at the national and international levels. Securing the participation of a broad spectrum of nations has been vital in the fight against terror finance.[14] Despite these major

[14] In 2001, a United Nations resolution calling for the criminalisation of terrorism financing by all member nations and detailed an exhaustive list of groups and individuals who were known participants in terror finance under the new definitions. The G-7 sponsored Financial Action Task Force (FATF) contributed greatly to the proliferation of effective anti-money laundering systems and techniques; information sharing on terror finance trends, patterns, and specific activities (Trinkunas 2019). The Egmont Group, the umbrella organisation for financial intelligence units worldwide, grew exponentially post-September 11th.

developments, the blanket use of regulation and even the widespread financial intelligence activities have not maintained pace with terrorist innovation due to a number of challenges.[15]

Another basic problem facing anti-terror finance is terror groups wresting control of financial or commercial infrastructure and other important economic assets and mechanisms. When terrorists control territory, they often control the economic output of that area as well. This means that the distinction between legitimate economic activity emanating from a particular country and operations funding militant groups is difficult if near impossible.[16]

Similar to the previously discussed counter-terror methods, the field of anti-terror finance is also in need of intra-organisational analysis. Some initial research has already been done on exploiting individuals' incentives within a terror organisation (Shapiro and Segal 2007). This research can understand organisational weaknesses by targeting specific individuals within a terror group with a financial attack. Similarly, researchers have long been at work identifying how terrorist groups as a whole respond behaviourally to financial issues such as gains, losses, and different types of expenditures (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). This knowledge can be readily applied in formulating ways to best trigger intra-organisational strife and with which anti-finance means.

6.2.4 Anti-Terror through an Intra-Organisational Approach

Research shows that terrorist groups have a high level of resilience as a consequence of their flexibility and adaptability to face all types of enemies. This makes it harder for anti-terror strategies, whether military-political or economic policies base, to be an effective measure. In most cases, the terrorist Groups are more prepared to counter them. But they have a weakness: because terror groups seek to operate in a cohesive structure, they are subject to the tensions of conflicting interests and opposing goals that are the nature of many organisations. This gives way to a different approach to anti-terrorism policy, where instead of prioritising the external attacks, the anti-terror frameworks should focus on looking or profiting from the internal weaknesses of the terror groups. While this approach has been applied before by many anti-

15 Informal money transfer mechanisms beyond the reach of conventional regulatory devices including physical money deposits via middlemen and agents based on a system of trust, which are common in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world, the hawala networks (Farooqi 2010).

16 Shiite terror group Hezbollah has managed to gain control of many licit and illicit businesses and commercial systems in Lebanon (Trinkunas 2019). Similarly, when a terror group gains control of a financial institution, it can provide a mask of legitimacy, and therefore perfect cover, for terror-related finance (Dal Bello 2021).

terrorist agencies, it has only been used as a complementary approach due to a sufficient theoretical foundation (Laksmana,2019). This study provides an economic and organisational based view of violent non-governmental organisations that contributes a new avenue to countering terrorism and expands the theory and literature on countering terrorism. This has been discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The purpose of this section is not to repeat that content but rather lay it out from the perspective of one identifying potential targets in the same way a military strategist would assess a map of enemy territory.

Furthermore, it is worth noting again that this work is not asserting a "brand new" approach to the counter-terror strategy. Scholars and policymakers alike have long been aware of organisational weaknesses and have even developed and pursued strategies to attack them. This research offers a conceptualisation and validation of an intra-organisational approach as a counter-terrorism approach alongside traditional approaches of external attack.[17]

The primary emphasis of the counter-terror approach being presented here is that intra-organisational strategies should be treated on par with, and perhaps even more important than external attack methods. This assertion is based on the model of viewing the terror organisation as a firm, which in many ways (outlined in Chapter 2) is similar and in many ways identical to legitimate business and other types of corporate entities. A major advantage of the intra-organisational approach is the range of possibilities associated with different organisational dimensions to counter-terrorism.

As mentioned in brief in the sections above, what underlies effective counter-terror strategy does not consist merely of recognising patterns in which terror organisations are weakened or collapse. Rather, identifying which individuals, among those that determine the strength and operability of a terror group, can be affected by the available counter-terror resources. An intra-organisational model reveals numerous weak points in the terror group apparatus. The study of counter-terrorism through this prism uncovers an array of methods to target them effectively.

6.2.4.1 A Model of Intra-Organisational Fissure

[17] Most recent literature identifying and categorizing counter-terror strategies employed by state governments, their militaries and intelligence agencies has shown that all primary tactics and techniques to counter terrorist violence fall into some category of external attack. Only some of these methods are sometimes integrated with intra-organisational methods (see Byman 2019).

This mode posits a three-way schism within a terror group that may occur when the unique interests of the three main individuals come into conflict. First, it is necessary to define the underlying social dynamic which sits at the basis for organisational fissure. In common parlance, the terms goals and aims may perhaps be synonymous. However, for purposes of this discussion, the distinction between the overall goals of a terrorist group and the aims of particular strata or individuals within the group must be drawn. For example, the overall goals of a terror group (for example, to dislodge a colonialist power or gain political autonomy) might very well speak to all of its members.

Earlier a significant distinction was outlined between terror groups, revolutionary army or political mass movement that may have evolved and transformed different phases of conflicts. However, the immediate aims of the different people and groups within the organisations are by their very nature exceedingly different. Moreover, the prevailing inner-group ideology or policy reflects personal anti-terrorist policy because of the small number of members, which are, at their most, not more than a few hundred. Thus, the demographics of the terror group are a reflection of personal relationships. This can act as both a positive or negative force because it is subject to the group's complex interpersonal dynamics.

6.2.4.2 Structure of Terror Group

In addition, governments can adopt tactics to further exacerbate fictionalisation. In the realm of propaganda, messaging via media and official communications can be used to highlight group differences or pre-existing schisms between factions and individuals within a terror organisation. At the operational level, attacks against the group can be publicly framed as attacks targeting a specific racial or ethnic faction, heightening pre-existing animosity toward that sect.

By analysing the possible conflicts within the terror group's structure, we use the model developed previously, looking for possible fissures between the terror group's various strata. The terror group is comprised of three key individuals:

A. Ideological/Political leaders
B. Operational Managers
C. Foot Soldiers

Ideological/ Political leaders

As noted in Chapter 2, scholars have recognised the organisational structure of the terror groups. The political leaders are on the top level of the organisational structure. The ideological or the political leaders' sub-groups in the terror organisational demonstrate different strengths that make the terror group effective in fighting against the anti-terrorist agencies. The leaders are visionary and provide a road map for the group course, thus making members aware of and believe in what they are fighting for or against. The ability to recruit more members to their crusade increases the group's influence within the territories the terror group is based. This actor has access to a high level of resources, hold high status and respect and exert significant influence on the group and its. In many cases, like terror group leadership is formed for the legitimate political class, they have a political influence that might be local and international.

However, substantial studies indicate that the ideological or political leader terror sub-groups exhibit different weaknesses, such as they are always on the run as they are hunted. The sub-group provides the theoretical framework and influence the implementation by others as they lack the operational knowledge. They do not have direct contact with the foot soldiers due to their hunted nature, and they only provide information passed through a chain of commands.

Operational Manager:
The operational manager is responsible for managing and implementing the policies provided by the political leadership, made of battlefield veterans and individuals with more operational field knowledge. They have specialised roles and are knowledgeable in managing the foot soldiers, and they have moderate access to resources. This actor's functionality exposes the operational managers to targeting by the anti-terrorist agencies.

This sub-group represents a weak point of the terror group for several reasons. Terrorism is a livelihood or economic means which makes them susceptible to apathy and corruption over time; they are overtasked and therefore prone to making errors; and they often lack strategic thinking and so are more susceptible to capture by anti-terrorist agencies. Within the terror group, operational managers have a negative reputation among foot soldiers, which makes them susceptible to betrayal.

Foot Soldiers
Foot soldiers or fighters are an essential component of the terrorist organisation structure can represent the largest proportion of a terror group. They are not strategic thinkers but are responsible for implementing the ideology, strategies and operational plans cascaded down from the political leaders sub-group. The level of commitment to the ideology can vary significantly among foot soldiers, and they do not enjoy the ultimate benefits of the terrorist

organisation. The strengths and the weaknesses among the three sub-groups can be exploited in countering terrorism in the conflict within the terrorist group.

6.2.4.3 Conflictive Interactions

Within the terror group, three kinds of conflicting interactions are possible between the three individuals (Figure 26). The unique characteristics of each actor can be a source of tension and potential conflict in the relationship between any two individuals in the group that represent opportunities for counter-terrorism measures. Different dimensions of conflict can be identified based on this triadic relationship.



Figure 26 Triadic Structure of Terror Group

Ideological Tension

Ideological tension represents a point of stress or latent conflict based on differences that develop between the three individuals in the terror group. A central premise of this model is that the changing context of terror groups creates ideological tension between the individuals that can be exploited as divisive counter-measures.

The most glaring distinction between leaders and on-the-ground-operatives appears at the level of ideology and ethos. While terror groups arise to achieve a specific set of real-world goals, there is typically an ideological ethos behind the group's motives. In terms of ideological commitment, the largest variances in interests within a terror group can most often be found when contrasting the leadership strata with middle management and foot soldiers.

The ideological puritanism and fanaticism of foot soldier recruits to terror organisations have been well documented. In comparative studies on recruiting and training techniques, researchers found that while methods in these endeavours vary widely from group to group, the heavy emphasis on the ideological component in induction and qualification remains

constant in nearly all organisations. That pattern points to the fact that militant groups' foot soldier and middle management ranks will be highly ideological and puritanical in their devotion to the group's ethos (Lia, 2008).

However, motivation and commitment are temporal and will weaken over time as a terror group does not find a clear victory in its objectives (it is, as it does not transform itself into a revolutionary army that fights for a political and military victory against the state). In the beginning, ideology is the most critical driver of an organisation, and the level of loyalty of fighters is high in their belief in the justice of their cause. In this stage, political leaders are involved in the first ranks, making them leaders by their example.

As terror operations prolong and become more routinised or less ideologically orientated, then there is a likelihood that terrorists find themselves as professional workers for life where the terrorist activity becomes an occupation. From the moment that their motivation is compromised, as can be considered like ordinary workers of any factory, in this case, a "terror factory".

Ideological conflict may also develop between political leadership and other individuals when over time, ideological concessions are made by the leadership. This need for ideological concession can and has been a substantial intra-organisational strain on terror groups. Decisions by leadership spurred by political considerations can cause animosity and even outright desertion by the foot soldier rank and file. In sharp contrast, the political leaders of a terror group are conscious of the big-picture needs of maintaining the group and ensuring its long-term survivability.

Because of this fact, leaders must work within the framework of individuals that influence or hold stakes in the group's program (Chatham House, 2017). The inevitable need to solidify alliances, perform favours, and provide concessions to these individuals can compromise the group's ideals. Similarly, political leaders must also consider public perception, whether that be a perception of the group's members and support base or the broader regional or international community.

The view that the operational and political leaders are diverting from the initial and main goal of the terror group may widen the gap between the foot soldiers and their superiors. If the situation is not contained for a long period, it will likely cause a massive dissertation by the foot soldiers, thus weakening the organisations as the leaders have less access to resources and

influence to recruit new soldiers to support the organisation ideology. This led to the terror group dying a natural death (Chatham House, 2017).

Strategic Tension

Strategic progress can be a source of latent conflict when objectives go unrealised or are perceived as unrealistic or unattainable. Leadership's pursuit of unachievable objectives can cause severe stress on the chain of command when experienced officers resist or withdraw support. Such a case developed between Michael Collins, the IRA intelligence director, and De Valera, who was on the operations manager position of the IRA group, differed on over the signing of a treaty of which Collins has negotiated with the British to free 26 counties of Southern Ireland. As the operational manager, De Valera opposed the treaty as it failed to include the northern counties. The conflict led to the death of Collins in the hand of the IRA and the split of the Sinn Fein party to anti-treaty and pro-treaty. The IRA also splinted into two the IRA and the Free State Army. The war between the two groups continued for more than half a century, and the British still had control of the northern Irish. Differences between leadership and management on the final objective can lead to collapse or fragmentation of the group split into smaller groups with different goals and limited access to resources(Chatham House, 2017).

Another aspect of strategic tension can develop when top-level leadership can be driven by yet another motivation or vision for the terror group that generates resistance and conflict with operational management and foot soldiers. Typically, unique to them leaders may focus on the very preservation of the organisation and struggle for which it was created to achieve material enrichment and international status. Volkan (2014), in his comprehensive investigation into the social psychology of violent groups, has shown the tendency of militant leaders to descend into narcissism and even megalomania. This pattern has been observed in organisations ranging from South East Asia to jihadist groups like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.

As delineated above, leadership interests consist primarily of those that relate to the organisation as a whole. The leadership strata must present themselves as the group's public persona in the context of engaging with the support base, meeting donors, and promoting the group's ideology. Leadership's intense focus on public perception and public relations can substantially affect their operational priorities and operational planning. For that reason, the aims of leaders are often more grandiose and unrealistic (Califf 2010, Olsson 2014) compared to those of operational managers who not only prefer to pursue lower risk level objectives but

also have a more grounded understanding, gained from time in the field, of what is possible to accomplish and what is not.

Economic Tension

Financial and economic individuals represent a source of potential conflict that impact the relationship between individuals in different ways. Firstly, leadership's strategic vision may commit the terror group to highly ambitious goals and require significant investment in operations over the long-term that places significant strain on the group's financial resources. In the long term, this may result in expenditure reduction and funding on essential activities for the organisation to survive (Chatham House, 2017). Such a move, more often than not, will affect the lower levels of the organisation's hierarchy while leaving the middle to upper management less affected, if at all.

Financial constraints can bring ideological schism between leaders and foot soldiers to the fore when the principal conflicts with the strategic visions. A scenario can emerge where the leadership level is inclined to refrain from operations because of its awareness of its costs. This is often due to its understanding of the uneconomic cost-benefit ratio of a particular course of action. It can also be simply due to a lack of funds and a decision to spend available resources in more essential areas of the organisation's upkeep. From the leadership's perspective, this strategy is more prudent and certainly more beneficial for the organisation's survivability in the long term (Holliday, 2013).

Financial tensions can develop from the consequences of a terror group's operations that may cause economic disruption and undermines access to funding and resources, and impair political leader's abilities to recruit new members. Instead, existing resources are focused on essential operations and compromise the attainment of organisational goals (Holliday,2013). The operational managers and the ideological subgroups of the terror organisation are likely to agree on the current situation due to their vast experience. However, foot soldiers are negatively impacted, likely to feel more neglected and hardship by this situation.

Research shows that the foot soldier strata of terror organisations tend to be the most interested in improving living conditions and consider this a primary grievance. Researchers analysing militant groups in Africa have discovered a significant (albeit unquantifiable) percentage of foot soldiers who would abandon the group when economic alternatives to fighting the regime become available (Ghaddar, 2016). Even so, financial tension has less of an effect on a significant portion of terror operatives who commit to the struggle not out of economic

necessity but through ideological commitment. Research findings on the ideological extremism of investigators were discussed above.

Similarly, investigations showing that economic levels (and therefore economic considerations) are not consistent markers of terror recruitment are now well cited in the literature (see Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003; Sela-Shayovitz 2007). That opens the possibility for a situation in which foot soldiers are motivated primarily by considerations of economics and living conditions while their mid-level managers are not. That scenario is made all the more likely, considering that more ideologically committed members attain management positions.

Security Tension

Intra-organisational conflict can emerge between foot soldiers and their superiors in management and leadership strata. Security tension arises in attitudes to safety and risk between political leaders and foot soldiers. At lower levels, there is strong fear for the security and safety of foot soldiers' kinship and the perception by the majority of a serious threat to life, both personally and for their families. Political leaders and operational managers enjoy a substantially higher degree of personal safety than low-level operatives. Crenshaw (1987b) discovered that terror recruiters employed methods to identify risk-taking propensities in individuals. That seems to have been to ensure recruits would be willing and able to engage in high-risk operations and live in a state of medium to danger for prolonged periods. Foot soldiers, by necessity, must live lives close to "the front", whether that be on a traditional battlefield or in the humble dwellings of a sleeper cell, and are exposed to more danger. On the other hand, leaders are, at least in theory, able to live more stable day-to-day lives and are therefore prone to less danger.

This conflict can develop over time when the acceptance of the risk that foot soldiers naturally face is lessened for a number of reasons. After years of fighting and living under conditions of hardship, fighters often lose their former devotion, preferring less activity. As researchers point out, that coincides with a realisation of the risk burden being carried almost solely by them, the foot soldiers (Lee, 2016b). Low-level operatives will come to see themselves as no longer being idealistic freedom fighters but simply workers in a terror setting being exploited by their commanders.

As this reality sets in, formerly zealous recruits will prefer less activity, develop greater fear of death and imprisonment, and begin to loath the leadership strata. This situation is exemplified

by research that has shown a reduced motivation and acceptance of the risk that foot soldiers face as a factor in the dissolution of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, commonly known as FARC. The FARC freedom fighter demanded good governance in Colombia. The foot soldiers believed that they fight for the liberation of the country. However, after more than four decades of fighting against the government, the foot soldiers have become less motivated. The series of desertions by FARC foot soldiers, an important factor in the group's demise, was triggered by the trend of Colombian military successes against the group beginning in early 2004 under the administration of President Álvaro Uribe. Scholars point to this severely increased risk to low-level operatives – while leadership remained largely safe – as a major strain in the organisation that eventually contributed to the group's capitulation (Spencer 2011).

This effect, however, is associated with terror groups in the longer term that have endured prolonged exposure conflict and high levels of risk. During these initial phases of a terror organisation's development, lower strata of the organisation's hierarchy, consisting of highly motivated young men, operatives are interested in action, view a strategic retreat as weakness, and any form of the operational refrain as a betrayal of the organisation's goal.

As such, they prefer by nature maximum activity on the part of the organisation and do not have the knowledge or capacity to calculate enterprise-level considerations (Rachlin, H., 2004). Thus, recruits and, in general, young organisations will have a distinct tendency at the operational strata to execute operations and disregard economic or personal considerations.

6.2.5 Intra-Organisational Counter-Terrorism Approach

These different tensions and interplays between the key three individuals can form the focus of a range of intra-organisational counter-measures that maximise the disruption, conflict and ultimately collapse of terror groups. Figure 6-2 models the conflictive triadic interplay that feed into different types of tensions. Counter terror strategies and tactics can be targeted to heighten conflicting relations and tensions and undermine core functions and increase the economic and social costs that can result in dissent escalating to conflict, fragmentation of the group and at the extreme total collapse and dissolution. These counter-measures draw on the previous sections that highlight, on the one hand, the characteristics and role of the different individuals and the different tensions and potential sources of conflict on the other.

6.2.5.1 Strategic Counter-Terrorism Measures

From the evidence, three strategic counter-measures can be advanced that exploit the different tensions to generate division and conflict that significantly impacts the functioning and survival of terror organisations:

- Undermine leadership credibility and support
- Target operational capabilities
- Promote knowledge and intelligence gathering



Figure 27 Intra-Organisational Model of Fissure

Strategy 1 - Undermine Leadership Credibility and Support

It has been asserted above that undermining the terrorist leader's power and authority would help erode that leader's stabilising ability for the organisation. The ideological and strategic tensions postulated in the model supports a strategy of leadership fissure focusing on undermining the legitimacy, support and credibility of leadership. Leadership reputation is a highly desirable target in triggering terror group destabilisation. Indeed, damage to the image of a leader has been shown to produce a "collective sense of failure" within terror groups (Gvineria, 2009).

The potential for polarisation of ideologically and strategic perspectives, commitment and goals between leaders and lower levels of group generates vulnerabilities that may be exploited. Targetting leadership can be highly effective in severing the bonds between sub-groups and aggravating the rifts between them. The differences in the characteristics, attitudes and experiences between the three individuals in terror organisations suggest an opportunity to employ tactics that maximises divisions and create dissent between individuals.

Such a strategy undermines leadership ability to control and govern the terror organisation and give rise to dissent and division and create leadership challenges or fragmentation of the organisation. Leaders ideologically position, beliefs, strategic goals, political behaviour or lifestyle all can be targeted to maximise latent dissent that may exist with other individuals in the organisation. During the life of the organisation, leaders may become diametrically opposed to other individuals in the organisation on different issues. However, as Al Raffie and Huehn (2016 p.213) note, there are no universal ethical standards by which all terror leaders are judged, as any group's particular standards are rooted in the specific cultural and/or religious context from which the terror group emerges. This emphasises the timing and coordination and timing of tactics based on analysis and intelligence of the terror group.

Strategy 2 - Target Core Operational Capabilities

The second strategic option is focused on targeting core operational activities to disrupt and undermine the internal functioning of the terror group to heighten tensions and maximise conflict between individuals. Findings from this study highlight three core functions for targeting: finance, human resources, and communication. Disruption in either of three areas can intensify different types of tensions in the organisation and creates pressures on the relationships and interactions between individuals.

Terror operatives at all levels are essential to the functioning of the organisation and the achievement of terror goals in many ways. There is a need to focus on new alternative offensive strategies and programs required to build the offensive capability to disrupt the 'supply' of terrorists. Therefore a strategy that focuses on recruitment, retention and 'working' conditions significantly undermines operational capabilities and survival of terror organisations. In terms of recruitment, the goal should be to limit the ability of terror organisations to attract and recruit new operations domestically and internationally. In terms of retention, the goal should focus on encouraging desertion of members of the organisation. The impact of this strategy is that it

reduces the size of the organisation and the availability of operatives and different expertise to carry out operations. This can heighten tensions between middle management and upper in realising operational goals and achieving strategic goals.

Finance represents a critical component that underpins all aspects of the terror groups operations. Without continuous flow funding, terror organisations are unable to carry out operations, develop and expand. A strategy that targets funding activities has the potential to generate significant internal pressures and challenges and maximise tensions. Without funding, the ability to realise ideological, strategic goals, finance living conditions and provide security is severely undermined. This can lead maximise tensions in the relations, creating dissent, frustration, conflict and desertion.

The third element of this strategy should focus on targeting the communication capabilities of organisations. Intercepting and disrupting communication can undermine operational functioning limiting the ability to share information, learn and undermine ideological narratives. This strategy can support measures countering terror groups' ability to communicate extremist ideologies and undermine the recruitment of new operatives. Furthermore, tactics can limit communication options and interception of communications.

Strategy 3 - Enhance Knowledge and Intelligence

Counter-measures to exploit different tensions within terror organisations are dependent on effective knowledge and intelligence gathering. This is critical for effectively targeting strategies and tactics and supporting the identification of moderates, dissenters, and developing allies. Identification and understanding of a terror organisations vulnerabilities and pressure points allow counter-terror agencies to plan and execute measures that can undermine the functioning of the terror group to height tensions and promote internal conflict. This will allow for profiling of the structure of the organisations, the number and characteristics of operatives at different levels, different perspectives, and attitudes of individuals in relation to strategies and tactics. Differences in the use of violence, types of violence, strategic objectives, problems and challenges, attitudes of foot soldiers, operational challenges can be used to understand and exploit organisational weaknesses.

In this conflict, operational managers are considered an important key to destroying the organisation. With appropriate temptations, they can be used to inform the ideological leaders of the organisation (Chatham House, 2017). A good example is the Red Brigades Fighting communist party formed in 1981, which was one of the largest groups among the three groups

that split from Red Brigades; the group was led by the ideology of overthrowing the capitalist state and replace it with the dictatorship of the proletariat, it also demands withdrawal of Italy form NATO (Holliday, 2013). The reorganised group ensured that the core objectives of the original Red Brigades were implemented. However, despite the weakening of the terror group by imprisonment of its leader, the group was the most successful B.R. successors that carried out more high-profile attacks and operated for a long.

6.2.5.2 Tactical Counter-Terrorism Measures

Based on the evidence, a number of tactical counter-measures can be employed to underpinning the strategic goals. Different tactics can be employed to undermine the credibility and authority of leadership. Identifying and publicising the negative aspect of leadership has the potential to undermine trust and respect, and control within the organisation and create division among individuals. One of the most effective ways of undermining leadership has been to expose the lavish lifestyle they live in. It is also possible to tarnish the reputation of political leaders and disseminate rumours on them so that they lose their credibility, and the loyalty of fighters decreases, thus provoking defections. The tremendous wealth enjoyed by the leaders of the Palestinian terror group Hamas was cited above.

Equally important to note, however, are the schisms created within the organisation when these facts came to light. Several Hamas high-ups are known to have left the organisation and even worked together with Israeli security forces against the group, primarily motivated by the excessive wealth of the leadership. Now well-known examples include the actions of Suheib Yousef, a son of the co-founder of Hamas, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, publicly turning on his father and exposing the luxury in which Hamas's commanders live. Sheikh Hassan's oldest son, Mosab, went to work for Israel's internal security service, Shin Bet, after being disenchanted by the organisation for similar reasons (Staff 2019). Indeed, financial intelligence work has, in recent years, begun to focus on spending patterns that point to those supporting the lavish lifestyles of terror operatives (OECD 2019). However, these detection efforts have been primarily geared toward identifying sources of money laundering and disrupting terror financing. From an intra-organisational approach, this intelligence can and should also be used to expose leadership corruption and their amassing of personal wealth. With this knowledge in mind, governments can take several concrete strategies to undermine leaders and their critical role in maintaining group stability.

Additionally, misinformation campaigns can surgically target the essential image components of terrorist leaders. Drawing on the research cited above, the specific image assets of a given leader can be identified. The smear campaigns can be a strategy that can be used to undermine terror groups. For instance, such campaigns can target political leaders ideological integrity by suggesting or accusing them of using the terror group activities to enrich themselves, by collaborating with international organisations to create personal wealth through the natural resources the terror group have control over. This may undermine the support of other individuals in the leadership, causing significant disruption, conflict and potentially fragmentation and collapse of the group. On the other hand, smear, the campaign can target the error of the operational manager labelling them as intentional, creating conflict between the foot soldiers and the operational management (Byman & Kroenig, 2016). The smear campaigns can also target the foot soldiers by invoking the lifestyle they live in and misinformation that there are many government informants within the group, thus creating mistrust among the fighters and the other two subgroups.

It is acknowledged that where leaders may not lead lavish lifestyles or where leaders assume strong internal and public image, that military tactics can offer fallback. Terror groups that are highly cohesive and share common commitment and goals, that are the focus of this strategy, might focus on the elimination or removal of leaders. In such a case, capturing or assassination, or conciliation of the ideological or political leaders constitutes a fatal blow to the organisation. The second row of leaders is not ready and is not compatible with the fighters.

Counter-messaging can be used to weaken the perceived legitimacy of terror organisations and counter their ideologies. Deligimitising and undermining support for terror organisations through counter-messaging can impact on recruitment and financing of terror groups. Targetting recruitment should also be in conjunction with tactics to promote desertion so that, over time, the organisation is weakened. High-quality content across different media, including social media, that counter-terrorist narratives should be supported by financing that enables different voices, as co-ordinated around the broad strategy of factual messaging that counters terrorist ideologies. Delegitimizing tactics can have a positive effect on intelligence gathering and undermine solidarity and group cohesion in terror organisations. The implementation of the program in Italy, for instance, turned out to be an overwhelming success. Not only did it provide the police with detailed information helping to crack down on cells of the Red Brigade, but it also enabled former terrorists and Red Brigade operatives to re-enter everyday life.

Tactics can also focus on foot soldiers to encourage desertion and recruit informers and moderates through amnesties, reduced punishments, financial incentives and building social ties. Therefore, it is always important to separate the fighters and not to be united in supporting ideological leaders or operational managers because the foot soldiers are the balance knob in the conflict(Chatham House, 2017). General amnesty or reduce the punishment can lessen the repercussions of desertion and be a motivating factor. More high-level operatives who have in-depth knowledge and intelligence may even be offered protection. Former terrorists who credibly show that they wish to renounce terrorist activities should be supported and not penalised. This method has been used, for example, in the case of the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) in Italy, the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) in Germany, and the Action Directe (Direct Action) in France. In Italy, a law introduced in 1982, the legge sui pentiti (law on regretters), gave courts the discretion to reduce sentences when convicted terrorists provided tangible information leading to the arrest and conviction of fellow terrorists.

In that case, convicted terrorists received both in Germany and Italy reduced prison sentences and other concessions, even including daytime furloughs from prison to hold a normal job. Serious terrorist crimes were effectively de-penalised by offering terrorists an opportunity to accept their defeat, admit their guilt, and inform other terrorists. Research into counter-narrative campaigns targeting radical groups has shown that many former terrorists that underwent deradicalisation were eager to participate in formulating messaging to effect deradicalisation (Van Eerten et al. 2017).

Key tactics to disrupt financial flows comprise targeting traditional financial channels which bypass formal banking channels. Intelligence gathering can help unravel physical transfer networks using individuals. Monitoring and tracking of financial flows be conducted to identity handover points. Other measures include the limited ability of terror organisations to establish corporate entities, transfer funds across borders, limit the travel of potential carriers across boundaries. The ISIS case analysis shows that the organisation is funded through a wide range of criminal activities and for control of oil resources. Tactics can target specific activities that should be targeted to disrupted the flow of funding from key sources. Repeatable patterns of funds transfer and criminal activities can be targeted.

Tactics for intelligence gathering can first commence with fostering conditions that undermine support and generate opposition terror organisations. Tactics for counter-messaging can support this. At a state level, different tactics can be employed to promote more inclusive

conditions that minimise alienation, discrimination, marginalisation and suffering. This can allow for a diverse range of tactics focused on developing social ties, recruiting informers. Tactics can focus on mapping and profiling operation processes and personnel. To directly target the management level of a terror group, governments can hone in on the intra-organisational component managers are most susceptible to, namely the operational viability of leadership's strategy. Coercive tactics combined with financial incentives can be employed to recruit and secure the cooperation of operational managers and even defection. This can secure valuable information about leaders, strategies and tactics operations and internal weaknesses.

6.3 Summary of Findings

This chapter proposed model of organizational fissure. Terrorism devastating and lasting impacts on society and remains a global threat to peace and security that has yet to be effectively countered. This research adopts a novel approach to terrorism research by investigating terror groups from at the organizational level through the lens of multi-product firms. This goal of this study was to develop a business model of a violent non-governmental organization. Triangulation of difference sources data validated the significance of key dimensions that inform a model of intra-organisational fissure

The findings reveal four sources of organisational tension: ideological, strategic, economic security that underpin and influence a three-way schism within a terror group that occur when the unique interests of the three main individuals come into conflict. These tensions develop through the interplay of internal individual and group level dynamics. The findings identify multiple triggers and contexts that inform a range of strategies and tactics that maximise the dissent, conflict, fragmentation and collapse of terror groups.

6.4 Contributions of the study

The study offers a novel intra-organizational approach to terrorism research in identifying sources of organizational tension at individual and group level dynamics that can support the development of counter-terrorism measures that undermine the core functions and capabilities of terror organisations. Triangulation of difference sources data validated the significance of key dimensions that inform a model of intra-organisational fissure that support the development of anti-terror strategies.

6.4.1 Academic contributions to study on terrorism

This model has three main theoretical contributions to terrorism field. Firstly, it identifies source of organizational tension that can be targeted to disruption and undermine the functioning and operational capabilities of terror organisations. It underlines at different levels of the organization, the interplay between actors that seeds defection from inside the group. Secondly, the findings underline the cost implications to terrorist activities and the impact on the efficiency of operations. A third contribution, is the identification of pathways to undermine sources of funding both directly and indirectly. Targeting of different sources of tensions can impact on both supply and demand side factors of the terror group. It offers a framework for situating counter-measures in relation to the interplay between actors and conflicts dynamics and operational processes. Conflict dynamics is underpinned by inter-group and individual interactions within groups of actors at different levels of the organisation. This dynamic can be influenced by the external factors that impacts on both supply and demand-side strategies that feeds into the organisation. It is important to conceive these dynamics from and organisational perspective to understand the different ways that terror organisation can be targeted and disrupted.

6.4.2 Practical Contributions and Implications to counter-terrorism strategy

The findings offer practical contributions to counter terrorism strategy for practitioners and policy. Firstly, it emphasises multi-dimensional organizational and the development of integrated counter-terrorism that targets different actors of the organisations and sources of tensions. The model can be applied as a framework to tailor strategies potential sources of vulnerability to seed dissent and defection. Further counter-terrorism strategy can be focused on exploiting sources of tensions of actors and different levels of the organization. It places focus on the effective profiling and mapping of actors to better understanding of attitudes, characteristics and behaviours. This has implications for sufficient resourcing financial and human development to support strategic information and planning system to capture data on the individual, group and organizational characteristics of terror organization. This measure is critical to effectively develop strategies for specific contexts. There is implication for intelligence gathering through different mechanisms to understand the actors and operational elements.

REFERENCES

Abadie, A. (2004). Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism. Harvard University and NBER.

Abbasi, I., & Khatwani, M. (2014). An Overview of the Political Theories of Terrorism. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 19(8).

Abdellahi, J. A (2017). Model for Adjusting Product Portfolio Complexity in Diversified Firms Using Corporate Datasets, Similarity measure and Clustering Algorithms.

Abrahms, M. (2008). What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy. *International Security*, *32*(4), 78-105.

Abu Rumman, M. (2020). *The future of ISIS: Strengths and weaknesses dynamics of the "virtual caliphate" and the gap in counterterrorism strategies*. [Online] Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/16943-20201214.pdf [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Achilli, L., & Tinti, A. (2019). Debunking the Smuggler-Terrorist Nexus: Human Smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1-16.

Adebayo, B. (2019). Muslim cleric who hid Christians during attacks honored in the US [Online] Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/18/africa/nigeria-cleric-honored-intl/index.html [Retrieved 12 April 2021]

Agencies for Citizen Digital (2016). We believe we've killed mastermind of El Adde attack-KDF. [Online] Available at: https://citizentv.co.ke/news/we-believe-weve-killed-mastermind-of-el-adde-attack-kdf-112396/ [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Agrawal, A. (2020). The economics of terrorism: an economic Perspective to terrorists' psychology. South Asian Law & Economics Review. Vol. 5, ISSN 2581-6535.

Aistrope, Tim (2016) Social media and counter-terrorism strategy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70:2, 121-138, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2015.1113230

Akhmat, G., Zaman, K., Shukui, T., & Sajjad, F. (2013). Exploring the root causes of terrorism in South Asia: everybody should be concerned. Springer Science and Buisness MEdia.

Al Raffie, D. and Huehn, MP (2016), "Terrorist Leaders – How Ethical Must They Be?", Leadership Lessons from Compelling Contexts (Monographs in Leadership and Management, Vol. 8)

Al-Arabiya (2014). ISIS 'executes 100 deserters' in Syria's Raqqa. *Al Arabiya***,** [Online] Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2014/12/20/ISIS-executes-100-deserters-in-Syria-s-Raqqa-report [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Ali, A. (2010). Economic cost of terrorism. *Strategic Studies*, *30*(1/2), 157-170.

Ali, M. (2015). ISIS and propaganda: How ISIS exploits women. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 10-11.

Aliu, M., Bektashi, M., Sahiti, A., & Sahiti, (2017). A review of sources on terrorist financing. Acta U. Danubius Jur., 97.

Al-Rikabi, M. K. (2021). The Role Of The Interpol In The Counter-Terrorism In Iraq 2003-2017. e-Bangi, 18(1).

Anderson, D. M., & McKnight, J. (2015). Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa. *African Affairs*, *114*(454), 1-27.

Anderton, C. H., & Carter, J. R. (2019). *Principles of conflict economics: the political economy of war, terrorism, genocide, and peace*. Cambridge University Press.

ANI, (Friday, 20th August, 21): Some countries seek to subvert collective resolve to fight terrorism need to call out their doublespeak: Jaishankar at UNSC: Accessed 22nd Aug, 21.

Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. (2001) Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy. Rand Corporation.

Arreguín-Toft, I. (2001). 'How the Weak Win War: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. *International Security*, 26:93–128

Arreguín-Toft, I. (2012). Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict Theory in Historical Perspective. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24:4, 635-657

Aubrey, S. M. (2004). The new dimension of international terrorism. vdf Hochschulverlag AG.

Babb, C. (2017). *In Afghanistan, US destroys $80M in drug money during counter-Taliban campaign*. [Online] Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-us-destroys-millions-drug-money-counter-taliban-airstrikes/4160917.html [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Bacon, T., & Muibu, D. (2019). The Domestication of Al-Shabaab. *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, *10*(3), 279-305.

Balcells, L. (2011). Continuation of politics by two means: Direct and indirect violence in civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(3), 397-422.

Bapat, N. A. (2007). The internationalization of terrorist campaigns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *24*(4), 265-280.

Bartlett, A. W. (2002). The swerve of desire: epicurus, economics and violence. *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 319-332.

Basile, M. (2004). Going to the source: Why Al Qaeda's financial network is likely to withstand the current war on terrorist financing. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(3), 169-185.

Basuchoudhary, A., & Shughart, S. (2010). On ethnic conflict and the prigins of transnational terrorism. Defence and Peace Economics.

BBC (2020). Pakistan fire: Two to hang for Karachi garment factory inferno [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54250075 [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Benmelech, E., & Berrebi, C. (2007). Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3).

Benmelech, E., Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2012). Economic conditions and the quality of suicide terrorism. *The Journal of Politics*, *74*(1), 113-128

Berebbi, C. (2009). The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful? In Social Science for Counter Terrorism: Putting the pieces together.

Berman, E. (2009). Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terorrism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Berman, E., & Laitin, D. D. (2008). Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model. Journal of public Economics, 92(10-11), 1942-1967.

Berrebi, C. (2003). *Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians.* Princeton: Princeton University Industrial Relations Section.

Berrebi, C., & Ostwald, J. (2011). Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism: Do natural disasters incite? Springer Science and Business Media.

Berrebi, C., & Princeton University. (2003). *Evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among Palestinians*. Princeton, N.J.: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University.

Biersteker, T., & Eckert, S. (2008). Terroist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or Tranformation? In *Countering the Financing of Terrorism.* New York: Routledge.

Bischof, C. (Ed.). (2008). Parallel computing: Architectures, algorithms, and applications (Vol. 15). IOS Press.\

Blaker, Lisa (2016) "The Islamic State's Use of Online Social Media," Military Cyber Affairs: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 4.

BLAKLEY, G. R., & 1979 International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge. (June 01, 1979). Safeguarding cryptographic keys. 313-318.

Blannin, P. (2017). Islamic State's financing: Sources, methods and utilisation. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, *9*(5), 13-22.

Blannin, P. (2017). Islamic State's financing: Sources, methods and utilization. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 9(5), 13-22.

Bloom, M. M. (2005). *Dying to kill: The global phenomenon of suicide terror.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Boddery, S. S., & Klein, G. R. (2021). Presidential use of diversionary drone force and public support. *Research & Politics*, *8*(2), 20531680211019904.

Boddery, S. S., & Klein, G. R. (2021). Presidential use of diversionary drone force and public support. Research & Politics, 8(2), 20531680211019904.

Bolanos, A., Duyvesteyn, I., & Malkki, L. (2012). *Is there a "new terrorism" in existence today. Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*. London, the United Kingdom: Routledge, 29-42.

Borgeson, K., & Valery, R. (2009). Terrorism in America. Canada: Jones and Bartlett Press

Bosi, L., della Porta, D., & Malthaner, S. (2019). Organizational and Institutional Approaches. In *The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism* (p. 133). Oxford University Press.

Bowman-Grieve L. (2013). "A psychological perspective on virtual communities supporting terrorist & extremist ideologies as a tool for recruitment," Security Informatics, 2, no. 1,1-5.

Boylan, B. M. (2014). What drives ethnic terrorist campaigns? A view at the group level of analysis. SAGE Journals, 33(3).

Brickley, J., & Smith, C. (2002). *Designing Organizations to Create Value: From Strategy to Structure.* McGraw Hill.

Brown, G., Louis, A., & Cox, T. (2011). How probabilistic risk assessment can mislead terrorism risk analysis. Risk Analysis, 31(2).

Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2005a). Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. *International Organization , 59* (1), 145-176.

Buffaloe, D. L. (2006). Defining asymmetric warfare. Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army.

Burke, R., & Cooper, C. (2008). International Terrorism and Threats to Security: Managerial and Organizational Challenges.

Burns, J. F. & Semple, K. (2006). US finds Iraq insurgency has finds to sustain itself [Online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/world/middleeast/26insurgency.html [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Butler, Leroy Bryant (2011) "Hezbollah: The Dynamics of Recruitment" School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort

Leavenworth, Kansa [Online] Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA545234.pdf [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Byman, D. (2016). ISIS goes global: Fight the Islamic state by targeting its affiliates. Foreign Affairs, 95(2), 76-85.

Byman, D.L. (2019). *Five initial thoughts on the New Zealand terrorist attack*. [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/15/five-initial-thoughts-on-the-new-zealand-terrorist-attack/ [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Byman, Daniel & Kroenig, Matthew. (2016). Reaching Beyond the Ivory Tower: A How-To Manual. Security Studies. 25. 289-319

Byman, Daniel "Counterterrorism Strategies," in Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, Eds. Erica Chenoweth et al. (Oxford University Press, 2019)

Califf, G. R. (2010). Sacred Values, Strategic Communication, and Military Operations in Afghanistan. Air War College Air University Maxwell AFB United States.

Callaway, R. L., & Harrelson-Stephens, J. (2006). Toward a theory of terrorism: Human security as a determinant of terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(8), 773-796.

Caplan, B. (2013). Terrorism: The Relevance of Rational Choice Model. Public Choice, 128.

Carter, D. B. (2012). A blessing or a curse? State support for terrorist groups. International Organization, 66(1), 129-151.

Caruso, R., & Locatelli, A. (Eds.). (2014). Understanding terrorism: A socio-economic perspective. Emerald Group Publishing.

Casptack, A. (2015). Deradicalisation programs in Saudi Arabia: A case study. Middle East Institute, 10. Center for the Analysis of Terrorism. (2016). ISIS Financing. France: CAT.

Chalk, P. (1995). The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence 7(4): pp. 10-44.

Chatham House. (2017). The UAE View of the GCC Crisis: What Happened and What Happens Next? [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKl5IIK71I8&feature=youtu.be [Retrieved 2 June 2021]

Chenoweth, E., English, R., Gofas, A., & Kalyvas, S. N. (Eds.). (2019). *The Oxford handbook of terrorism*. Oxford University Press.

Chermak, S., Freilich, J., & Suttmoeller, M. (2013). The organizational dynamics of far-right hate groups in the United States: Comparing violent to nonviolent organizations. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(3), 193-218. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2013.755912

Choi, S. W. (2010). Fighting terrorism through the rule of law?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(6), 940-966.

Choi, W. S., & Luo, S. (2013). Economic Sanctions, Poverty and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis. International Interactions, 39.

Chulov, M. (2019). The rise and fall of the Isis 'caliphate'. *The Guardian*, [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-isis-caliphate [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Clarke, C. (2019a). *The terrorist threat posed by neglect and indifference*. [Online] Available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/09/the-terrorist-threat-posed-by-neglect-and-indifference/ [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Clarke, C. (2019b). *What does the Islamic State's organisational restructuring tell us?* [Online] Available at: https://icct.nl/publication/what-does-the-islamic-states-organisational-restructuring-tell-us/ [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Clarke, C. P. (2015). Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare. ABC-CLIO.

Cleaver, T. (2013). *Understanding the world economy*. Routledge.

Coffee, N. (2006). Eteocles, Polynices, and the Economics of Violence in Statius'" Thebaid". *American journal of philology*, 415-452.

Cohen, S. J. (2019). The unconscious in terror: An overview of psychoanalytic contributions to the psychology of terrorism and violent radicalization. International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 16(4), 216-228.

Combs, C.C. (2017). *Terrorism in the twenty-first century*. London: Routledge.

Comras, V. (2007). Al Qaeda finances and funding to affiliated groups, terrorism financing and state responses. *Stanford*, pp. 115-133.

Cox, Kate, William Marcellino, Jacopo Bellagio, Antonia Ward, Katerina Galai, Arya Sofia Meranto, Giacomo Persi Paoli "Social Media in Africa A Double-Edged Sword for Security and Development" United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Centre for Africa (November 2018)

Cragin, K., Daly, S. A., Everingham, S. S., Hoube, J., Kilburn, M. R., & Marcum, C. Y. (2004). *The dynamic terrorist threat: An assessment of group motivations and capabilities in a changing world*. Rand Corporation.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative politics, 13(4), 379-399.

Crenshaw, M. (1987). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and organisational approaches. The Journal of strategic studies, 10(4), 13-31.

Crenshaw, M. (2007). The logic of terrorism. *Terrorism in perspective*, 24, 24-33.

Crenshaw, Martha “How Terrorism Ends,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1987.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist Thread March/April 2015 Foreign Affairs Volume 94 Number

Cruz, E., D'Alessio, S. J., & Stolzenberg, L. (2020). The Labor Market and Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(3), 224-238.

Cunliffe, E., & Curini, I. (2018). ISIS and heritage destruction: A sentiment analysis. *Antiquity*.

Dal Bello, G. (2021) “Managing a Crisis: Hezbollah’s Welfare Expansion” E-International Relations [Online] Available at:https://www.e-ir.info/2021/04/26/managing-a-crisis-hezbollahs-welfare-expansion/ [Retrieved 3 March 2021]

Daymon, C., & Holloway, I. (2010). *Qualitative research methods in public relations and marketing communications.* London: Routledge.

De Mesquita, E. B. (2005). Conciliation, counter-terrorism, and patterns of terrorist violence. International Organization, 145-176.

Desmedt, Y., Hou, S., & Quisquater, J. -J. (January 01, 1998). Audio and Optical Cryptography. 392-404.

DeVore, M. R., & Stähli, A. B. (2015). Explaining Hezbollah’s effectiveness: Internal and external determinants of the rise of violent non-state actors. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(2), 331-357.

Dion-Schwarz, C., Manheim, D., & Johnston, P. B. (2019). Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrencies: Technical and Organizational Barriers and Future Threats. Rand Corporation.

Diop, A. N. (2019). Vulnerability of Economies Facing Terrorism: Case of the Countries of the Sahel Belt. Journal of Economics, 7(2), 103-114.

Dunn, S. P. (2012). John Kenneth Galbraith and the theory of the firm. In Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Easterley, W. (2016). The War on Terror vs The War on Poverty. The New York Review of Books.

Ehdaie, M., Eghlidos, T., Aref, M. R., & 2008 International Symposium on Telecommunications (IST). (August 01, 2008). A novel secret sharing scheme from audio perspective. 13-18.

Ekumaoko, C. E., & Ezemenaka, K. E. (2020). Responsibility to protect: external intervention on Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Security Journal, 1-21.

Elmi, M. A., & Ngwenyama, O. (2020). Examining the use of electronic money and technology by the diaspora in international remittance system: A case of Somali remittances from Canada. *The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries*, *86*(5), e12138.

Emel'janov, V. P. (1999). Terrorizm - kak javlenie i kak sostavprestuplenija. Har'kov: Pravo [in Russian].

Estrada, M. A. R., Park, D., & Khan, A. (2018). The impact of terrorism on economic performance: The case of Turkey. Economic Analysis and Policy, 60, 78-88.

Etzioni, A. (2010). Rational Actors: Neither Mad nor M.A.D.I :The Meanings of Rationality, Rogue states and Terrorists. Defense and Security Analysis, 26(4).

Fair, C. & Shepherd B. (2006). 'Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29(1), 51–74.

Fandl, K. J. (2003). Terrorism, development & (and) trade: Winning the war on terror without the war. *Am. U. Int'l L. Rev.*, *19*, 587.

Fandl, K. J. (2003). Terrorism, Development & (and) Trade: Winning the War on Terror without the War. Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., 19, 587.

Feridun, M. and S. Sezgin (2008). "Regional Underdevelopment and Terrorism: The Case of South-Eastern Turkey." Defence and Peace Economics 19(3): 225-233.

Filipec, O. (2020). The Islamic State: From Terrorism to Totalitarian Insurgency. Taylor & Francis.

Financial Action Task Force (2008). *Terrorist financing*. [Online] Available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Financial Action Task Force (2015). *Financing of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).* [Online] Available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Forest, J. J. (2007). Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st century: Strategic and tactical considerations. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Fortna, V. P. (2015). Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes. International Organization, 69(3).

Francisco, R. (2004) "After the Massacre: Mobilisation in the wake of harsh repression" *Mobilisation: An International Journal* 9(2)

Francisco, R. (2004). After the massacre: Mobilization in the wake of harsh repression. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *9*(2), 107-126.

Freedman, L. (2007). Terrorism as a Strategy. *Government and Opposition*. 42(3), pp. 314-339

Freeman, K. (2012). *Secret Weapon: How Economic Terrorism Brought Down the US Stock Market and why it Can Happen Again*. Regnery Publishing.

Freeman, M. (2011). The sources of terrorist financing: Theory and typology. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(6), 461-475.

Freeman, M. (2014). A theory of terrorist leadership (and its consequences for leadership targeting). *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *26*(4), 666-687.

Freeman, M., & Ruehsen, M. (2013). Terrorism financing methods: An overview. *Perspectives on terrorism*, *7*(4), 5-26.

Frey, Bruno S. "Countering Terrorism: Deterrence vs More Effective Alternatives" Open Economics 2017; 1: 30–35

Frifita, M., & Hadhek, Z. (2019) The Effects of Terrorism on Business Failure in the MENAP Region.

Galbraith, J. K. (1967). The new industrial state. Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev., 1, 11.

Galbraith, J. K. (1998). The affluent society. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Galbraith, J. K. (2007). *The new industrial state*. Princeton University Press.

Gallimore, T. (2004). Unresolved Trauma: Fuel for the Cycle of Violence and Terrorism.

Ganor, B. (2005). *The counter-terrorism puzzle: A guide for decision makers*. Transaction Publishers.

Gardner, Kathryn L. "Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way" Global Governance 13 (2007), 325– 345

Gelber, K. (2018). Incitement to Hatred and Countering Terrorism: Policy Confusion in the UK and Australia. Parliamentary Affairs, 71(1), 28-49.

Gerges, F. A. (2017). ISIS: a history. Princeton University Press.

Ghaddar, Hanin "Economic Alternatives Could Help Split Shiites From Hezbollah" PolicyWatch 2711, The Washington Institute October 18, 2016

Gillespie, A. (2014). Foundations of economics. Oxford University Press, USA.

Gillon, Jihâd "From Bin Laden to al-Zawahiri: The story of al-Qaeda's rise"

Gold, D. (2003). Economics of Terrorism. New York.

Gold, D. (2004). Economics of terrorism. Columbia University Press.

Goldman, S. O., & Bar, L. (2020). The global law of terror organization lifespan. *Terrorism and political violence*, 32(8), 1636-1665.

Goldstein, N. J., Cialdini, R. B., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a viewpoint: Using social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels. *Journal of consumer Research*, *35*, 472-482.

Gordon, P., Moore, J. E., Park, J. Y., & Richardson, H. W. (2007). The economic impacts of a terrorist attack on the US commercial aviation system. Risk Analysis, 27(3).

Graham, R. (2013). Managerial economics for dummies. John Wiley & Sons.

Gray, S., & Adeakin, I. (2015). The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Missionary Activism to Transnational Jihad and the Failure of the Nigerian Security Intelligence Agencies. African Security, 8(3).

Greaver, B. S. (2016). *Terrorist group brands: understanding terrorist group strategies through brand exposure.* Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States.

Grynkewich, Alex Reifel, Chris "Modeling Jihad: A System Dynamics Model of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat Financial Subsystem" (Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue November 8 2006) Defense Technical Information Center

Gumedze, S. (2008). The private security sector in Africa: Country series. Institute for Security Studies Monographs, 2008(146), 106.

Gunaratna, R. (2002). Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gunaratna, R. (2017). Strategic Counter-Terrorism. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, *9*(6), 1-5.

Gustafsson, L. and Ranstorp, M. (2017). *Swedish foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq: An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data*. [Online] Available at: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1110355/FULLTEXT01.pdf [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Gvineria, G. (2009). How does terrorism end?. *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, *257*.

Hamin, Z., Othman, R., Omar, N., & Selamat, H. S. (2016). Conceptualizing terrorist financing in the age of uncertainty. Journal of Money Laundering Control.

Hansen, S. J. (2013). Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group. Oxford University Press.

Harmon, C. C. (2012). Spain's ETA terrorist group is dying. Orbis, 56(4), 588-607.

Harrison, M. (2003). The logic of suicide terrorism. *Royal United Services Institute Security Monitor*, *2*(1), 11-13.

Harrison, M. (2006). An economist looks at suicide terrorism. *WORLD ECONOMICS-HENLEY ON THAMES-*, *7*(3), 1.

Hasan, S. (2010). Pakistan suicide bomb on police. Children among dead. BBC. BBC.

Hazzaa, R. N., Oja, B. D., & Jung, H. (2021). The importance of value congruence: An analysis of college recreation employees and organizations. *Managing Sport and Leisure*, *26*(3), 161-174.

Heath, J. (Ed.). (2019). The veil: Women writers on its history, lore, and politics. University of California Press.

Heger, L., Jung, D., & Wong, W. (2012). Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence , 24*, 743-768.

Hickman, K., Weissmann, M., Nilsson, N., Bachman, S. D., Gunneriusson, H., & Thunholm, P. (2018). Hybrid Threats and Asymmetric Warfare: What to do?. In Hybrid Threats and Asymmetric Warfare: What to do? Stockholm 14-15 November, 2017, the Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden. Försvarshögskolan (FHS).

HM Government. (2006). Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy. London: Crown Copyright.

Hodgson, J. S., & Tadros, V. (2013). The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism. New Criminal Law Review, 16(3).

Hoffman, B. (2017). Inside terrorism. (3rd Ed). Columbia university press.

Hoffman, B. (2018). The Modern Terrorist Mind-Set: Tactics, Targets, Tradecraft, and Technologies. In Inside Terrorism (pp. 242-268). Columbia University Press.

Höflinger, T. (2020). Modern terrorism: motives of individual terrorists or the strategies of terrorist groups?. Global Change, Peace & Security, 1-7.

Holliday, J. (2013). The Assad regime: from counterinsurgency to civil war. Institute for the Study of War.

Hollis, M., & Smith, S. (1991). Beware of gurus: structure and action in international relations. *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), 393-410.

Holmes, J. S., Gutiérrez De Piñeres, S. A., & Curtin, K. M. (2007). A subnational study of insurgency: FARC violence in the 1990s. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(3), 249-265.

Horgan, J. (2009) *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengaments from Radical Extremist Movements* London: Routledge

Horgan, J., & Taylor, M. (September 01, 1997). The provisional Irish republican army: Command and functional structure. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9,* 3, 1-32.

Horowitz, M. C. (2010). Nonstate actors and the diffusion of innovations: The case of suicide terrorism. International Organization, 64(1), 33-64

Horowitz, M. C. (2014). Adoption capacity and the spread of suicide bombing. Adoption Capacity and the Spread of Suicide Bombing: A Response to Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, "The Spread of Military Innovations: Adoption Capacity Theory, Tactical Incentives, and the Case of Suicide Terrorism," Security Studies, 23(3), 513-547.

Hou, D., Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2020). Introducing extended data on terrorist groups (EDTG), 1970 to 2016. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *64*(1), 199-225.

Hou, Y., & Quek, K. (2019). Violence exposure and support for state use of force in a non-democracy. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 6(2), 120-130.

Hubbard, Ben "Iran's Allies Feel the Pain of American Sanctions" *New York Times* March 28, 2019

Hudson, R. (2003, July). Terrorist and organized crime groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America. In Report prepared by the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division under Interagency Agreement with the United States Government.

Hudson, R. A. (1999). The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why?. Library of Congress Washington Dc Federal Research Div.

Humanity, V. O. (2021). Global terrorism index. *Retrieved December*, *18*, 2017.

Hutchinson, S., & O'malley, P. (2007). A crime–terror nexus? Thinking on some of the links between terrorism and criminality. *Studies in conflict terrorism*, *30*(12), 1095-1107.

Iannaccone LR, Berman E. (2006). Religious extremism: the good, the bad, and the deadly. Public Choice 128:109–29

Iannaccone LR. (2006): The market for martyrs. Interdiscip. J. Res. Religion 2:1–28

Information Resources Management Association (IRMA) (2016). Violence and Society: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice. IGI Global

Ingiriis, M. H. (2020). The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement's recruitment project. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 31(2), 359-380.

Ingram, H. J. (2020). Sunni Jihadist charismatic leadership. *Routledge International Handbook of Charisma*, 288.

International Crisis Group (2000) “The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet” ICG Africa Report N° 24 [Online] Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/algerian-crisis-not-over-yet [Retrieved 2 July 2021]

Jamal, A. (2009). A Profile of Pakistan’s Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. *Combating Terrorism Centre*, *2*(9).

Jayasuriya, D. (2002). Money laundering and terrorist financing: the role of capital market regulators. Journal of Financial Crime.

Johnson, D. (2009). Darwinian selection in asymmetric warfare: the natural advantage of insurgents and terrorists. Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, 89-112.

Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Scholars on the Sidelines,” Washington Post, April 13 2009

Kaati, L. , E. Omer, N. Prucha and A. Shrestha, “Detecting Multipliers of Jihadism on Twitter,” 2015 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Workshop (ICDMW), 2015, pp. 954-960, doi: 10.1109/ICDMW.2015.9.

Karandashev, V. (2021). Theories, Examples of Cultural Models, and Methods to Explore Those. In Cultural Models of Emotions (pp. 93-157). Springer, Cham.

Karmon, E. (2015, April). Research Notes Islamic State and al-Qaeda Competing for Hearts & Minds. *9* (2).

Kern, S. (2017). France: Deradicalization of Jihadists a” Total Fiasco. Gatestone Institute.

Khan, A. (2020). Steps-to-War Theory and Interstate Wars in the Middle East: Is State-Sponsored Terrorism Another Escalating Step?. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 0021909620970573.

Khan, A., & Zhaoying, H. (2020). Conflict escalation in the Middle East revisited: thinking through interstate rivalries and state-sponsored terrorism. Israel Affairs, 26(2), 242-256.

Khan, S. A. R., & Yu, Z. (2019). Terrorism in Emerging Economies: A Double-Edged Sword. In Terrorism and Developing Countries. IntechOpen.

Khan, Tariq “The Social, Political and Economic Effects of the War onTerror: Pakistan 2009 To 2011” ISSRA Papers Vol. 5 Issue 1 (2013)

Khosravi, A., & Haghighi, A. M. (2018). New Science and Technology in Line with Terrorist Groups in the Middle East. International Journal of Political Science, 8(4), 79-87.

Kilberg, J. (2012). A basic model explaining terrorist group organisational structure. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(11), 810-830.

Kilberg, J. A. (2011). Organizing for destruction: How organizational structure affects terrorist group behaviour (Doctoral dissertation, Carleton University)

Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2019). Trump Considers Them Terrorists, but Some Are Allies [Online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/world/middleeast/trump-muslim-brotherhood.html [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Kolhammar, T. (2007). Reconceptualizing Spoiling in Peace Processes. A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden.

Kolodny, N., & Brunero, J. (2013). Instrumental rationality. [Online] Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-instrumental/ [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Korotayev, A., Vaskin, I., & Tsirel, S. (2021). Economic growth, education, and terrorism: A re-analysis. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *33*(3), 572-595.

Korstanje, M. E. (2021). Tracing the Cultural Background of Lone-Wolf Terrorism: Dilemmas, Contradictions, and Opportunities for the Next Decade. *International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism* (IJCWT), 11(1), 45-56.

Krajnev, A. (1997). Terrorizm - global'naja problema sovremennosti. Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie - Foreign military review, 6, 5-8 [in Russian].

Kranacher, M. J., & Riley, R. (2019). Forensic accounting and fraud examination. John Wiley & Sons.

Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2010). Terrorism in the worlds of welfare capitalism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *54*(6), 902-939.

Krieger, Tim, and Daniel Meierrieks. "What Causes Terrorism?" Public Choice, 147, no. 1/2 (2011): 3-27.

Krueger, A B., & Malečková, J. (2003). "Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?." Journal of Economic perspectives 17, no. 4,: 119-144.

Krueger, A. B. (2007). Introduction to What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism. *Introductory Chapters*.

Krylov, A. V. (2020). Terrorist Islamist Groups on the Sinai Peninsula. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 20(4), 763-780.

Kubic, M. (2021). ARAFAT AND THE RISE OF THE PLO. In *From Prague to Jerusalem* (pp. 163-173). Cornell University Press.

Lagarde, C. (2021). The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. IMF

Lai, B. (2007). "Draining the swamp": An empirical examination of the production of international terrorism, 1968—1998. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 24(4), 297-310.

Lake, D.A. (2016). *The statebuilder's dilemma*. Cornell University Press.

Laksmana, E. A. (2019). Civil-military relations under Jokowi: Between military corporate interests and Presidential handholding. Asia Policy, 26(4), 63-71.

Wilcoxon, C. L. (2019). Agency Theory: An Examination of the Intra-Organizational Relationships within the Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Office of the Chief Financial Officer and Embedded Chief Financial Officers in the Context of the Chief Financial Act of 1990 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Baltimore)

Landeta, J. (2006). Current validity of the Delphi method in social sciences. *Technological forecasting and social change*, *73*(5), 467-482.

Laslie, B. D. (2015). The Air Force way of war: U.S. tactics and training after Vietnam. University Press of Kentucky.

Laub, Z., & Masters, J. (2014). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). *Council of Foreign Relations*, *27*.

Lee, B. X. (2016b). Causes and cures VI: The political science and economics of violence. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, *28*, 103-108.

Lee, C. Y. (2016a). Terrorism - Counterterrorism aid, and foreign direct investment. 12087. Foreign Policy Analysis.

Leistedt, S. J. (2013). Behavioural aspects of terrorism. Forensic science international, 228(1-3), 21-27.

Lenain, P., Bonturi, M., & Koen, V. (2002). The Economic Consequences of Terrorism. Working Paper 334. Paris: OECD.

Leuprecht, C., & Walther, O. (2018). Applying Social Network Analysis to Terrorist Financing. In the Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law (pp. 945-966). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Levitt, M. (2019). Hezbollah's procurement channels: Leveraging criminal networks and partnering with Iran. *CTC Sentinel*, *12*(3), 1-9.

Li, Q., & Schaub, D. (2004). Economic globalization and transnational terrorism: A pooled time-series analysis. Journal of conflict resolution, 48(2), 230-258.

Lia, B. (2008). Doctrines for jihadi terrorist training. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *20*(4), 518-542.

Lin, C.-C., Laih, C.-S., & Yang, C.-N. (January 01, 2003). New Audio Secret Sharing Schemes with Time Division Technique. *Journal of Information Science and Engineering, 19,* 605-614.

Ljujic, V., van Prooijen, J. W., & Weerman, F. (2017). Beyond the crime-terror nexus: socio-economic status, violent crimes and terrorism. Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice.

Lutz, B. J., & Lutz, J. M. (2014). Economic, social and political globalisation and terrorism. Journal of Political, Economic, and Social Studies, 39(2), 186-218.

Lutz, J. M., & Lutz, B. J. (2006). Terrorism as economic warfare. Global Economy Journal, 6(2).

Lyall, J. (2009). Does indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? Evidence from Chechnya. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(3), 331-362.

Macchia, F. (2004). Terrorists, Security, and the Risk of Peace: Toward a Moral Vision. Pneuma, 26(1), 1-3.

Madani, B. (2002). Hezbollah's global finance network: the triple frontier. *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, *4*(1), 3-4.

Mahan, S., & Griset, P. L. (2012). Terrorism in perspective. Sage publications.

Malakoutikhah, Z. (2020). Iran: Sponsoring or combating terrorism?. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(10), 913-939.

Mann, M. (January 01, 2015). The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Results. *Historical International Relations, 3,* 81-105

Marsh, D., & Furlong, P. (2002). A skin not a sweater: ontology and epistemology in political science. *Theory and methods in political science*, *2*, 17-41.

Marshall, M. (2002). Global Terrorism: An Overview and Analysis. University of Maryland College Park, Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

Martin, G. (2010). Religious Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies. SAGE Publications.

Martin, S. T. (2001). Willing to Kill and Die, but Why?. *St Petersburg Times*.

Martini, A. (2020). Rethinking terrorism and countering terrorism from a critical perspective. CTS and normativity.

Massaroli, A., Martini, J. G., Lino, M. M., Spenassato, D., & Massaroli, R. (2018). The Delphi method as a methodological framework for research in nursing. *Texto & Contexto-Enfermagem*, *26*.

Mattsson, C. (2019). Policing violent extremism: How the global war on terror meandered into local municipal policies in Sweden. Sage open, 9(1), 2158244019837462.

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *20*, 415-433.

McCormick, G. H. (January 01, 2003). TERRORIST DECISION MAKING. *Annual Review of Political Science, 6,* 473-507.

Mccullough, C. W. (2017). Observations On Asymmetric Warfare. Academy Papers 2017, 79.

Meisels, T. (2006). The trouble with terror: The apologetics of terrorism—A refutation. Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(3), 465-483.

Mendelsohn, Barak (2020) Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Challenges of Succession in Terrorist Organizations, Terrorism and Political Violence

Mendick, R. (2017, December 3). Treasury crackdown on Bitcoin over concerns it is used to launder money and dodge tax. *The Telegraph*.

Merari, A. (1993). Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency. Terrorism and political violence, 5(4), 213-251.

Merari, A. (2007). Psychological aspects of suicide terrorism. Psychology of terrorism, 101-115.

Merari, Ariel (1998). "The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East." In Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, 192–207. Second edition, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press.

Meserole, C. & Byman, D. (2020). Terrorist Definitions and Designations List. What Technology Companies Need to Know. [Online] Available at:https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GRNTT-Paper-No.-7.pdf [Retrieved 13 June 2021]

Millare, Mark "Defeating ISIS in Iraq" *NCO Journal* Army University Press January 2019 #4

Miller, A. H. (2019). Introduction: International terrorism, a type of warfare. Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations, 1-13. doi:10.4324/9780429308642-1

Miller, S. (2009). *Terrorism and Counter: Terrorism*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Mishal, S., & Sela, A. (2006). *The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence*. Columbia University Press.

Moghadam, A. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second intifada: Motivations and organizational aspects. *Studies in conflict and terrorism*, *26*(2), 65-92

Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration. American Psychologist, 60 (2), 161. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161

Mohamed, A. J. (2016). Citizen Journalism and Conflict News Reporting: A Case Study of the Garissa University Terror Attack (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

Morgan M. J. (2009). The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything? Palgrave Macmillan.

Morrison, J. F. (2013). The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact of Organizational Splits. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Nacos, B. (2016). Mass-mediated terrorism: Mainstream and digital media in terrorism and counterterrorism. Rowman & Littlefield.

Nacos, B.L. (1994). Terrorism and the Media. From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City Bombing. New York, Columbia

Naheem, M. A. (2020). Morocco's market economy expansion and its successful strategy in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing. Journal of Money Laundering Control.

Nakhla, M. (2016). Terrorist financing & social media. *The Camstoll Group, United Nations*.

Nalbandov, R. (2013). Irrational Rationality of Terrorism. Journal of Startegic Security, 6(4).

Naor, M., & Shamir, A. (1994). *Visual cryptography*. Rehovot: Weizmann Institute of Science. Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science.

Narang, N., & Stanton, J. A. (2017). A strategic logic of attacking aid workers: evidence from violence in Afghanistan. International Studies Quarterly, 61(1), 38-51.

Natarajan, M. (Ed.). (2019). International and Transnational Crime and Justice. Cambridge University Press.

Nesser, P. (2004). *Jihad in Europe: A survey of the motivations for Sunni Islamist terrorism in post-millennium Europe*. Kjeller, Norway: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt.

Nesser, P. (2012). Perspectives on Terrorism Volume 6, Issue 6 71 December 2012.

Neumann, P. (2008). Terrorism in the 21st century the rule of law as a guideline for German policy. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Njoku, E. T. (2020). Merchants of Terror: Neo-Patrimonialism, Counterterrorism Economy, and Expansion of Terrorism in Nigeria. African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, 10(2), 83-107.

Obakhedo, N. O., & Igbinovia, D. O. (2020). Terror and Terrorism (I): The Path of History from Sicarii Zealots to Sons of Liberty. KIU Journal of Social Sciences, 6(3), 117-125.

O'Brien, M. (2012). Fluctuations between crime and terror: The case of Abu Sayyaf's kidnapping activities. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *24*(2), 320-336.

OECD (2019) Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax Auditors [Online] Available at: www.oecd.org/tax/crime/money-laundering-and-terroristfinancing-awareness-handbook-for-tax-examiners-andtaxauditors.pdf. [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Ogunmokun, O. A., Eluwole, K. K., Avci, T., Lasisi, T. T., & Ikhide, J. E. (2020). Propensity to trust and knowledge sharing behavior: An evaluation of importance-performance analysis among Nigerian restaurant employees. *Tourism Management Perspectives*, *33*, 100590.

O'Keefe, G. J., & Reid, K. (1990). The uses and effects of public service advertising. *Journal of Public Relations Research*, *2*(1-4), 67-91.

O'Keefe, G. J., & Reid, K. (1990). The uses and efiects of public service advertising. *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 2(1-4), 67-91.

Okoli, C. R. (2020). United States Counterterrorism Strategies and Al-Shabaab Terrorism in Somalia: Explaining the Gaps and Critical Junctures. Africa Peace Review, 16(1).

O'Leary, L. C. (2017). Targeting Detached Corporate Intermediaries in the Terrorist Supply Chain: Dial 2339/13224 for Assistance. Va. L. Rev., 103, 525.

Olsson, P. A. (2014). *The Making of a Homegrown Terrorist: Brainwashing Rebels in Search of a Cause*. ABC-CLIO.

Onuoha, F. (2013). Westgate Attack: Al-Shabab's Renewed Transnational Jihadism. Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, November 10.

Pape, R. A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American political science review*, 343-361.

Parker, M. (2018). Tackling Terrorist Fundraising and Finances. *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 2004.

Parliament. House of Commons (2002). *Part One: The continuing threat from paramilitary organisations*. Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Fourth Report. [Online] Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmniaf/978/97806.htm [Accessed 2 February 2021]

Passas, N. (2007). Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas. In *Terrorist Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (p. 31). Stanford University Press.

Peresin, A., & Cervone, A. (2015). The Western muhajirat of ISIS. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(7), 495-509.

Petallides, C. J. (2012). Cyber terrorism and IR Theory: realism, liberalism, and constructivism in the new security threat. Inquiries Journal, 4(03).

Phillips, B. J. (2014). Terrorist group cooperation and longevity. International Studies Quarterly, 58(2), 336-347.

Phillips, B. J. (2015). Deadlier in the U.S.? On lone wolves, terrorist groups, and attack lethality. Terrorism and Political Violence, 29(3), 533-549. doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1054927

Phillips, P. J., & Pohl, G. (2021). Behavioural Economics and Terrorism: Law Enforcement and Patterns of Behaviour. Routledge.

Piazza, J. A. (2020). Politician hate speech and domestic terrorism. International Interactions, 46(3), 431-453.

Picarelli, J. T., & Shelley, L. I. (2007). Organized crime and terrorism. Terrorism financing and state responses: A comparative perspective, 39-55.

Pieth, M. (200)2. *Financing terrorism*. Dordrecht, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, vi, 216 p.

Pieth, M. (2002). Financing of terrorism: following the money. In Financing Terrorism (pp. 115-126). Springer, Dordrecht.

Platt, S. (2015). Terrorism financing. In: *Criminal Capital* (pp. 138-152). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Plummer, C. (2012). Failed States and connections to terrorist activity. Justice Review, 22(4).

Polo, S. M. (2020). The quality of terrorist violence: Explaining the logic of terrorist target choice. Journal of peace research, 57(2), 235-250.

Post, J. M., Ali, F., Henderson, S. W., Shanfield, S., Victoroff, J., & Weine, S. (2009). The psychology of suicide terrorism. *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and biological processes*, *72*(1), 13-31.

Powell, K. A. (2018). Framing Islam/creating fear: An analysis of U.S. media coverage of terrorism from 2011–2016. Religions, 9(9), 257.

Primoratz, I. (1990). What is terrorism?. Journal of applied philosophy, 7(2), 129-138.

Quinn, M. D. (2001). Asymmetric warfare and the will to win. A thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California

Rachlin, H. (2004). The behavioral economics of violence. *Ann. NY Acad. Sci*, *1036*, 325-335.

Raczynski, S. (2020). Interactions between Terror and Anti-terror Organizations. In *Interacting Complexities of Herds and Social Organizations* (pp. 31-46). Springer, Singapore.

Rafizadeh, M. (2016). In first, Hezbollah confirms all financial support comes from Iran [Online] Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2016/06/25/In-first-Hezbollah-s-Nasrallah-confirms-all-financial-support-comes-from-Iran [Retrieved 20 Dec 2020]

Ragazzi, F. (2016). Suspect community or suspect category? The impact of counter-terrorism as 'policed multiculturalism'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42(5), pp.724-741.

Reedy, J., Gastil, J., & Gabbay, M. (2013). Terrorism and Small Groups. SAGE Journals, 44(6), pp.

Reinares, F. (2010). The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism. Survival, 52, 104 - 83.

Reisman, W. M. (1999). International legal responses to terrorism. Hous. J. Int'l L., 22, 3.

Richardson, L. (2007) "Britain and the IRA" in *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lesson from the Past* Washington DC: USIP Press

Richardson, L. (2007). *Democracy and counterterrorism: Lessons from the past*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Riggs, R. J. (2021). The Qatar–Iran–Turkey Nexus: Shifts in Political Alliances and Economic Diversification in the Gulf Crisis. In *The 2017 Gulf Crisis* (pp. 181-191). Springer, Singapore.

Roberts, N. C. (2011). Tracking and disrupting dark networks: Challenges of data collection and analysis. Information Systems Frontiers, 13(1), 5-19.

Rohner, D., & Frey, B. S. (2007). Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media. Public Choice, 133(1-2), 129-145.

Rosendorff, B., Sandler, P., & Sandler, T. (2004). The proactive response dilemma. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(5), pp.

Rosenthal, J. A. (2008). For-profit terrorism: The rise of armed entrepreneurs. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(6), 481-498.

Ross, J.I. and Gurr, T.R., 1989. Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada and the United States. Comparative Politics, 21(4), pp.405-426.

Roth, M. P., & Sever, M. (2007). The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as criminal syndicate: Funding terrorism through organized crime, a case study. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(10), 901-920.

Ruby, L. (2002). The Definition of Terrorism. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2

Saad, A., & Alhumaid, A. (2018, November). How terrorist groups use social networking media to attract and recruit new members. In 2018 International Conference on Innovations in Information Technology (IIT) (pp. 129-134). IEEE.

Sageman, M. (2008). *Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sageman, M. (2011). *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc.

Sageman, M. (2014). The stagnation in terrorism research. *Terrorism and political violence*, 26(4), 565-580.

Salami, I. (2018). Terrorism financing with virtual currencies: can regulatory technology solutions combat this? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41(12), 968-989.

Salehyan, I. (2008). No shelter here: Rebel sanctuaries and international conflict. *The Journal of Politics*, *70*(1), 54-66.

Sambo, U., & Sule, B. (2021). Financing as a Livewire for Terrorism: The Case of North-Eastern Nigeria. In Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in Global Financial Systems (pp. 157-182). IGI Global.

Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2008). Economic Consequences of Terrorism in Developed and Developing Countries an Overview. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sandler, T., Enders, W., & Lapan, H. E. (1991). Economic analysis can help fight international terrorism. *Challenge*, *34*(1), 10-17

Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2016). *Research methods for business students*. 8th edition. London: Pearson Education Limited.

Schmid, A. P. (2015). Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.

Schmitt, E. (2009). Many Sources Feed Taliban's War Chest. [Online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/asia/19taliban.html [Retrieved 10 July 2020]

Schneider, F., Brück, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2010). "The economics of terrorism and counter-terrorism: A survey" (Part II).

Schweitzer, Y. (2011). Innovation in Terrorist Organizations: The Case of PFLP and its Offshoots. Strategic Insights, 10(2), 23-24.

Scrivens, R., & Gaudette, T. (2021). Terrorists' and Violent Extremists' Use of the Internet and Cyberterrorism. In T. J. Holt (Ed.), Crime Online: Causes, Correlates and Context, Fourth Edition. Carolina Academic Press.

Sela-Shayovitz, R. (2007). Suicide bombers in Israel: Their motivations, characteristics, and prior activity in terrorist organisations. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV), 1(2), 160-168.

Seliktar, O., & Rezaei, F. (2020). Hezbollah in Lebanon: Creating the Model Proxy. In Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars (pp. 21-56). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Shamir, A. (1979). *How to share a secret*. Cambridge (MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Computer Science

Shands, G. (2020). Predictors of Lone Wolf Terrorism.

Shapir, Y. S. (2017). Hezbollah as an Army. Institute for National Security Studies Strategic Assessment, 19(4), 67-77.

Shapiro, C. (November 01, 1983). Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98,* 4, 659-679

Shapiro, J. (2013). *The Terrorist's Dilemma. Princeton*, New Jersey: Princetown University Press.

Shapiro, J. N. (2008). Bureaucracy and control in terrorist organizations. *Princeton Uni*.

Shapiro, J. N. (2012). Terrorist decision-making: insights from economics and political science. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *6*(4/5), 5-20.

Shapiro, J. N. (2015). Terrorists' dilemma - managing violent covert organizations

Shapiro, J. N., & Siegel, D. A. (2009). Underfunding in terrorist organisations. In Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism (pp. 349-382). Springer, Vienna.

Sharifi, H., & Fathpour, F. (2017). Requirements of countering terrorism in context of humanization of international law. *Journal of Legal Studies*, 9(2), 211-243.

Shiffman, Gary (2020). The Economics of Violence: How Behavioral Science Can Transform our View of Crime, Insurgency and Terrorism. Cambridge Press.

Sick, G. (2003). "Iran: Confronting Terrorism" Washington Quarterly, 26(4), 83-98.

Sikorski, T. A. (2014). *Airwaves and microblogs: A statistical analysis of Al Shabab's Propaganda Effectiveness.* A thesis submitted on the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

Silke, A. (2004). Becoming a Terrorist; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Singh, R. (2019). Suicide Terrorism. In *The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism* (p. 429). Oxford University Press.

Slater, M. D. (1995). 10 Choosing Audience Segmentation Strategies and. *Designing health messages: Approaches from communication theory and public health practice*, 186.

Socek, D., Magliveras, S. S., & 2005 IEEE International Conference on Electro Information Technology. (January 01, 2005). General access structures in audio cryptography.

Solomon, H. (2015). Al Shabaab in Somalia: between clan and faith. In *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa* (pp. 39-66). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Somer, E., Ruvio, A., Soref, E., & Sever, I. (2005). Terrorism, distress and coping: High versus low impact regions and direct versus indirect civilian exposure. *Anxiety, Stress, and Coping*, 18(3), 165-182.

Spencer, D. (2011). The evolution and implementation of FARC strategy: Insights from its internal documents. Security and Defense Studies Review, 12, 73-98.

Sprinzak, E & Denny L. (2003). The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with Thirty Five Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists', *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 15(1), 171–84.

Sprinzak, E. (January 01, 2000). Rational fanatics. *Foreign Policy.*

Staff, T (2019). The second son of Hamas leaves the terror group, exposing corruption, Turkish spy ring. February 26, 2020. [Online] Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/second-son-of-hamas-leaves-terror-group-exposing-corruption-turkish-spy-ring [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Staniland, P. S. (2010). Explaining cohesion, fragmentation, and control in insurgent groups (Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

Stemmann, Juan Jose Escobar "Middle East Salafism Influence and the Radicalization of Communities in Europe" MERIA Journal Vol. 10 No. 3 (September 2006)

Stepanova, E. (2008). Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects. SIPRI Research Reports. Oxford University Press.

Stout, M. E., Huckabey, J. M., & Schindler, J. R. (2008). *The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and operational views of Al Qaida and associated movements*. Annapolis, Md: Naval Inst. Press.

Study of Canada and the United States," Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4, July

Tahanout, K. (2021). "Financial technology prospects in the Middle East and Africa" Journal of Economic Growth and Entrepreneurship, 6(3), 14-25

Tavares, J. (2004). The open society assesses its enemies: shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks. *Journal of monetary economics*, 51(5), 1039-1070.

Teichmann, F. M., & Sergi, B. S. (2018). Compliance in Multinational Corporations: Business Risks in Bribery, Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing and Sanctions. Emerald Group Publishing.

Teiner, D. (2020). Cartel-Related Violence in Mexico as Narco-Terrorism or Criminal Insurgency. Perspectives on terrorism, 14(4), 83-98.

Telesur (2014). Bolivia Pays Tribute to Indigenous Leader Tupac Katari. *Telesur* .

The Africa Report May 7 2021

Tilly, C. (1977). From Mobilisation to Revolution [Online] Available at: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/50931/156.pdf [Retrieved 2 February 2021]

Tilly, C. (1978). *Collective violence in European perspective*. *PhD Thesis.*

Tokdemir E., Akcinaroglu S. (2018) To instill fear or love: Terrorist groups and the strategy of building a reputation. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35(4), 355–377.

Tokdemir, E. and Akcinaroglu, S., 2016. Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset: Measuring popularity of terror groups. Journal of Peace Research, 53(2), pp.268-277.

Torpey, K. (2018). "Bitcoin Laundering" Study: Where Do Criminals Turn to Mask Illicit Cryptoassets?

Trager, R., & Zagorcheva, D. (2006). Deterring Terrorism: It can be done. *International Security*, *30* (3), 118.

Trebin, M. P. (2019). The Phenomenon of terrorism: understanding the essence. Вісник ну" юридична академія україни імені ярослава мудрого". Серія: філософія, філософія права, політологія, соціологія [Bulletin of nu "yaroslav mudroy law academy of Ukraine". Series: philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology], 41(2), 88-102.

Trejo, G. and Ley, S. (2017). Why did drug cartels go to war in Mexico? Subnational party alternation, the breakdown of criminal protection, and the onset of large-scale violence. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(7), pp.900-937.

Trinkunas, H. (2019). Financing terrorism. The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323.

U.S. Army (2014) "Insurgency and Countering Insurgency" FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, C1 Department of the Army: Washington, DC

United Nations Development Programme "Measuring the Economic Impact of Violent Extremism in Africa" Report: 2019 University Press.

US Government Department of Defence. (2012). *Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan) Encyclopaedia: Islamist Extremism and Terrorism, Jihad and Sharia Law, Relationship to Hamas, Egyptian Uprising and the Ouster of Mubarak, Election of Mohamed Morsi.* Congress.

V.Khobragade, P., & Uke, N. (April 10, 2012). Cogent Sharing Of Covert File Using Audio Cryptographic Scheme. *International Journal of Applied Information Systems, 1,* 8, 1-4.

Van Eerten, J. J., Doosje, B., Konijn, E., de Graaf, B. A., & de Goede, M. (2017). Developing a social media response to radicalisation: The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalisation and deradicalisation.

Vittori, J. (2008). Idealism is not enough: the role of resources in the autonomy and capability of terrorist groups. Dissertation. University of Denver.

Volkan, V. (2014). *Blind trust: Large groups and their leaders in times of crisis and terror.* Pitchstone Publishing (US&CA).

Waller, J. (2007). Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing Oxford: Oxford University Press

Warrick, J. (2015). Black flags: The rise of ISIS. Anchor.

Webber, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2018). The social-psychological makings of a terrorist. Current opinion in psychology, 19, 131-134.

Weber, M. (1968). *On charisma and institution building* (Vol. 322). University of Chicago Press.

Wehrey, F. M., Green, J. D., Hansell, L., Nichiporuk, B., & Nader, A. (2009). *The rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the domestic roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps* (Vol. 821). Rand Corporation.

Weimann, Gabriel. Terrorist Migration to Social Media, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Vol. 16, No. 1 Georgetown University Press

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Canetti-Nisim, D. (2003). The social and religious characteristics of suicide bombers and their victims. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(3), 139-153.

Weiner, A. S. (2017). Just War Theory & the Conduct of Asymmetric Warfare. *Daedalus*, 146(1), 59-70.

Wendt A. (1995). Constructing International Politics, *International Security,* vol.20, no. (1), pp71–81.

Whittaker D. J., (2003). The Terrorism Reader, London: Routledge,

Wilkinson, P. (2011). Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response. Taylor & Francis.

Wilson, J. Q. (1989). *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.* New York: Basic Books.

Wing, S. D. (2019). Crisis and Intervention: Combating Terrorism in the Sahel. In Before Military Intervention (pp. 99-121). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Woudenberg, F. (1991). An evaluation of Delphi. *Technological forecasting and social change*, *40*(2), 131-150.

Wright-Neville, D., & Smith, D. (2009). Political rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion. Global Change, Peace & Security, 21(1), 85-98.

Yaghin, R. G., Ghomi, S. F., & Torabi, S. A. (2014). Pricing and lot-sizing decisions in retail industry: a fuzzy chance constraint approach. In Mathematics of Uncertainty Modeling in the Analysis of Engineering and Science Problems (pp. 268-289). IGI Global.

Yin, R. K. (1994). Discovering the future of the case study. Method in evaluation research. *Evaluation practice*, *15*(3), 283-290.

Young, J. K., & Dugan, L. (2014). Survival of the fittest: Why terrorist groups endure. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(2), 2-23.

Zabyelina, Y. (2019). The "capone discovery": Extortion as a method of terrorism financing. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 1-16.

Zelinsky, A., & Shubik, M. (2009). Research note: Terrorist groups as business firms: A new typological framework. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(2), 327-336.

Zhukov, Y. M. (2012). Counterinsurgency in a non-democratic state: The Russian example. In The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (pp. 293-307). Routledge.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. INFORMATION SHEET

TITLE: APPLYING A NEW BUSINESS MODEL TO THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Name of Researcher: Eisa Younes <eisayounes85@gmail.com>
School/ Faculty: Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid

I am a researcher from Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. I am asking you to take part in this research. Before you decide if you want to take part or not, I want to tell you why the research is being done, and what you can expect if you do take part. Please read what I have to say carefully. Ask me if you have any other questions. Please feel free to talk to others about the study if you wish. Take as much time as you like to decide. Thanks for reading this.

What is the purpose of the study?

The research aims to develop a business model of violent non-governmental organisations based on existing literature, refine the model in Delphi research, and validate it in a case study experiment. The interview / Delphi sessions are in a bid to contribute to the information needed to achieve the thesis objectives.

Why have I been asked to take part?

You have been contacted because we want to interview people who have knowledge and experience, either as academic persons, or as government practitioners, on the subject of terrorism. The discussions will mainly focus on ISIS post-2018 activities and behaviour. We will look at the organisational structure of the violent non-governmental organisation, key institutional processes, and overall hierarchy or business forms.

Do I have to take part?

No. It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not you want to take part. If you decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep. You will also be asked to sign a 'consent form'. If you decide to take part, you are still free to stop at any time without giving a reason. No questions will be asked if you stop. Deciding whether or not to take part in the study will not affect the standard of any care you may receive.

What will happen if I take part?

If you sign the consent form and send back the enclosed 'reply slip' (or return email in case, you received this interview invitation by email). Please proceed to confirm your willingness to participate in the interview and the researcher will discuss with you a suitable time. All interviews will be conducted in accordance with COVID-19 protocols using online meeting platforms (ie zoom or teams). The interview will take about 30 minutes of your time. The researcher will try to answer any questions you may have about the project.

What would the interview be like?

You can keep this information sheet – it will be given to you together with the 'consent form'. You should only sign this form or proceed to participate if you agree to take part in the interview. I will ask questions about what you think about ISIS, what your thoughts and feelings have been about their activities as a result of your exposure to the knowledge in your field of work or expertise. I will not ask about what you have done personally nor, will I ask you to produce names, location or any confidential details. I will not do any counselling or provide any advice to influence you in any way or form.

How long would the interview take?

The time it takes for the interviews vary, but we may most likely complete it within 30 to 40 minutes. In is important that you reserve at least 1 hour even though the interview may take half or less time. Remember, if you want to stop the interview at any time, you can do so without giving any reason at all.

What if I decide to withdraw after the interview has taken place?

If you decide to leave after the interview has taken place, all materials will be removed. Your response may be traced and removed from the interview responses. You will be debriefed after the interview to reconsider whether or not you wish to participate or edit your responses in any way or form.

What would happen after the interview?

I will label the interview responses with a code number and enter it into MAXQDA qualitative analysis software. If you wish, I will send a copy of the interview responses to a pre-arranged safe address. This will however assist in your decision to exclude your response.

How would the researcher use the interview response?

Your response would be used along with other interview response from between 5-6 other participants, in both fields of academia and practice, but with similar experiences and knowledge. All data use is strictly within the terms of the data regulatory acts of the UAE such as the Federal Decree Law No. 5 of 2012 on Combating Cybercrimes and the Federal Law 3 of 1987. The data are also in line with the data protection laws of Spain.

What will happen to my personal data in terms of storage and disposal?

For the interview, any personal data collected will be recoded to permit confidentiality and anonymity in the thesis report. Consent will be expressly received. All collected data including signed forms will be stored on secured computers on Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. Three years after completing the study, all personal data will be disposed of or completely deleted.

What are the benefits and disadvantages/ risks of taking part in the study?

There are no direct benefits to taking part in the study aside from the indirect contribution of knowledge to the broader academic scope. No form of financial rewards will be offered, and the findings will be shared with you upon request. The study will not affect you negatively in any way or form aside from the time you lose after choosing to participate. Your participation is absolutely confidential and will not be shared with anyone.

Who has reviewed the study?

This study was given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct by the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid Ethics Committee. If you wish to make a complaint about any aspect of the study, please contact me directly or my supervisor.

Contact for further information.

I hope that this information sheet has told you what you need to know before deciding whether or not to take part. If you have any queries at all about the project, please email me on: eisayounes85@gmail.com

Given the nature of this study, it is highly unlikely that you will suffer harm by taking part. If you wish to complain about any aspect of the way in which you have been approached or treated during the course of this study, you should contact any of the emails above.

Supervisor Name: Prof. Jose Maria Mella

Email: Josemaria.mella@gmail.com

APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM

TITLE: APPLYING A NEW BUSINESS MODEL TO THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Name of Researcher: Eisa Younes <eisayounes85@gmail.com>

School/ Faculty: Facu Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid

Dear Participant

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information provided for the above study. Also, I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. ☐

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw now, without giving a reason and that this will not affect legal rights. ☐

3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study will be anonymised and remain confidential, including participant emails - the researcher will delete it after three years. ☐

4. I agree for our organisation and workers to take part in the above study. ☐

5. I agree to conform to the Data Protection Act. ☐

Name of Participant: _____ Date: _____ Signature: _____

Name of Organization: _____

Name of Researcher: Eisa Younes Date: _____ Signature: _____

APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

US	EU/Spain	LA
Middle East		

	Likert 1 Strongly Disagree / *Muy en desacuerdo*	Likert 2 Disagree / *En desacuerdo*	Likert 3 Agree / *De acuerdo*	Likert 4 Strongly Agree / *Muy de acuerdo*
Abbreviated, short-form of questions for reference purposes.				
1 State sponsorship is more significant than ideology *El patrocinio estatal es más significativo que la ideología.*				
2 Discipline with force is more significant than organizational structure. *La disciplina es mas efectiva usando la fuerza que la estructura de una organización.*				
3 ISIS after 2018 has been successful at strategic adaptation. *ISIS ha tenido exito con su adaptación estratégica*				
4 Economic improvement is more important than using force. *Mejorar la economía es más util que el uso de la fuerza.*				
5 Rewarding defection is more important than using force. *Recompensar la deserción es más util que el uso de la fuerza.*				
6 Spending patterns have changed more than financial sources. *hábitos financieros han cambiado más que las fuentes financieras.*				
7 Exposing ISIS money laundering is more important exposing fundamentalism. *Revelar el lavado de dinero es más importante que revelar el fundamentalismo.*				
8 Targeting financing is more important than targeting operations. *Atacar el financiamiento es más importante que atacar las operaciones.*				
9 For authorities, international funding is more important than coordination. *Para los gobiernos, el financiamiento internacional es más importante que la coordinación.*				
10 ISIS marketing needs to be challenged on media. *El marketing de ISIS debe ser negado en las redes sociales.*				

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW GUIDE

TITLE: APPLYING A NEW BUSINESS MODEL TO THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Name of Researcher: Eisa Younes <eisayounes85@gmail.com>

School/ Faculty: Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid

Interview Number/Code: _____
Delphi Session: _____ of 3
Time:
_____
Respondent (code):
_____
Location: _____

Statement
This interview is conducted with reference to ISIS post-2018 activities as a terrorist group.

Terrorist group structure

Question 1: How do the ideological leaders of the terrorist organisation differ from traditional business ownership or shareholder?

Question 2: How do the operational managers of the terrorist organisation differ from the functional heads or middle level managers (techno-structures) of traditional entities?

Question 3: How do the fighters / front liners of the terrorist group differ from the workers of the traditional organisation?

Organisational Processes

Question 4: What kind of financing restrictions do ISIS face? In what ways do you think they overcome these restrictions to remain operational after losing their territory?

Question 5: What security restrictions do ISIS face, and how do they maintain internal and external security?

Question 6: How do ISIS recruit members at the local, regional, and international levels after they got defeated in Iraq and Syria?

Question 7: How do ISIS pursue efficiency (input over output)?

Question 8: In what ways do leadership maintain control over middle and lower-level ranks in ISIS? How may efficiency and control be inversely related?

Business formats



Question 9 Considering the various organisational structures presented above, how would you classify ISIS after losing terrority post-2018? Is ISIS of more than one format, or have it transformed?

Question 10: How would you describe their political and economic activities in terms of efficiency/control and security?

Question 11: How would counter-terrorism strategies work on ISIS considering the economic or business restrictions available to global political parties?

Thank you for your time!!!